






This symposium considers the broad topic of urban growth and the con-
trol or management of that growth by various techniques of government in-
tervention. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of legal de-
velopments in the growth management area. It is not designed to discuss or
catalogue each and every case. What it is intended to do, however, is to show
that the federal courts have consistently eschewed active intervention in this
area when, at the same time, selected state courts have made headlines
by intervening agressively in the land use regulation process.
State government's authority to regulate comprehensively the use of land
is derived from the police power.' States have the inherent power to legislate
to promote the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.' In
contrast, local governments only possess authority expressly or impliedly
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1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See generally D. HAGMAN,
URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 76-77 (1971).
2. The states are "the residual repository of all governmental power in the federal system." D.
MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 27 (1977). Typi-
cally this power is attributed to the tenth amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Thus, state legislatures can enact legislation with-
out specific statutory or constitutional authorization in the exercise of their inherent police pow-
ers. Federal and local governments, on the other hand, have limited power. A source of authority
must be identified for legislation enacted by these levels of government. In the absence of such a
source of power, legislation is unwarranted.
In many states courts have developed and incorporated into state constitutions a concept of
public purpose as a limitation on the state police power. Under this principle state legislatures
may not act for private, as opposed to public, purposes. See 6 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPO-
RATIONS § 24.09 (3d ed. 1969).
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granted by either state constitutional or legislative provisions.3 Typically, states
have delegated their police power authority in the land use control field to lo-
cal units of government by enactment of enabling legislation; 4 this allows local
governmental bodies to carry out land use planning and regulatory func-
tions .5
The general validity of a comprehensive governmental regulation of land
use and the permissibility of a local unit of government's exercising this au-
thority were established in the seminal Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.6 That deci-
sion involved a facial challenge to a suburban Cleveland village's comprehen-
sive zoning plan. In sustaining the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance,
the Court emphasized the neighborhood effects that emanate from any indi-
vidual's use of his own land. 7 Although these external effects did not reach so
far as to be considered a nuisance under traditional court-derived principles,
they legitimately served as a basis to warrant government regulatory interven-
tion.
Euclid, therefore, established two principles that have been pivotal in the
evolution of American land use law: (1) government in general may regulate
comprehensively land use patterns, even if a use prohibited by a zoning ordi-
nance would not be so noxious on its own to warrant a finding of nuisance;
and (2) state governments may delegate their regulatory authority in the land
use field to local units of government.
While establishing these broad propositions, the Court carefully an-
nounced principles of limitation which have served as important sources of lit-
igation challenging restrictive local government regulatory actions. First, while
rejecting the facial challenge in Euclid, the Court ruled that landowners have
the right to attack the constitutional validity of a zoning ordinance as applied
to their particular parcel of land. Alleged individualized injustice could be
3. See D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note 2, at 148-5 1.
4. State governments often adopt comprehensive enabling legislation that authorizes action by
local governments. Most states have used the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA) as a
general model. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, SSZEA (1926) reprinted in 3A RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING 765 (4th ed. 1979). The SSZEA authorized local governments to divide
their territory into districts, with regulations governing height, area, and bulk, in addition to use.
The SSZEA, and state statutes modeled after it, assumed that the purpose of local zoning laws
was to prohibit undesirable development, not to encourage desirable development.
The ALl Model Land Development Code (Official Draft No. 1, 1975) is designed to provide a
more modern framework for planning law than the SSZEA, a product of the 1920's. Like the
SSZEA, it also focuses on physical development of land, not social and economic objectives.
5. Local legislatures may not exceed the bounds of the power delegated to them. The so-
called "Dillon's Rule" confines these powers to those expressly granted to a local entity, those nec-
essary to or implied by powers expressly granted, and those essential to declared objectives of the
local entity. The rule is in essence one of strict construction against an expansive reading of state
enabling legislation. D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note 2, at 150.
6. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
7. Id. at 391-95.
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raised on a case by case basis even though the overall zoning power existed
and was exercised reasonably." In the subsequent Nectow v. City of Cambridge9
decision, the Court sustained the claim of an individual landholder who as-
serted that a zoning ordinance was invalid as applied to his parcel, thereby
giving explicit recognition to the pattern of land use challenges that would be
entertained in the post-Euclid era. Indeed, the Nectow case has influenced the
course of landowner challenges, establishing the existence of a federal consti-
tutional issue in the application of a local zoning ordinance.' 0
The second principle of limitation articulated in dictum in Euclid con-
cerned the authority of local governments to control land use. Although local
decision making units might well legislate in their own interests at the expense
of broader regional welfare, the Court suggested that there might be constitu-
8. Id. at 395.
9. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). The relief awarded in Nectow was an in-
junction against enforcement of the invalid land use restriction. This has been labeled the "Nectow
fallacy" by Professor Robert Ellickson, who suggests that a damages remedy would be more ap-
propriate than injunctive relief when a court invalidates a land use restriction against private
property. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385,
490 (1977). See generally notes 607-21 and accompanying text infra.
10. Since the Nectow decision in 1928 the Supreme Court has not been active in adjudicating
individual landowner grievances against allegedly oppressive land use regulations. Nectow arose
during the activist economic substantive due process era when governmental restrictions on pri-
vate rights were routinely invalidated as arbitrary and unreasonable. More recent Supreme Court
decisions suggest a more permissive attitude in regard to regulation of private property, as one
would expect given the erosion of the economic substantive due process doctrine in the last forty
years. In the 1978 Penn Central decision the Court indicated the wide scope of governmental
regulatory power in the land use area. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978). See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962).
Surprisingly, the constitutional doctrine of "taking" has evolved in state courts in a way more
consistent with the decisions of the economic substantive due process era than with the more re-
cent decisions that reflect the demise of economic substantive due process as a viable federal con-
stitutional doctrine. This is partially explained by the Supreme Court's reluctance to involve itself
with these cases. State courts continue to rely upon the Euclid-Nectow guidelines.
Much of the confusion in the area, however, may be traced to the earlier decision in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal, a coal company had
sold surface rights to a property while retaining rights to subsurface minerals. The Pennsylvania
legislature enacted legislation that barred owners of subsurface mineral rights from exploiting
those resources if surface properties would be significantly impaired. The Supreme Court invali-
dated the act.
Instead of holding the statute unconstitutional under a traditional economic due process analy-
sis, the Court introduced the concept of "taking." Justice Holmes suggested that when regulation
went too far, the governmental regulatory activity constituted a "taking" of private property that
must be compensated. The difference between taking and regulation was one of degree, not
kind. Thus, Pennsylvania Coal, which suggests that a different form of analysis is appropriate in
"taking" situations than is used in the economic substantive due process area, has helped spawn
the apparent divergence between the zoning cases, in which judicial review is still seriously exer-
cised, and the other economic regulatory areas, in which judicial review is essentially a rubber
stamp of legislative judgments. See Section V, D., infra.
For criticism of the Pennsylvania Coal approach, see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE
TAKING ISSUE 124-95 (1973).
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tional limits on the authority of local units of government to control land use
when parochial interests were clearly outweighed by overriding regional
needs.1" Presumably, there could be a point beyond which a local political
unit, unaccountable to any political constituency other than its own resident
voters, could not act on issues of regional import. That is, the Court's dictum
implied that, although promotion of local welfare was generally an appropri-
ate frame of reference for local zoning measures, there were undefined con-
stitutional boundaries to the ability of local governments to favor their own
welfare at the expense of the broader common good.
The fundamental principles established in Euclid have influenced the for-
mat of subsequent land use litigation (the vast bulk of it in state courts). The
Nectow-style challenges have focused on the rationales for ard reasonableness
of specific restrictions on the use of land. Over time, state courts developed a
comprehensive body of case law based on Euclid and Nectow, but it was not
until Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead in 1962 that the Supreme Court again en-
tered the arena. 2 Its intervention in Goldblatt and since1 3 has resulted in an
increasingly permissive approach toward governmental regulation of land use.
With respect to the Euclid dictum concerning a local unit's possible regional
duties, the Supreme Court has declined numerous invitations to develop dic-
tum into doctrine.1 4 The Court's reticence in developing the regionalism dic-
tum and its narrowing of the Nectow opening have meant that federal court
challenges to local land use regulations have met with scant success. Some
state courts, however, have asserted themselves actively in the land use area,
building on the Nectow" and regionalism1 6 openings. As a consequence, they
have inserted themselves aggressively in the policy making proccess that in-
volves balancing collective with individual interests and regional with local
concern.
This article will discuss some of the techniques of intervention adopted by
the state courts, built upon the Euclid dicta and the Nectow decision. It will
show how the rationales developed by the state courts have been resisted by
the federal courts, which have not only declined to look seriously at regional
considerations, but have also undercut much of the basis for federal interven-
tion even in Nectow situations. Finally, the article will examine two statutory
11. 272 U.S. at 389-90.
12. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
13. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
14. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See also James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137 (1971).
15. See National Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
16. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135
Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle,
38 N.Y. 2d 102, 341 N.E. 2d 236, 378 N.Y.S. 2d 672 (1975); Township of Willistown v.
Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
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At the outset, it is helpful to trace briefly the evolving perceptions of the
problem of suburban growth controls. Planning and regulation of land use
through zoning were easy to promote as techniques for coping with widely
recognized external effects of land usage. The judge-made law of nuisance
was seen by planning proponents as something of a blunderbuss, requiring an
egregious interference by one landowner with the interests of another before
a judicial remedy could be invoked. It was not difficult to make the case that
governmental intervention was appropriate at some stage prior to a finding of
nuisance, provided the intervention was aimed at protecting individual prop-
erty owners or members of the community generally from a harm imposed by
a contextual misuse of land.17
But as is so often the case when governmental intervention is sought, the
justification for intervention in the abstract may command consensus while
specific application of governmental policy elicits conflict. The idea of estab-
lishing zones where specified uses would be restricted seemed reasonable
enough as a means for protecting certain roses from designated weeds."8
Thus, exclusion of factories from residential areas-even where nuisance law
would not warrant injunctive relief' 9-seemed a justifiable form of govern-
mental regulation. But since the theory of zoning was inherently exclusionary,
the inevitable issues would and did arise: What are roses and which ones are
worthy of protection and appropriate to protect? Is it appropriate to protect a
rose, not from weeds, but from honeysuckle? Furthermore, at what cost is it
acceptable to maintain large rose gardens when planters of other worthy flow-
ers are clamoring for more space to cultivate their favorite seedling?2 °
17. Some commentators, however, have expressed skepticism about the value of zoning as an
effective form of land use regulation. They suggest that conflicts among neighboring landowners
might be better resolved by systems less centralized than those of master planning and zoning.
These commentators prefer to rely on private, non-regulatory alternatives, such as covenants. See
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U.
CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973); Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 71 (1970).
18. The form of zoning upheld in Euclid was hierarchical. The most restrictive zone permitted
only single-family residences. Since each lower use category added permissible uses while also al-
lowing the higher use classification in that zone, single-family residences were permitted in all
zones. This form of hierarchical or cumulative zoning has been labeled Euclidian.
19. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 222, 257 N.E. 2d 870, 871, 309
N.Y.S. 2d 312, 314 (1970).
20. For consideration of these issues in the context of zoning ordinances that restrict mobile
homes, compare the New Jersey decision in Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester Tnshp., 37
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These exclusionary issues were never far from the surface in zoning con-
troversies even in the Euclid case. In sustaining a comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance, the Court acknowledged that some uses "of an innocent character
might fall within the proscribed class."'" Nevertheless, a restrictive regulatory
scheme would not be stricken for. overinclusiveness because some "reasonable
margin to insure effective enforcement" 22 was necessary in light of the diffi-
culty in drawing distinctions between compatible and less compatible uses.
But for the Euclid Court, it was the exclusion of apartments and all busi-
ness and commercial uses from residential districts that posed the most trou-
blesome aspect of the case. 23 Looking at the issue from the perspective of the
landowner, the Court was concerned that the exclusion of apartments from
residential areas unjustifiably foreclosed a profitable and productive use. To
Justice Sutherland and a property-rights oriented Court, what apparently was
persuasive for permitting the exclusion was the argument that apartments can
be "parasites '2 4 in single-family residential neighborhoods. That is, they "take
advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings ' 25 created by the
single-family residences.
Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed by others
bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to
increased traffic and business . . . until, finally, the residential character of the
neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached residences are utterly
destroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment houses, which in a different
environment would be not only entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable,
come very near to being nuisances.
26
Consequently, it was the perception of negative external effects from apart-
ment houses that led the Court in Euclid to legitimize exclusion of apartment
houses from single-family residential areas. The exclusionary impact indeed
was the primary justification for that particular land use restriction. Neverthe-
less, Justice Sutherland's description of the negative effect was carefully con-
fined to physical impacts-blocking the rays of sun, increasing noise and traf-
fic.2 7
It did not take much imagination for planners and local government offi-
cials, however, to perceive and act on the opportunity left open by Euclid. Ra-
tionales for restrictive land use controls expanded from the protection against
N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 (1962), with the dissent of Justice
Hall in that decision, id. at 245, 181 A.2d at 140, and the Rhode Island decision in Town of
Glocester v. Olivo's Mobile Home Court, Inc., 111 R.I. 120, 300 A.2d 465 (1973).
21. 272 U.S. at 389.
22. Id. at 388.
23. Id. at 390.
24. Id. at 394.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 394-95.
27. Id.
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physical side effects to the amorphous concept of "preserving the character"
of a community. Use of this broader rationale made distinct what had only
been gossamer earlier-that zoning and other regulatory tools in the hands of
local government could be used to influence the socioeconomic character of a
community. Thus the concept of "exclusionary zoning" was born, a phrase
that is something of a misnomer since zoning is necessarily exclusionary, but
nevertheless communicative of a sentiment that local governments were wield-
ing land use tools as a means of shaping the socioeconomic (and perhaps ra-
cial) composition of their communities. 2
State courts legitimated the "character of the community" rationale,
permitting local units of government considerable discretion in determining
what land uses were entitled to protection and the degree of protection to be
afforded. A particularly explicit example of judicial solicitude for the subur-
ban community's exclusionary interests was the opinion of Chief Justice
Vanderbilt for the New Jersey Supreme Court in the 1952 case of Lionshead
Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne. 29 The challenge in Lionshead Lake involved a
minimum dwelling size ordinance, which meant that 80 percent of the ex-
isting buildings in parts of the township were out of compliance.
30
The court sustained the ordinance on two separate grounds. First, and less
significantly in this context, Chief Justice Vanderbilt credited the township's
mental health rationale-that the township could impose reasonable minimum
dwelling size requirements because of the adverse psychological effects of
overcrowding on the family. 3 1 Second, and more consequential for this dis-
cussion, the court accepted the view that dwelling size influences the charac-
ter of the community, and "minimum floor-area standards are necessary to
protect the character of the community. '32 The character of the community
rationale was separated explicitly from the public health justification by Chief
Justice Vanderbilt:
But quite apart from these considerations of public health which cannot be
overlooked, minimum floor-area standards are justified on the ground that
they promote the general welfare of the community and . . . the courts . . .
take a broad view of what constitutes general welfare.
33
The implications of the majority opinion in Lionshead Lake were not lost on
Justice Oliphant, who dissented "from the philosophy and the result arrived
28. See generally Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 1051 (1953); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent,
21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969). For a summary of issues involved in exclusionary zoning, see
Bigham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An Examination of the Current Controversy, 25 VAND.
L. REV. 1111 (1972).
29. 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
30. Id. at 168, 89 A.2d at 694.
31. Id. at 173, 89 A.2d at 697.
32. Id. at 174, 89 A.2d at 697.
33. Id.
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at in the majority opinion. ' '34 He observed that the township's minimum
dwelling size ordinance precluded individuals who could not afford the requi-
site size house "from ever establishing a residence"35 in Wayne Township. 36
In his classic dissent ten years later in the Vickers37 case, in which a ban on
mobile homes was upheld, Justice Hall noted that relaxed judicial review of
suburban zoning decisions gave "almost boundless freedom to developing mu-
nicipalities to erect exclusionary walls on their boundaries, according to local
whim or selfish desire, and to use the zoning power for aims beyond its legiti-
mate purposes."3 He was particularly critical of the expanded scope of per-
missible purposes the courts had accepted as justifications for zoning. Justice
Hall proposed that the only permissible purpose to justify zoning should be to
promote physical planning objectives, not the vague "character of the commu-
nity ''a notions approved in Lionshead Lake and subsequent decisions:
We should not forget some fundamentals. Zoning is land use control by phys-
ical planning to bring about physical results for public, not private, welfare. It
is not a device to be used to accomplish any and all purportedly desirable so-
cial results unrelated to the statutorily stated purposes .... Certainly "general
welfare" does not automatically mean whatever the municipality says it does,
regardless of who is hurt and how much. And no matter how broadly the
concept is viewed, it cannot authorize a municipality to erect a completely iso-
lationist wall on its boundaries. 40
Over time, the concerns expressed in the Lionshead Lake and Vickers dis-
sents, amplified by numerous commentators, 41 focused on both the purpose
promoted by local land use restrictions and the effect of those limitations.
The next Section will consider the approaches developed by state courts in
Pennsylvania and New Jersey to the problem of exclusionary zoning-to com-
bat the perceived inequity of restrictive local land use regulations. In Section
IV the states of New York and California will be used to illustrate the more
permissive attitude that has evolved to restrictive land use policies designed to
manage urban growth.
34. Id. at 181, 89 A.2d at 701.
35. Id.
36. Id. For more extensive analysis of the Lionshead Lake opinion see Haar, supra note 28. See
also Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 193, 336
A.2d 713, 735 (1975) (Pashman, J., concurring).
37. Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S.
233 (1963).
38. Id. at 252-53, 181 A.2d at 140.
39. Id. at 261-63, 181 A.2d at 145.
40. Id.
41. See Haar, supra note 28; Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom-In Brief Reply, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 986 (1954); Sager, supra note 28.
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III
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: PENNSYLVANIA AND NEW JERSEY
As a litigation strategy, plaintiffs who sought to challenge local land use
regulations could formulate an attack on the basis of either purpose or effect.
Under a purpose approach the rationale would be, as Justice Hall had sug-
gested, that the exclusionary goals were impermissible under either the police
power or the enabling legislation. 42 The purpose analysis could have two fac-
ets. The state's inherent police power requires that legislation be in further-
ance of a public health, safety, morals, or general welfare objective-that is, it
must promote a public purpose. 4 One approach would emphasize that
preservation of the character of a community, with its implicit or explicit
socioeconomic overtones and undercurrents, is an impermissible private
rather than public purpose.4 4 The second form of purpose challenge would
rely on the language of the state enabling legislation, arguing that specific im-
plementation devices adopted by local governments were not authorized by
the pertinent state enabling legislation.
4 5
The purpose analysis, from a plaintiff's perspective, raises serious prob-
lems of proof.4 6 It requires the production of evidence of intent, not always
easy to uncover, and, furthermore, encourages well counseled local govern-
ments to inhibit litigation duplicitously by creating a suitably antiseptic public
record. 47 For plaintiffs, therefore, an effect standard has the distinct advan-
tage of being more objectively determinable, thereby increasing the prospects
of success in litigation. The problem in seeking an effect standard is to estab-
lish a convincing rationale for its adoption.
42. 37 N.J. at 261, 181 A.2d at 145.
43. Legislation may not serve purely private interests. 6 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 2.
44. The Kohn court used this reasoning:
There is no doubt that many of the residents of this area are highly desirous of keeping
it the way it is, preferring, quite naturally, to look out upon land in its natural state
rather than on other homes. These desires, however, do not rise to the level of public
welfare. This is purely a matter of private desire which zoning regulations may not be
employed to effectuate.
419 Pa. at 531, 215 A.2d at 611.
45. This is the approach of Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W. 2d
322 (1971). Compare it and the dissenting opinion in Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.
2d 359, 383, 285 N.E. 2d 291, 305, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138, 156 (1972) (Breitel, J., dissenting), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972), with the Golden majority, 30 N.Y. 2d at 370-71, 285 N.E. 2d at
297, 334 N.Y.S. 2d at 145-46 for an illustration of varying interpretations of enabling legislation
language.
46. See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Leg-
islative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
47. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68
(1977), the Court listed factors which could lead to a finding of impermissible purpose. That list
could be used as a virtual handbook of duplicity to well-counseled local governments who seek to
cover their tracks.
PROLEGOMENON
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
At least two grounds are typically advanced for justifying an effect analy-
sis. The first is primarily an evidentiary rationale, where the occurrence of an
event is so likely to have resulted from an improper action that proof of the
result is deemed sufficient, at least to make out a prima facie case. In these
situations-the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is an example 4S-the showing
of an effect casts the burden of going forward with rebuttal evidence on the
party that might have better access to data and thereby be in a better position
to present evidence. In this context, the reliance on an effect standard does
not alter the basic underlying theory of liability. It is essentially an evidentiary
allocation of the burden of adducing evidence, shifting some of the responsi-
bility to a defendant once a prima facie showing of impact has been estab-
lished by a plaintiff. The defendant, however, has an oportunity to rebut the
prima facie case by presenting evidence that refutes the inference of im-
proper purpose. 49
A second justification for an effect test is more substantive in character. In
this context, the showing of an impact is conclusive in finding liability.50 Be-
fore this form of liability formula makes sense, however, there must be a
prior determination that a substantive duty or obligation exists whose breach
can be ascertained purely on the basis of a numerical showing. This use of
impact evidence changes the fundamental theoretical basis for liability because
purpose no longer is relevant even theoretically in determining culpability. An
outcome deemed unsatisfactory is sufficient to impose liability under this for-
48. Res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself") is a form of circumstantial evidence used
in tort cases. One may infer both negligence and causation from the mere occurrence of an event
and a defendant's relation to it if: (a) the event would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negli-
gence; (b) evidence eliminates other responsible causes; and (c) the indicated negligence is within
the scope of the defendant's duty to the injured party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 328D
(1966). This inference is not irrebuttable. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 233-35
(4th ed. 1971).
49. This seems to be the approach adopted by the federal courts in race discrimination mat-
ters. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21
(1977). See also Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
50. The tort counterpart to this is the doctrine of strict liability. In some circumstances a de-
fendant may be held strictly liable for harm caused by his actions without an indication of wrong-
doing on his part or even a departure by him from a reasonable standard of care. W. PROSSER,
supra note 48, at 495. The most widespread application of the concept is in the products liability
field. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, stupra note 48, at § 402 A and Commentary. The defend-
ant is held liable because of a social decision on risk allocation and compensation, not because of
individualized determinations of culpability. W. PROSSER, supra note 48, at 495. For economic cri-
tiques of the doctrine, see Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Posner,
Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).
In some circumstances, defendants may be able to justify their behavior because of an
overriding interest. That is, despite the normally impermissible impact of specified conduct, a
court may decide that the result must be countenanced in particular circumstances where
offsetting values are necessarily implicated. That approach, characteristic of the strict scrutiny
form of federal equal protection review, has been applied by the eighth circuit in a Fair Housing
context. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). See generally notes
649--68 infra.
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mulation; rebuttal evidence concerning purpose is beside the point.
Given this overview of purpose and effect theories of liability, it remains to
consider the cases in which the state courts have developed rationales for
striking exclusionary land use regulations. Developments in Pennsylvania will
be examined in some depth and compared with parallel doctrines in New Jer-
sey, New York and California.
A. Pennsylvania
One of the most significant plaintiff's cases is the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision in National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn. 5' Kohn involved a
challenge to the validity of a four-acre minimum lot size legislated by a subur-
ban community. Justice Roberts approached the problem from the perspec-
tive of the landowner whose land had been effectively devalued by govern-
mental regulations52 and from the perspective of the potential residents to
whom a locality had some undefined duty of nonexclusion.5 3 From the court's
opinion, holding invalid the large lot provision of Easttown Township, it was
clear that the burdensome impact on land values weighed especially heavily in
the court's determination. Thus, Justice Roberts warned that zoning "involves
governmental restrictions upon a landowner's constitutionally guaranteed
right to use his property, unfettered, except in very specific instances, by gov-
ernmental restrictions."5 4 Justice Roberts said that the complexity of the issues
involved should not lead courts to abdicate "their judicial responsibility to
protect the constitutional rights of individual citizens."5 5
Concerned about governmental restrictions on private property interests,
the court proceeded to address the issue of appropriate governmental ob-
jectives in land use regulation matters. In clear terms, the court held that sub-
urban communities could not "shirk their responsibilities" to shoulder the
"economic burdens which time and natural growth invariably bring."56 In an
often quoted passage, Justice Roberts noted that the purpose of zoning is to
"plan for . . . not . . . deny the future."57 If a reasonable use of land meant
the public investment would be necessary to accommodate development, then
the court was prepared to impose a duty of accommodation on the locality.
Local governments would not be permitted to use large lot zoning as a means
of avoiding the fiscal impact of growth on public expenditures nor as a means
of protecting the old-time ambience of a suburban community.
In formulating a standard by which to judge suburban land use restric-
51. 419 Pa. 504. 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
52. Id. at 522, 215 A.2d at 607.
53. Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
54. Id. at 522, 215 A.2d at 607.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 528, 215 A.2d at 610.
57. Id.
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tions in Kohn the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used a purpose analysis. Al-
though it was apparent that the court envisioned chaos if localities were
permitted to deny to a growing population sites for residential development
within the means of "at least a significant segment of the people," 8 and, as a
consequence, concluded that the concept of general welfare necessitated a broad-
er focus than the parochial interests of a local unit of government, neverthe-
less, in articulating its conclusion, the court wrote in terms of purpose or intent:
A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of new-
comers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the
administration of public services and facitities can not be held valid .... It is
clear ... that the general welare is not fostered or promoted by a zoning or-
dinance designed to be exclusive and exclusionary.5 9
Consequently, in Kohn the court held invalid a large lot zoning ordinance be-
cause the purpose was impermissibly parochial and exclusionary. For the
Pennsylvania court, the preservation of the character of the community for
the benefit of existing landowners was not a public but a private purpose.
6 0
While government could not protect the interests of the large estates, it also
could not regulate restrictively the lot size of developments in order to keep
public expenditures down. The court invoked the as yet undefined notion of
regional responsibility to conclude that the four acre minimum lot size re-
quirements impermissibly interfered with the landowner's constitutionally pro-
tected property rights. But the court's language seemed limited to the situa-
tion where the community intended to restrict development for one of the
purposes the court had deemed improper.
It was not long, however, before the Pennsylvania court expanded the lan-
guage in Kohn to establish an effect standard. This was done without any fan-
fare, merely by announcing that Kohn established more than it had seemed to:
"We decided in National Land [Kohn] that a scheme of zoning that has an ex-
clusionary purpose or result is not acceptable in Pennsylvania."' 1 Thus, in
1970, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held invalid a two acre minimum lot
size because it was not "a necessary size for the building of a house. '62 While
minimum lot sizes were not inherently unreasonable,6 3 a two acre minimum
would be considered unreasonable prima facie "[a]bsent some extraordinary
justification .64
In Kit-Mar Builders, Concord Township sought to justify the two and
58. Id.
59. Id. at 532-33, 215 A.2d at 612 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 531,215 A.2d at 611. See note 44 supra.
61. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. 439 Pa. 466, 470, 268 A.2d 765, 766 (1970) (emphasis
added).
62. Id. at 471, 268 A.2d at 767 (emphasis in original).
63. Id. at 470, 268 A.2d at 766.
64. Id. at 471, 268 A.2d at 767.
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three acre minima primarily on the basis of potential sewerage problems.
Relying on Kohn, the court rejected potential sewerage problems as an "ex-
cuse" for "exclusionary zoning. '65 Justice Roberts regarded Kohn as having
established that because there are "alternative methods for dealing with
nearly all the problems that attend a growth in population, including sewage
problems, zoning which had an exclusive purpose or effect could not be
allowed.
66
The engrafting of the effect language on the purpose analysis of Kohn cer-
tainly reflected an expansion of the Kohn formulation by Kit-Mar Builders.
There is no question that Justice Roberts in Kit-Mar Builders placed greater
emphasis on the duty of localities to accommodate the interests of prospective
residents than he had in Kohn. He acknowledged the importance of the inter-
ests of prospective newcomers in a footnote: "Although National Land [Kohn],
and this problem in general, is postured as involving the constitutional due
process rights of the land-owner whose property has been zoned adversely to
his best interests, it cannot realistically be detached from the rights of other
people desirous of moving into the area 'in search of a comfortable place to
live.' "67 He also carefully reaffirmed the duty of suburban communities to ac-
commodate growth: a community cannot "keep out people, rather than make
community improvements. "6 That is, "communities must deal with the prob-
lems of population growth . . . . It is not for any given township to say who
may or may not live within its confines, while disregarding the interest of the
entire area." 69
Given the stress on a locality's duty to prospective residents to accommo-
date rather than thwart growth, it is arguable that the effect language of Kit-
Mar Builders made proof of purpose immaterial. The court outlined permissi-
ble ways by which communities could cope with development efficiently,
prominently espousing the flexibility of the planned unit development,70
which had been approved by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1968.71
What is left unanswered is whether the community that uses planned unit de-
velopment techniques would be subject to judicial second guessing if it chose a
balance of land use patterns not in conformity with maximum balanced resi-
dential development. Indeed, if some substantive regional duty underlay the
decision in Kit-Mar Builders, the contour of that standard was not identified or
articulated but remained submerged. The court, for example, made no state-
65. Id. at 472, 268 A.2d at 767.
66. Id. at 473, 268 A.2d at 768.
67. Id. at 474 n.6, 268 A.2d at 768 n.6 (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768.
69. Id. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768-69.
70. Id. at 475-76, 268 A.2d at 769. For a thorough legal discussion of planned unit develop-
ment, see Symposium: Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 3 (1965).
71. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
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ment about whether the local community has a special duty to accommodate
prospective residents from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds.
The vagueness of the regional duty established in Kit-Mar Builders made it
difficult to apply an effect test in a substantive way: The proof of what impact,
standing alone, would make out a constitutional violation? Rather, it seems
probable that the court was adopting the effect standard as an evidentiary de-
vice. Once it could be shown that there were less restrictive land use controls
consistent with admittedly valid local environmental concerns, the burden of
justifying the more restrictive controls fell on the local zoning officials. The
court undercut many of the permissible purposes often utilized by local offi-
cials to justify restrictive land use regulations,7 2 but the suggestion that
planned unit development was a preferred mechanism for accommodating
growth implied that certain undefined strategies of balancing economic with
housing interests might be acceptable.
This view would indicate that Kit-Mar Builders added an effect component
to the Kohn purpose formulation in order to facilitate a plaintiff's satisfying
his burden of proof; it shifted the responsibility to the local government to
justify its land use control system once a prima facie exclusionary effect were
shown.7" However, no clearly articulable substantive regional duty was estab-
72. The court eliminated use of sewerage problems, housing, school and recreational facility
needs, traffic congestion, and public transportation costs as grounds for restrictive zoning. 439
Pa. at 475, 268 A.2d at 769. Aesthetic considerations, such as maintaining rural or historic sur-
roundings, were also rejected. Id. at 472 n.5, 268 A.2d at 767 n.5.
73. That Kit-Mar Builders can be read as an intermediate step from Kohn is supported first by
the plurality nature of Justice Roberts' opinion. Chief Justice Bell's concurrence relied exclusively
on the landowner's interests in being free from unreasonable governmental regulation and
avoided mention of the regional duties discussed by Justice Roberts' plurality opinion. Moreover,
the two dissenting opinions stressed that they disagreed with the plurality in terms of allocating
the burden of proof. For example, Justice Jones argued that it was plaintiff's obligation to prove
that the zoning legislation under attack was arbitrary, thereby overcoming the presumption of va-
lidity that normally attaches to regulatory measures. Id. at 486-89, 268 A.2d at 774-75.
The plurality opinion itself lends support,to this interpretation. In dismissing purported ration-
ales for the two and three acre minima other than potential sewage problems, Justice Roberts
called them "so clearly makeweights as to barely require comment." Id. at 472 n.5, 268 A.2d at
767 n.5. There is other evidence that the plurality thought the township's alleged justifications
were mere shams for an impermissible exclusionary motive. For example, it labeled "patently ri-
diculous" the argument that large lot zoning was needed for proper on-site sewerage. Id. at 476,
268 A.2d at 769. Cf. id. at 486, 268 A.2d at 774. (Jones, J., dissenting) (by implication). Justice
Roberts painstakingly discussed and sought to refute as disingenuous the township's sewage ra-
tionale by presenting materials from state regulations about percolation rates. His conclusion was
that "[ilt is obviously sheer fantasy for the township to claim that, because of an on-site sewerage
problem, houses cannot be built on a one acre lot, but can be built on a three acre lot." Id. at 478,
268 A.2d at 770. From this detailed analysis, the plurality concluded that the township's actions
were "[tihinly veiled justifications for exclusionary zoning" which could not be countenanced by
the court. Id.
The court's emphasis on the apparently exclusionary purposes behind the two and three acre
lot size requirements suggests that the effect standard articulated in Kit-Mar Builders served a
burden-shifting function, and that the plurality was not persuaded that the township could justify
its zoning regulations on nonexclusionary grounds. The dissenters declined to permit a showing
[Vol. 43: No. 2
Page 5: Spring 1979]
lished. At least it seemed plausible that rebuttal evidence on purpose or intent
would be relevant if presented on behalf of the locality. To be sure, the
scope of permissible purposes was narrow, so the circle of discretion was self-
evidently closing in that sense. But at least Kit-Mar Builders left open the infer-
ence that a community's motivation was germane on the issue of liability.
In Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc.7 4 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court moved a step closer to establishing an effect standard as a sub-
stantive requirement rather than as a burden-shifting evidentiary device. It
did this by expanding on its earlier decision in Appeal of Girsh75 and by
adopting the "fair share" concept as it had been developed several months
earlier by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the well known decision, Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel.76
Chesterdale Farms was bought by a developer who sought to build apart-
ments on a tract of land not zoned for apartments. 77 Initially, the township
had not provided for any apartment zones; the developer's proposal to build
them was accordingly rejected by the town.7 8 Subsequently, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ruled in the Girsh79 case that a suburban community's land
use plan which did not provide for apartments was unreasonable and there-
fore invalid. In response to Girsh, Willistown Township rezoned 80 acres (out
of the township's 11,589 acres) to permit apartment dwellings. Chesterdale
Farms' land was unaffected by the rezoning, and it argued successfully that
the rezoning of 80 acres was "tokenism" and thereby violated the principle
announced in Girsh.8 0
In sustaining the developer's challenge, the court adopted the "fair share"
standard, imposing on a community an affirmative duty in its land use plan to
provide for prospective regional housing needs by permitting a variety of
housing choices to current or prospective residents."' The court concluded
that the allocation of 80 out of 11,589 acres for apartments was "exclusion-
ary" in that it did not provide for a fair share of the township acreage for
of effect to alter the traditional allocation of the burden of proof, which required a plaintiff to
overcome the presumption of validity that attaches to governmental action. Kit-Mar Builders,
therefore, does seem to stop short of adopting the form of effect test that would make rebuttal
evidence concerning purpose immaterial. On the other hand, however, it became clear after Kit-
Mar Builders that the range of permissible goals a local government could pursue in the land use
area was extraordinarily circumscribed in Pennsylvania.
74. 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
75. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (holding invalid a zoning ordinance which totally ex-
cluded apartments from a township).
76. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
77. 462 Pa. at 447, 341 A.2d at 467.
78. Id.
79. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
80. 462 Pa. at 447, 341 A.2d at 467.
81. Id. at 448-50, 341 A.2d at 468.
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apartment construction. 2 The Pennsylvania court was circumspect in its
discussion of fair share and, unlike the New Jersey court from which it bor-
rowed the term s3 made little effort to refine its meaning. No definition was
set out and virtually no mode of analysis for future cases was articulated. Nev-
ertheless, the expansion of the Girsh rule on barring total exclusion of apart-
ments and the adoption of the regional fair share language were strong indi-
cations that a new type of effect analysis was evolving. In Chesterdale Farms the
court seemed to focus on outcomes that it deemed unacceptable, namely what
it considered a practice of "selective admission""4 and a concomitant failure to
shoulder a responsibility to accommodate regional growth needs. Since, as the
dissent noted, there was not "any evidence of a purpose to exclude apart-
ments permanently from other portions of the municipality, "8 5-a point
unchallenged by the court's opinion-one could fairly conclude that good
faith would be insufficient to rebut evidence of exclusionary effect.
In that way Chesterdale Farms, albeit implicitly, seemed to have altered sub-
tly an important effect rationale adopted in Kit-Mar Builders. It marked the
beginning of a transformation in Pennsylvania from the use of effect as an in-
ference of improper purpose to the use of effect as evidence, standing alone,
of a violation of an evolving regional fair share duty.
What was implicit in Chesterdale Farms became explicit in Surrick v. Zoning
Hearing Board. 6 In Surrick a developer whose land was located in a district
zoned for single-family residences sought to build apartments and town-
houses. The community's business (B) zone permitted construction of apart-
ments, but only 43 of a total 3,800 acres in the township (1.14%) were in the
B zone." The existing B zone was "already substantially developed"8 8 and
"multi-family dwellings [were] only one of more than a dozen other uses
permitted on this fraction of land."' 9 Although there was no total exclusion of
apartments, the court concluded that the locality had not met its regional "fair
share" duty to provide land for multi-family dwellings.
In Surrick the court's analysis acknowledged explicitly that "evidence of ex-
82. Id.
83. For further discussion of the New Jersey decisions, see Section II.B. infra.
84. 462 Pa. at 449, 341 A.2d at 468.
85. Id. at 452. 341 A.2d at 469. The dissent found no exclusionary intent but "a bona fide un-
dertaking to bring the Township zoning structure into harmony with the Court's decision in Girsh
Appeal ..." Id. at 452 n.4, 341 A.2d at 469 n.4 (citation omitted). Justice Pomeroy characterized
the rezoning of 80 acres as "a first step in providing for apartments in an orderly fashion." Id. at
452, 341 A.2d at 470. Since this rezoning was consistent with overall county plans for redevelop-
ment, and other land could be rezoned as the community continued to grow, the court could not
properly act as a "super board of adjustment." Id.
86. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
87. Id.-at 187, 382 A.2d at 107.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 195, 382 A.2d at I11.
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clusionary motive or intent, whether direct or circumstantial, is not of critical
importance."9 Although the Chesterdale Farms opinion did not clearly negate
the importance of impermissible purposes in an exclusionary zoning case, Jus-
tice Nix in Surrick matter-of-factly noted that Chesterdale Farms "marked an im-
plicit departure away from judicial inquiry into the motives underlying a par-
ticular zoning ordinance." '9 1 Support for that view came from the opinion of a
lower court judge in Chesterdale Farms that the exclusionary impact was a re-
sult of inadvertence, not design.92 However, in Chesterdale Farms the lack of a
showing of intent to exclude was only mentioned in Justice Pomeroy's dis-
sent9 3 and not relied on by the court.
Nevertheless, the Surrick case reflects the Pennsylvania court's explicit
transformation of the effect rationale from an evidentiary tool for over-
turning the normal presumption of validity in zoning matters into a free
standing substantive doctrine. As Justice Nix said, after Surrick the court's
"primary concern" would be "centered upon an ordinance's exclusionary im-
pact,' 94 which will be determined by the extent of the exclusion in relation to
community land availability and regional housing needs.9 5 As in Kit-Mar
Builders, the Pennsylvania court subtly added an important element to its ap-
proach in suburban land use control challenges without forthrightly
acknowledging what was happening. 96 In each situation the movement to fa-
cilitate landowner challenges to suburban land use restrictions represented a
significant expansion of prior doctrine, and the development was downplayed
either by ignoring the matter9 7 or making explicit something an earlier case
had done "implicit[ly]." 9 In neither situation was the rationale for expansion
or the consequence of expansion addressed since the expansion was treated as
a fait accompli by an earlier decision. 99
90. Id. at 192, 382 A.2d at 110.
91. Id. at 193, 382 A.2d at 110-11.
92. Id. at 193, n.10, 382 A.2d at 110 n.10.
93. 462 Pa. at 451-52 n.4,341 A.2d at 469 n.4. The dissent is discussed in note 85 supra.
94. 476 Pa. at 193, 382 A.2d at 11I.
95. Id. at 194, 382 A.2d at 111.
96. Indeed, at the very end of his opinion, Justice Nix seemed to deny what the court had
done by reaffirming the presumption of validity that attaches to any challenged zoning ordi-
nance. Id. at 195 n.13, 382 A.2d at 112 n.13. He further noted, however, that the presumption is re-
buttable and will not foreclose review of constitutional issues. Id. Apparently this initial presump-
tion is reversed when an impermissible, exclusionary impact is found, for "[w]here, as in the
instant case, the facts show an obvious dearth of land zoned as available for multi-family dwell-
ings, the proponents of the zoning ordinance must put forth adequate justification for this
zoning-created scarcity." Id. Perhaps this is an oblique suggestion that an overriding substantive
governmental objective would satisfy the court. See note 50 supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 61-73 supra.
98. That was done in Surrick, 476 Pa. at 193, 382 A.2d at 11 (1977).
99. For a similar treatment of precedent by the New York Court of Appeals, see Berenson v.
Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y. 2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975) (construing
Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931)). Berenson is discussed in the
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In summary, the evolution of cases in Pennsylvania from Kohn'0 0 (1965) to
Surrick (1977)"'1 represents a growing sensitivity to regional needs for housing
and to a suburban community's duty to nonresidents to make land available
through its land use regulation to accommodate its regional fair share of
housing and population growth.1 0 2 At first, the court narrowed the range of
permissible purposes, holding invalid the formerly acceptable goals of
preserving the character of a community or zoning solely for fiscal ends.10 3
Then, the court permitted evidence of exclusionary effect to reverse the gen-
eral presumption of validity normally attaching to governmental land use re-
strictions. Under that formulation, it seemed that localities could present evi-
dence of good faith to refute a plaintiff's prima facie case, even if the range
of permissible purposes was narrow indeed. Finally, after Chesterdale Farms
and Surrick, the court has established a hazily defined regional fair share duty
as a substantive standard, departure from which cannot be excused by rebut-
tal evidence of good faith intent. It is now appropriate to compare the
Pennsylvania substantive standard with the cases decided in New Jersey and
then with those decided in New York and California.
B. New Jersey
The Pennsylvania "fair share"' 0 4 cases build generally on the foundation
laid by the Kohn case, which established a suburban community's duty to ac-
commodate population growth.' 0 5 However, the specific regional fair share
concept was drawn from New Jersey's seminal Mt. Laurel decision.10 6
New Jersey had permitted communities to justify zoning schemes for years
as furthering the character of the local community. 7 In dissenting from a
decision that upheld a locality's total exclusion of mobile homes,108 Justice
Hall wrote eloquently of the socioeconomic impact that resulted from such ex-
text accompanying notes 242-46 infra. Cf. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (construing
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)).
100. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
101. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
102. See generally Comment, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusionary Suburban Zoning:
From Bilbar to Girsh-A Decade of Change, 16 VILL. L. REv. 507 (1971).
103. Cf. Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958) (holding
valid a one acre minimum lot zoning requirement and stating that consideration of general wel-
fare alone would justify an ordinance, as long as the ordinance was not arbitrary, unreasonable
or confiscatory).
104. See Section III.A. supra.
105. National Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
106. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 12 (1975).
107. See, e.g., Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d
129 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 (1963); Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401
(1955); Lionshead Lake v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed,
344 U.S. 919 (1953).
108. Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester Tnshp., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
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clusionary measures." 9 Thirteen years after his classic Vickers dissent, Justice
Hall was able to write his views on exclusionary zoning into New Jersey law by
authoring the Mt. Laurel opinion (1975) for a unanimous court. 10
In Mt. Laurel, the township of 11,221 population and 14,000 acres had 65
percent of its land vacant. The rate of population increase was dramatic, dou-
bling each decade during the 1950-70 period."' The industrial zone consisted
of almost 30 percent of the total land, but that was little utilized." '2 Of the
10,000 acres (70 percent) zoned for residential purposes, 3,000 were zoned
for quarter-acre lots and 7,000 for half-acre lots. The residential zoning cate-
gories established minimum lot area and width and dwelling floor area re-
quirements." 13
The court accepted the township's position that the land use pattern was
not intended or designed to exclude newcomers on the basis of "race, origin
or believed social incompatibility.""' 4 What was intended, however, was to en-
courage a "selective type of growth"'"1 5 whose objective was to minimize the lo-
cal property tax burden. That is, the township, consistent with the policies of
other developing communities, employed its land use regulatory authority to
control the growth of public expenditures and encourage the development of
ratables that yield tax revenues. Since public education is by far the largest
single local government expenditure, the strategy was to keep population den-
sity reasonably low; as a consequence, apartments or other less expensive
rental accommodations were made unavailable.
In Mt. Laurel the New Jersey court did not face the excessively large lot
sizes involved in the earlier Pennsylvania cases. Moreover, the evidence would
have supported a finding that the actions of the township were a deliberate
effort to act "in its own selfish and parochial interest and in effect build[] a
wall around itself to keep out those people or entities not adding favorably to
the tax base. .. ""6 While the groundwork for an intent analysis-parallelling
109. Id. at 263-66, 181 A.2d at 146-47 (Hall, J., dissenting). See Town of Glocester v. Olivo's
Mobile Home Court, Inc., 111 R.I. 120, 300 A.2d 465 (1973).
110. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713 (1975). Although the entire court concurred in the result, Justices Mountain and Pashman
filed separate opinions.
In what can only be charitably described as an oversight, Justice Hall in his Mt. Laurel opinion
did not so much as cite his Vickers dissent. He merely mentioned the Vickers majority as support
for the proposition that although the court historically had sanctioned "a broad measure of re-
strictive municipal decisions," id. at 176, 336 A.2d at 726, it had also warned "of the inevitability
of change in judicial approach and view as mandated by the world around us." Id. Justice
Pashman's concurrence did note the significance of the earlier dissent. Id. at 194, 336 A.2d at
735-36 (Pashman, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 161-62, 336 A.2d at 718.
112. Id. at 162-63, 336 A.2d 719.
113. Id. at 163-64, 336 A.2d at 719-20.
114. Id. at 159, 336 A.2d at 717.
115. Id. at 170, 336 A.2d at 723 (quoting the record of the trial court).
116. Id. at 171, 336 A.2d at 723.
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the Kohn approach-was available, Justice Hall explicitly eschewed that ap-
proach, noting that "the identical [analytical] conclusion follows even when
municipal conduct is not shown to be intentional, but the effect is substantially
the same as if it were."' 17 Thus, the Mt. Laurel court based its decision
invalidating the land use scheme on an effect analysis.
Given the relatively small lot size requirement involved, the Mt. Laurel de-
cision is a striking example of a court's adoption of a substantive duty as a
standard by which to measure the legality of a local zoning scheme. While the
Pennsylvania court articulated a concern with the exclusion of uses (e.g.,
apartments),"s the New Jersey court placed emphasis on the exclusionary im-
pact on low-income people. 9 The court reasoned that the state's police
power, which can be delegated to local governmental units, m~ust be exercised
in furtherance of the general welfare. The question, of course, is "whose gen-
eral welfare must be served or not violated in the field of land use regula-
tion. ' 120 The court concluded that since "the zoning power is a police power
of the state and the local authority is acting only as a delegate of that power
and is restricted in the same manner as the state . . . .when regulation does
have a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond
the borders of the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be
recognized and served."' 2'
Thus, a local government unit has an obligation to accommodate regional
interests. Justice Hall found shelter to be a basic human need and a funda-
mental part of the general welfare concept. 22 Since localities have regional
responsibilities to promote the general welfare and since housing is a compo-
nent of the general welfare concept, it followed that localities have a duty
through their land use plan to "make realistically possible an appropriate vari-
ety and choice of housing."'1 23
In refining the nature of a locality's regional housing obligation, Justice
Hall identified several elements. First, the analysis seemed limited to a "devel-
oping municipality," which was not precisely defined. 24 Second, the duty was
described as "presumptive. ' 125 The presumptive duty had both procedural
and substantive elements. The procedural obligation was described as follows:
117. Id. at 174 n.10, 336 A.2d at 725 n.10.
118. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 193 n.10, 382 A.2d 105, 110 n.10 (1977).
119. 67 N.J. at 173, 336 A.2d at 724.
120. Id. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726 (emphasis in original).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 178-79, 336 A.2d at 727. This contrasts with the approach taken by the federal
courts, both substantively, see Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972), and analytically, see San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). See generally, Ely, Foreword. On Dis-
covering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978).
123. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
124. Id. at 173, 336 A.2d at 724.
125. Id. at 174, 180, 336 A.2d at 724, 728.
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... [W]hen it is shown that a developing municipality in its land use regula-
tion has not made realistically possible a variety and choice of housing,
including adequate provision to afford the opportunity for low and moderate
income housing or has expressly prescribed requirements or restrictions
which preclude or substantially hinder it, a facial showing of violation of sub-
stantive due process or equal protection under the state constitution has been
made out and the burden, and it is a heavy one, shifts to the municipality to
establish a valid basis for its action or non-action. 126
The substantive aspect concerned what factors establish a burden-shifting
prima facie case and what defenses support the municipality's actions. These
were not spelled out other than to note that justifications "may well vary be-
tween municipalities according to peculiar circumstances." '127
The third element of the regional duty had both affirmative and negative
aspects. 12 8 Each developing community had "affirmatively to plan and pro-
vide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable opportunity for an appropri-
ate variety and choice of housing, including of course, low and moderate cost
housing, to meet the needs, desires and resources of all categories of people
who may desire to live within its boundaries."' 29 That is, the developing mu-
nicipality must plan to accommodate its "fair share of the present and pro-
spective regional need. '1 3 ° On the negative side, a developing community
"may not adopt regulations or policies which thwart or preclude that opportu-
nity."' 
31
Applying the standards announced to the Mt. Laurel situation, Justice Hall
concluded a prima facie case was established because of the limited type of
homes permitted, the minimum lot and floor size requirements, and the large
amount of land zoned industrial compared to its very low level of utiliza-
tion. 32 In response to the municipality's fiscal zoning rationale, the court sus-
tained fiscal concerns as a legitimate zoning purpose. However, a fiscal ration-
ale is insufficiently weighty to justify the exclusionary effect of excluding or
limiting categories of housing from a community. 1 33
With respect to the municipality's ecological argument, the court also
found environmental protection objectives to be permissible. However, "the
danger and impact must be substantial and very real . . .- not simply a make-
weight to support exclusionary housing measures or preclude growth-and
the regulation adopted must be only that reasonably necessary for public pro-
tection of a vital interest."' 134
126. Id. at 180-81, 336 A.2d at 728 (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 181, 336 A.2d at 728.
128. Id. at 179-80, 336 A.2d at 728.
129. Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 728.
130. Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
131. Id. at 180, 336 A.2d at 728.
132. Id. at 183-85, 336 A.2d at 729-30.
133. Id. at 185-86, 336 A.2d at 731.
134. Id. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731. See note 50 supra. For a discussion of the environmental im-
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In short, what the New Jersey court did in Mt. Laurel was to establish a re-
gional duty on the part of developing communities to bear their "fair share"
of regional housing needs, especially for low and moderate income housing.
The duty could be used to invalidate local land use regulations either because
a community failed to satisfy its affirmative obligation to make sites available
or because in some way it actually obstructed the development of low or mod-
erate income housing. Evidence of an exclusionary impact alone was sufficient
to shift the burden of justification onto the locality, but the local unit of gov-
ernment could not satisfy its burden merely by showing permissible motiva-
tion or legitimate policy objectives. The court accepted as legitimate both the
fiscal and ecological purposes proffered by Mt. Laurel. Rather, as in the fun-
damental interest substantive due process context, 1 3 1 the municipality had to
demonstrate both an overriding (not just legitimate) interest and narrowly
tailored means of achieving the overriding interest (a less drastic means ap-
proach) .136
The Mt. Laurel opinion raised as many issues as it resolved.' 37 The notion
of region was left imprecise as was the concept of "fair share." Similarly, there
was an air of unreality about the "fair share" concept because government
through land use controls does not construct housing for low and moderate
income persons. Such housing typically requires some form of public or pri-
vate subsidy to be viable. After Mt. Laurel one was left to wonder whether the
locality's duty extended to an obligation to provide housing directly for
underserved population groups. Other forms of regulation-building codes,
subdivision regulations-affect the cost of and, therefore, the accessibility of
housing to low and moderate income groups. Thus, would a community be
required to forgo fireproofing or water down other required, but costly, fire
prevention features of new housing in the name of regional fair share?
Would expensive mandatory water and sewer hook ups fall before the re-
gional housing duty? 138
pact of Mt. Laurel, see Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of Zoning Re-
form, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 1, 43-71.
135. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (regulation affecting the fundamental right of
privacy can only be justified by a compelling state interest and legislation must be narrowly drawn
to promote only the compelling state interest).
136. The analytical method of the federal cases involving substantive due process is summa-
rized in McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-Fundamental Right to Travel or "Newcomers" as a
Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 988-95 (1975).
137. Commentators have been quick to seize on this point. See, e.g., Ackerman, note 134 su-
pra; Mallach, Do Lawsuits Build Housing?: The Implications of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 6 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 653 (1975); Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government Law: The Case of
Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 803 (1976); Rose, Exclusionary Zoning and Managed
Growth: Some Unresolved Issues, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 689 (1975); Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Reme-
dies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L. REV. 760 (1976); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and
Timed Growth: Resolving the Issue After Mount Laurel, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 1237 (1977).
The New Jersey Court has not been unaware of the extensive discussion triggered by Mt. Lau-
rel. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 495 n.3, 371 A.2d 1192,
1198 n.3, (1977).
138. Cf. Robinson v. City of Boulder, 190 Colo. 357, 547 P.2d 228 (1976) (holding that a city
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In short, the Mt. Laurel decision left unanswered questions concerning ev-
ery facet of the fair share obligation. Did Mt. Laurel entirely overturn the pre-
sumption of validity in land use challenges, or was its analytical framework
limited to specific types of communities? What showing constituted a prima
facie case of exclusion, thereby shifting the burden of justification to the local
government? What local interests would be deemed sufficiently important to
outweigh the regional fair share duty?
Subsequent New Jersey decisions have provided insights into some of these
questions raised in Mt. Laurel. In Pascack Association, Ltd. v. Mayor of
Washington 3 ' the court considered the issue of whether Mt. Laurel's regional
fair share duty extended to all municipalities. 4 ' Backing away from the
broader implications of Mt. Laurel, 4 ' the court held that the regional fair
share duty does not apply to a community that is "developed substantially
fully upon detached single-family dwellings, '  even if the community makes
no provision for multifamily dwellings. The Mt. Laurel approach was con-
fined to situations where the municipality is "developing"'4 3 and where the
housing effectively excluded was intended directly for low and moderate in-
come people.
1 44
In Pascack the court declined to adopt a per se principle mandating zoning
for multi-family housing by every local unit of government "regardless of its
circumstances with respect to degree or nature of development. '145 Indeed,
outside the context of a "developing" locality, the court reaffirmed its pre-Mt.
Laurel endorsement of "maintaining the character of a fully developed, pre-
dominantly single-family residential community" 146 as a legitimate zoning ob-
jective. Consequently, if a substantially developed community chooses to ex-
clude multifamily housing in order to preserve its single-family character, it
can validly do so under Pascack, even if there is concededly a general regional
shotage of multifamily housing.
147
acting as a public utility may not refuse to extend water and sewer services beyond its geograph-
ical limits in an attempt to control land use and population growth in that area).
139. 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977).
140. Id. at 473-74, 379 A.2d at 7.
141. The court in Pascack followed the trend of retrenchment begun in Oakwood at Madison,
Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977). See text accompanying notes
153-91 infra. Justice Hall retired before either Pasack or Oakwood at Madison were written. Both
were authored by a temporarily assigned justice.
142. 74 N.J. at 474, 379 A.2d at 8.
143. Id. at 480, 379 A.2d at 11.
144. Id. There is an interesting tension between this requirement and the theory of supply
and demand-a "filter-down" theory-adopted in Oakwood at Madison. See note 161 infra.
145. Id. at 481, 379 A.2d at 11.
146. Id. at 483, 379 A.2d at 13.
147. Id. at 485-86, 379 A.2d at 13-14. Accord, Fobe Associates v. Mayor of Demarest, 74 N.J.
519, 526-27, 379 A.2d 31, 35 (1977). See also Montgomery Associates v. Township of Mont-
gomery, 149 N.J. Super. 536, 374 A.2d 86 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977). For an example of a state
court which expressly overruled an earlier decision that had forbidden a community from totally
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What Pascack and the contemporaneous decision in Fobe Associates v. Mayor
of Demarest1 48 indicate is that Mt. Laurel altered the judicial standard of review
in New Jersey only where a "developing" municipality is involved and where
the direct beneficiaries of a proposed project are low and moderate income
persons. Otherwise, the traditional restrained standard of review controls
-prohibiting "arbitrariness or patent unreasonableness" and requiring a "sub-
stantial relation" between the regulation and the government's permissible po-
lice power purposes.1 49 Where the threshold Mt. Laurel criteria are not met,
the Pascack court expressed clearly its disinclination
to substitute [its] conception of what the public welfare requires by way of
zoning for the views of those in whom the Legislature and the local electorate
have vested that responsibility. The judicial role is ... limited to the assess-
ment of a claim that the restrictions of the ordinance are patently arbitrary or
unreasonable or violative of the statute, not that they do not match the
plaintiff's or the court's conception of the requirements of the general wel-
fare, whether within the town or the region.1 50
While the court was "not insensitive to the current social need for larger
quantities of affordable housing of all kinds for the general population,"' ' it
suggested a legislative remedy because the courts are "not suited to the role of
an ad hoc super zoning legislature, particularly in the area of adjusting
claims for satisfaction by individual municipalities of regional needs, whether
as to housing or any other important social need affected by zoning ....
The problem is not an appropriate subject of judicial superintendence.""5 2
While Pasack reflects a sharp categorizational circumscription of the Mt.
Laurel analytical approach, 15 3 the court's decision in Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison15 4 was an attempt to clarify the meaning of and apply
the Mt. Laurel analytical framework.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Oakwood at Madison was dealing with an
"archetypal 'developing' municipality within the contemplation of . . .Mt.
Laurel,"' 55 and was obliged to apply the Mt. Laurel analytical mode, but the
excluding multifamily residences, see McDermott v. Village of Calverton Park, 454 S.W.2d 577
(Mo. 1970).
148. 74 N.J. 519, 379 A.2d 31 (1977).
149. 74 N.J. at 483. 379 A.2d at 12.
150. Id. at 485, 379 A.2d at 13.
151. Id. at 487, 379 A.2d at 14.
152. Id. at 487-88, 379 A.2d at 15.
153. For a discussion of this interesting technique for narrowing the reach of a doctrine, see
Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause and the New Federalism: The Case of Dis-
criminatory State Income Tax Treatment of Out-of-State Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REV. 473, 488
n.60 (1978); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1975).
154. 72N.J. 481,371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
155. Id. at 501. 371 A.2d at 1201.
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court was uncomfortable with its self-assigned role in implementing Mt. Lau-
rel. The court made "explicit" what had only been "adumbrated" in Mt. Lau-
rel, "that the governmental-sociological-economic enterprise of seeing to the
provision and allocation throughout appropriate regions of adequate and suit-
able housing for all categories of the population is much more appropriately a
legislative and administrative function rather than a judicial function to be ex-
ercised in the disposition of isolated cases."' 15 6 Nevertheless, "[i]n the absence
of legislation providing for regional zoning authorities, '157 the court enforced
the Mt. Laurel principles in the context of a developing community's failure to
provide for substantial multi-family or single-family residences accessible to
lower income groups.
Some of the questions raised by Mt. Laurel were addressed more defini-
tively in Oakwood at Madison. The mechanism by which affordable housing
could become available to lower income groups was clarified. The court de-
clined to impose an affirmative obligation on developing communities to cre-
ate additional lower income housing directly. The Mt. Laurel affirmative duty
did not require the actual construction or sponsorship of housing projects,
nor did it require tax concessions or zoning bonuses tied to rental or sale
price concessions for the benefit of prospective lower income persons.15 De-
spite its recognition that the unsubsidized private sector would not "construct
new housing affordable by the low income population and by a large proportion
of those of moderate income ,' 159 the court rejected the contention that "the
mandate of Mount Laurel is impracticable in the current economy and that liti-
gation to enforce it is futile.11 60 The court identified the filter down theory16 1
as the "only acceptable alternative recourse"'61 2 for private construction of
lower income housing. The filter down rationale is that, absent direct or indi-
rect subsidization, the only effective or realistic way to increase lower income
housing opportunities is to encourage overall increases in the housing stock.
As middle income families move into new units, existing units will become
available to lower income groups who could not afford the new units.163 In
156. Id. at 534, 371 A.2d at 1218.
157. Id. at 495, 371 A.2d at 1198.
158. Id. at 546, 371 A.2d at 1224.
159. Id. at 510, 371 A.2d at 1206.
160. Id. at 512, 371 A.2d at 1207.
161. An extensive review of filtration theory is found in W. GRIGSBY, HOUSING MARKETS AND
PUBLIC POLICY 84-130 (1963). See also C. HARTMAN, HOUSING AND SOCIAL POLICY 62-63 (1975); J.
LANSING, C. CLIFTON & J. MORGAN, NEW HOMES AND POOR PEOPLE: A STUDY OF CHAINS OF MOVES
(1969); Fisher and Winnick, A Reformulation of the "Filtering" Concept, 7 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 47
(1951).
162. 72 N.J. at 512, 371 A.2d at 1207.
163. See W. GRIGSBY, supra note 161, at 100-01.
Within an overall housing market, the filter down approach makes some sense, assuming of
course that supply availability does not in turn generate its own d.mand. If there is a relatively
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adopting the filter down rationale the court was obliged to modify some of
the Mt. Laurel language. Since Mt. Laurel would not be extended to an obliga-
tion to sponsor or subsidize lower income housing construction directly, the
court's exclusive focus in Oakwood at Madison was the community's pattern of
land use regulation. Consistent with that orientation, the court concluded that
the shorter the filtering process the better. Thus, it imposed on a growing
municipality the duty "to adjust its zoning regulations so as to render possible
and feasible the 'least cost' housing, consistent with minimum standards of
health and safety, which private industry will undertake, and in amounts suf-
ficient to satisfy the deficit in the hypothesized fair share."' 164 Thus, under
Oakwood at Madison the concept of "least cost" replaced the notion of "low and
moderate income" housing, at least as part of a developing community's fair
share duty to accommodate its land use regulations to regional housing needs.
The Oakwood at Madison court also clarified what constitutes a prima facie
case of exclusion. In Mt. Laurel the court had criticized bedroom restrictions
as exclusionary.1 6 5 In Oakwood at Madison the court considered bulk and den-
sity regulations in areas permitting multifamily dwellings to be exclusionary
because, given the "economics of building,"'1 66 they resulted in a foreseeable
mix of 80 percent one bedroom and 20 percent two bedroom development.
Also exclusionary was "the prima facie disproportion of land zoned for high
cost residences vis-ti-vis that zoned for lower cost residences and multifamily
units."'1 67 Especially criticized was the lack of zoning for single-family resi-
dences on very small lot sizes. 6 '
The exclusionary label was applied in Oakwood at Madison to much more
than lot size, bulk and density, or use allocation proportions. It was applied as
well to the "undue cost-generating features inherent in the ordinance which
raise the expense of purchasing or renting new housing units above the reach
of the great majority of the lower income population."'' 69 Madison township
had amended its ordinance in 1973 to provide for planned unit developments
(PUD) and cluster zoning and argued that those provisions satisfied its low
stable population size and mix-rather questionable in the "developing" municipalities to which
Mt. Laurel applies-it is reasonable to hypothesize that housing units vacated by middle income
persons will become available at relatively affordable prices to lower income persons. However,
for any given community, construction of new housing units for middle-income persons does not
assure that affordable units within that community will become available for lower income
groups. Id. at 129-30. Moreover, from an equitable perspective, there is a body of opinion that
undoubtedly would find such a trickle down approach unfair or unacceptably indirect. See, e.g.,
Mallach, supra note 137, at 666 n.55.
164. 72 N.J. at 512, 371 A.2d at 1207.
165. 67 N.J. at 182-83, 336 A.2d at 729.
166. 72 N.J. at 516, 371 A.2d at 1209.
167. Id. at 515, 371 A.2d at 1209.
168, Id. at 516, 371 A.2d at 1209.
169. Id. at 524, 371 A.2d at 1213.
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and moderate income housing obligation. The court in Oakwood at Madison
called the township's position "illusory"'7 0 since various PUD requirements
had "the potential for greatly increasing the costs of housing units in that
zone."
171
In Mt. Laurel the township had had a PUD zone but had repealed it. De-
spite the repeal, the court went out of its way to condemn the bedroom re-
strictions because the township could reenact a PUD zone and because "the
subject is of importance generally." '72 No other features of the PUD ordi-
nance were discussed as exclusionary, even though the Mt. Laurel attorney
apparently conceded at oral argument that some of the conditions imposed
on developers might be illegal.
73
The Oakwood at Madison court found several components of the PUD regu-
lations exclusionary. Consideration of these cost-generating provisions as ex-
clusionary is significant because they clearly circumscribe the ability of local
governments to exact concessions from developers to offset incremental costs
brought about by subdivision developments. 1 74 Although different state courts
have developed various tests to determine the validity of subdivision exac-
tions,175 the underlying concern has been that the costs imposed on the devel-
oper by the municipality be related to the costs imposed by the development
on the community. The disagreement among courts on the issue had focused
largely on the question of how unique and identifiable the costs imposed by a
specific development must be-whether a community can assert that overall
development incurs incremental costs and that specific developments can be
170. Id. at 507, 371 A.2d at 1204-05.
171. Id. at 508, 371 A.2d at 1205.
172. 67 N.J. at 182-83, 336 A.2d at 729.
173. Id. at 168 n.6, 336 A.2d at 722 n.6.
174. This contrasts with the approach of the California Supreme Court, which has recognized
that cost-increasing dedication requirements may be exclusionary but nevertheless are justified.
See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971). Associated Home Builders is discussed fur-
ther in text accompanying notes 263-84 infra.
175. In California exactions must be reasonably related to municipal needs, Ayres v. City
Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949), while in Illinois they must be specifically
and uniquely attributable to the subdivider's activity. Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village
of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961). In New York, Jenad, Inc. v. Village of
Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673. 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966), which follows the Wisconsin
rule, Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1966), appeal dis-
missed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966), subdivision exactions are permitted if a municipality must provide
more services because of foreseeable increases in subdivision developments generally, even if a
need is not solely attributable to a particular subdivision.
These major rules are critiqued by the Florida court in Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 338 So.2d 863 (1976). The Ayres standard is rejected as allowing "local governments al-
most unlimited discretion in the imposition of dedication requirements." Id. at 866. Pioneer Trust,
on the other hand, is not acceptable because it "created a standard which is unduly restrictive of
local exercises of the police power." Id. The court found the best approach to be the "rational
nexus" test of Jordan.
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required to bear an appropriately allocated average share; 176 or whether, in
order to justify an exaction, a community must show incremental costs attrib-
utable specifically and uniquely to a particular development. 1 77
The Oakwood at Madison court's treatment of the subdivision regulations,
therefore, is of especial significance in the growth management context be-
cause it concerns the heart of the growth management controversy-whether
new growth should pay its own way and bear its fully allocated share of at
least the marginal cost attributable to it. 1 78 In the Oakwood at Madison opinion,
the New Jersey Supreme Court redirected the focus of analysis away from is-
sues of fairness (fiscal equity) to the developer, relying instead on the exclu-
sionary effect of costly subdivision exactions on potential newcomers to the
community. In what was labeled a "corollary of Mt. Laurel,"'7 9 the court con-
cluded that "when municipal exactions from developers reach such propor-
tions as to exert an exclusionary influence, whether in a PUD or any other
context, they offend the constitutional precept of Mt. Laurel and must be
remedied."' 0
The three components of Madison's PUD regulations deemed exclusionary
were:
(a) the requirement that the developer construct and dedicate to the town-
ship a school to accommodate 0.5 children per dwelling unit;
(b) the requirement that the developer provide streets and utility hookups;
and
(c) the three step approval process that could take from one to two years.'"'
With regard to the school construction and dedication provision the court
cited the estimated cost of constructing complying school facilities and con-
cluded that the costs per unit did "not seem reasonable."' s2 The only frame
176. This would seem to be the Wisconsin approach as enunciated in Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1966).
177. That is the restrictive approach adopted in Illinois. Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v.
Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961). For a general discussion of the
problem of subdivision exactions, see Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased
Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
178. For an interesting perspective on the equitable and fiscal factors governing subdivision
exaction issues, see Ellickson, supra note 9, at 465-89. According to Ellickson, the critical determi-
nant in imposing exactions should be how similar municipal services were financed in the past. Id.
at 478. If benefits have been financed by general revenue exactions, newcomers should receive
similar generally financed benefits. Id. If services historically have been financed by dedication re-
quirements or other forms of special revenue raising, Ellickson would deem similar treatment of
newcomers appropriate, despite any exclusionary impact that that might have. Id. Provided that
equity among oldtimers and newcomers is achieved, Ellickson's criteria would be satisfied.
179. 72 N.J. at 520, 371 A.2d at 1211.
180. Id. The Oakwood at Madison rationale would find exclusionary any substantial exactions
that impeded development of low-cost housing. Presumably this would be the case even if, under
Ellickson's criteria, see note 178 supra, there would be no inequity between existing residents and
potential residents. Thus, the New Jersey court is imposing a duty on oldtimers to subsidize new-
comers, at least when not to do so would present a fiscal barrier to the entry of newcomers who
are of low and moderate income.
181. 72 N.J. at 520-23,371 A.2dat 1211-13.
182. Id. at 521, 371 A.2d at 1211.
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of reference mentioned was a 1964 study of subdivision exactions, wherein
the authors found a much lower range of costs per lot to be reasonable.
18 3
Strikingly, from the growth management perspective, there was no attempt
whatsoever to examine the costs for schooling actually imposed on a commu-
nity when a new development is constructed. Apparently, the reasonableness
of the relationship between the exactions on the developer and the incremen-
tal costs imposed by the development on the resources of the community is
not the critical analytical variable. Instead, some unarticulated, absolutist no-
tion of the reasonableness of the per unit cost of the proposed exaction is
what counts in the determination whether a regulation is exclusionary.' 84 Im-
plicitly, then, since the court held that the school construction and dedication
requirement "must be omitted in the revision of the ordinance,"' 8 5 the
Oakwood at Madison decision requires that a community subsidize growth if not
doing so would result in exclusion or discouragement of low and moderate in-
come persons from residing in the jurisdiction. 8 6
One final feature of the Oakwood at Madison decision bears mention. Mt.
Laurel had announced a developing community's affirmative duty to provide
adequate opportunity for low and moderate income housing. Oakwood at
Madison declined to extend this affirmative duty to include the direct con-
struction or sponsorship of such housing. It did, however, identify one com-
ponent of the affirmative obligation: A developing community must provide a
density bonus to developers for constructing larger units with three or four
bedrooms. I" 7 According to the court, this incentive is necessary to overcome
the market incentive to construct mainly one bedroom units;' accordingly,
183. Id. at 520, 371 A.2d at 1211. The study cited was Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 177,
which concluded that the "amount of the exactions at issue in the subdivision cases to
date-$37.50 per lot, $50.00 per lot, $80.00 per lot, $325.00 per lot---can surely not be character-
ized as exclusionary." Id. at 1155-56 (footnotes omitted). The New Jersey court estimated the
Oakwood at Madison exaction costs to be $1,275 per unit. 72 N.J. at 520, 371 A.2d at 1211.
184. See note 180 supra.
185. 72 N.J. at 521, 371 A.2d at 1211.
186. In addition to the school construction and dedication requirement, the court invalidated
street and utility hookup requirements and a three-step building application approval process.
Only nine percent of the town's vacant acreage was zoned for PUD, and two-thirds of this land
lay in a remote area. The court found an exclusionary impact in the increased costs to mul-
tifamily housing and estimated subsequent delays in building the more remote PUDs and ordered
that on remand the municipality be directed either to eliminate the requirements or render them
non-exclusionary. Id. at 522-23, 371 A.2d at 1212. The approval process was found to be exclu-
sionary because "a protracted approval process will add greatly to the cost of any project and
hence may tend to render development prohibitive to lower income users." Id. at 523, 371 A.2d
at 1213. The court ordered the municipality to eliminate one of the three stages. Id. at 524, 371
A.2d at 1213.
187. Id. at 517-18, 371 A.2d 1209-10.
188. The court concluded that "the maximum bulk and density regulations in the AF and
PUD zones ...when combined with the economics of building, effectively dictate development
on an 80 [percent] one bedroom, 20 [percent] two bedroom mix . Id. at 516, 371 A.2d at
1209.
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the court held that a developing municipality "should affirmatively act to en-
courage a easonable supply of multi-bedroom units affordable by at least
some of the lower income population."'1 89 Under the circumstances present in
Madison township, the court concluded that such density bonuses were "a vi-
tal weapon in the armament of affirmative zoning for adequate housing of
families in all income categories," and therefore they were a "necessary imple-
ment in the encouragemerit of builders to provide multifamily housing for
those of lower income."'19 Consequently, if "necessary to achieve sufficient
suitable least-cost housing," the density bonus "keyed to quantitative or bulk
concessions by the builder" is a mandatory component of a developing com-
munity's affirmative zoning scheme in New Jersey. 19t
IV
GROWTH MANAGEMENT: NEW YORK AND CALIFORNIA
The Pennsylvania and New Jersey cases on exclusionary zoning' 92 reflect a
growing sensitivity to the socioeconomic effects of delegating land use reg-
ulation authority to local units of government. 11 3 The Pennsylvania and New
Jersey Supreme Courts emphasized the desirability of considering regional
needs in local land use decisions and expressed their hope that appropriate
legislation would be forthcoming to establish effective regional planning
mechanisms.
The legal doctrines that evolved in those two states were designed to offset
the exclusionary impact the courts deemed undesirable. These approaches
stressed three related concepts. First, it was unacceptable to allow local units
of government in developing communities to legislate solely in their own self
interest. Even in the absence of legislation, courts had an obligation to factor
189. Id. at 517. 371 A.2d at 1209.
190. Id. at 517-18, 371 A.2d at 1210.
191. Id. at 546-47, 371 A.2d at 1225. The sort of density bonus the court approved was, using
the opinion's example, for each three or four bedroom unit constructed, permitting an additional
single bedroom or efficiency unit above the general density limits. Id. at 517 n.27, 371 A.2d at
1209 n.27. Since the regulation concerned physical use of land, it was permissible within both the
zoning and general police power. Id. at 517, 371 A.2d at 1210. The question of density bonuses
tied to rental or sales price concessions was reserved by the court for the future. Id. at 547, 371
A.2d at 1225. Generally labeled "rent skewing," this type of density bonus encourages a devel-
oper to include low and moderate income units either by "requiring that a mandatory percentage
of moderately priced dwellings be constructed . . . or allowing a developer a density bonus
enabling him to build, for example, one conventional unit for every two low or moderate income
units constructed." Id. at 518 n.28, 371 A.2d at 1210 n.28. The court believed that local govern-
ments probably could not exercise that sort of zoning power without express legislative authoriza-
tion. Id. at 518, 371 A.2d at 1210. See Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises, Inc., 214 Va.
235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973).
192. See Sections III.A. & III.B. supra.
193. See generally Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969).
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regional needs into the process of judicial review. Secondly, the regional focus
would be implemented by the imposition of a substantive duty on developing
communities to bear their fair share of regional housing needs. Thus, the
courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey undertook to define a substantive af-
firmative obligation on the part of local governments to make available ade-
quate locations suitable to a wide variety of housing opportunities. The New
Jersey court specified examples of cost-increasing regulations that had the im-
permissible, restrictive effect of limiting construction of least-cost housing. In
Pennsylvania and New Jersey proof of a violation of the substantive duty
could be mustered by a showing of impact alone; improper purpose was not
considered a critical component of proof.
The third concept developed seemed to bar a community from recovering
the marginal cost of new development on the ground that if such costs are
high they exclude some socioeconomic groups from the community. In effect,
this is a requirement that developing communites subsidize1 94 some forms of
development because to adopt a "new growth must pay its own way" philoso-
phy will have consequences deemed socially undesirable by the courts.
The New York and California cases on growth control can best be dis-
cussed against this background of intense judicial solicitude for the low and
moderate income housing needs of a region.
With the rise of the environmental movement, the array of land use re-
strictions once deemed exclusionary took on another character. 1 95 Resource
conservation became a widely approved value, and restrictions on rapid sub-
urban growth received a more sympathetic eye from commentators1 96
194. The concept of "subsidy" requires a normative benchmark. The term is generally not ap-
plied if government is merely providing a benefit to which an individual or a group is entitled.
Professor Ellickson uses as his benchmark the historical method of financing services used by a
community. He argues that newcomers are entitled to a level of services commensurate with the
level of services enjoyed by oldtimers. He would charge newcomers the marginal cost of new
services, provided that that form of special revenue raising was used in the past. Ellickson, supra
note 9, at 460-61. See note 178 supra.
Similarly, an "open-up-the-suburbs" proponent, one who takes seriously the affirmative duty of
local government to make a wide variety of housing opportunities available, might object to the
use of the word "subsidy" because one may not properly characterize as a subsidy something that
government is obligated to provide. Services that are appropriately governmental but which are
financed by general tax revenues are inevitably a form of subsidy unless they are user-based.
And, the argument would run, we do not use the term "subsidy" to describe the provision of, for
example, police services in areas that pay a disproportionately lower amount of taxes. Quite the
opposite, there is concern if those poorer areas receive a proportionately lower amount of gov-
ernmental services. See, e.g., Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1972); Hawkins v. Town of
Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). For a discussion of the municipal services cases, see Fessler
& Haar, Beyond the Wrong Side of the Tracks: Municipal Services in the Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 441 (1971).
195. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town ol Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
196. See, e.g., Freilich, Development Timing, Moratoria, and Controlling Growth, 1974 INST. ON
PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 147; Freilich and Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential
Controls-The Essential Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Directions for Land
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and courts. 197 Although many have argued that controls on growth are
functionally indistinguishable from the regulations hitherto deemed ex-
clusionary, 198 the courts have seemed relatively receptive to a variety of re-
strictive measures packaged as growth management schemes. The approaches
of the New York and California courts discussed in this Section are illu-
strative.
Suburban land use restrictions come in many forms. The classic targets of
the open-up-the-suburbs groups have been such zoning practices as minimum
lot size requirements, minimum floor space requirements, exclusion of uses
deemed undesirable (mobile homes), and exclusion or restriction of
multi-family dwellings.' 99 Provided that legislative purpose was the basis of
analysis, these land use restrictions were most likely to fall if preservation of
the character of the community could be discredited as a legitimate goal of
zoning. Subdivision exactions were more troublesome because, while their ef-
fect might be exclusionary, their ostensible rationale appeared benign, or at
least legitimate. Indeed, one of the most far-reaching aspects of the New Jer-
sey cases was their invalidation of subdivision regulations deemed excessively
costly or socioeconomically restrictive.
20 0
The newer forms of restrictions are not aimed ostensibly at influencing the
socioeconomic mix of a community. 2 °' They are characterized by various de-
velopment moratoria or charges on building permits, utility hook ups, and
subdivision approvals.2 0 2 The moratoria may be absolute, in the sense that
approval quotas are established, or couched in terms of performance
standards-developers are permitted to proceed once the growth bottleneck
identified is alleviated, either by public or private investment.
Professor Robert Ellickson, in his major work on suburban growth con-
trols, identifies three types of costs on existing residents that can stem from
new development and which, presumably, a local community might seek to
Use Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Region, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1974); Deutsch, Land Use
Growth Controls: A Case Study of San Jose and Livermore, California, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1 (1974);
Note, Time Controls on Land Use: Prophylactic Law for Planners, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 827 (1972). See
also Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan's
Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77 (1974).
197. E.g., Construction Ind. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.3d 582, 557
P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285
N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
198. See, e.g., Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole
World?, I FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 234 (1973).
199. See generally Bigham & Bostick, supra note 28, at 1120.
200. E.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
183, 336 A.2d 713, 729 (1975), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 12 (1975) (holding that bedroom restric-
tions were clearly contrary to the general welfare).
201. Construction Ind. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma. 522 F.2d 897. 908 n.16 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
202. See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 390-92.
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recoup or forestall: nuisance costs, congestion costs, and fiscal costs. 20 3 As
Ellickson uses the term, nuisance costs "arise when a new housing project is
subnormal in quality. °20 4 That is, any housing development that is below pre-
vailing standards of quality imposes costs on existing residents if, for whatever
reason, it causes nearby land to decrease in value. This is the classic descrip-
tion of an exclusionary purpose, and promotion of that end would likely be
met with hostility as exclusionary. 20 5 The Pennsylvania and New Jersey deci-
sions discussed in the last Section certainly viewed the avoidance of that type
of cost as an impermissible, exclusionary regulatory objective.2 6
Most of the recent suburban growth control activity-construction morato-
ria and quotas-seem aimed at preventing the congestion costs of growth. As
Professor Ellickson correctly notes, much of the housing inhibited by growth
control measures "would be superior in quality to most current housing in
their neighborhoods,' 20 7 a point not lost on reviewing courts.2 0 However, all
growth, even of the ostensibly high style variety, can contribute to such
community-wide disamenities as diminished air and water quality, increased
traffic congestion, and a variety of overcrowding (e.g., of schools or recrea-
tional facilities).20 9 Where courts have perceived land use restrictions as legiti-
mately coping with such congestion costs, they have been more receptive to a
community's police power claims of justifiable regulatory authority.2 10 Indeed,
the perceived distinction between control of congestion and nuisance costs has
played an important role, albeit implicitly, in altering the characterization of
restrictive land use practices from the pejorative "exclusionary zoning" to the
laudable "growth management."''
203. Id. at 441.
204. Id.
205. But see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (holding that zoning to pre-
serve the character of a community is a permissible object of the police power). Professor
Ellickson would allow a municipality to forbid nuisance features unless the antinuisance restric-
tions were grossly inefficient. Ellickson, supra note 9, at 441.
206. Indeed, the first circuit, in reviewing a large lot zoning scheme, went to great lengths to
distinguish the permissible environmental purpose in that case from the exclusionary purposes
struck down in cases involving more highly developed suburban areas. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v.
Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
207. Ellickson, supra note 9, at 441.
208. E.g., Construction Ind. Ass'n. v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.3d 582,
602, 557 P.2d 473, 484, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 52 (1976).
209. For further discussion of these issues, see Keyes, Channeling Metropolitan Growth, 43:2 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. Spring 1979, at 239.
210. E.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d
135 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). Compare Belle Harbor Realty Corp. v. Kerr, 35
N.Y.2d 507, 323 N.E.2d 697, 364 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1974) with Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Vil-
lage of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969). But see Board of
Supervisors v. Horne, 216 Va. 113, 215 S.E.2d 453 (1975) (holding invalid interim moratorium
on the filing of applications for approval of site plans and preliminary subdivision plats).
211. Professor Ellickson takes a somewhat less favorable view of growth management motiva-
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The third cost associated with growth is fiscal: "They arise when the incre-
mental costs to municipal taxpayers of servicing a new development exceed
the incremental municipal revenues the development would engender. 1'' 2 Re-
coupment of the incremental costs of growth characterizes legislation that has
been criticized as exclusionary and sustained as promoting orderly growth.
Here, the disagreement among courts in considering legislation as either
impermissibly exclusionary or acceptable growth management reflects a diver-
gence of basic values. For example, the New Jersey court in Mt. Laurel saw
costly development conditions and exactions to be exclusionary, presumably
even if they reflected the true incremental costs of growth. Implicitly, then,
courts that object to the imposition of the full cost of development on the new
development are requiring a community to subsidize growth.21 Those that
permit recovery of reasonable incremental costs of growth from developers
are apparently willing to allow a balancing of the expanded opportunities of
growth and the desirability of conserving resources. 21 4
A. New York
The New York Court of Appeals confronted the growth management is-
sue in the well known case of Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo.21 Ramapo
was a classic developing community in the Mt. Laurel sense; its population had
increased dramatically and projections indicated continued increases. As part
of its planning process, the town adopted two capital improvements programs
that extended over an eighteen year period. These programs were intended
to implement the land use design of the master plan.
In order to eliminate "premature subdivision and urban sprawl,' 21 6 the
town restricted residential development so that it would "proceed according to
the provision of adequate municipal facilities and services. '2 17 The technique
for restraining growth was to require that residential development proceed
only upon issuance of special permits, which would be granted when specified
tion, even when it is used to prevent congestion costs. Ellickson, supra note 9, at 442-43. He ar-
gues that suburban homeowners are likely to pursue "fiscal squeeze zoning," a term borrowed
from economist Michelle White, see White, Fiscal Zoning in Fragmented Metropolitan Areas, in FISCAL
ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 31 (E. Mills & W. Oates eds. 1975). Ellickson, supra note 9, at
451-52. Ellickson argues that "[t]he preeminent concern in cases of alleged fiscal discrimination
should be to ensure horizontal equity among landowners." Id. at 453. He would oppose growth
management strategies aimed at recouping increased congestion costs if those types of charges
had not been imposed on oldtimers in the community. Charges solely on newcomers, according
to Ellickson, are "instruments of housing monopolization efforts." Id. at 452.
212. Ellickson, supra note 9, at 441.
213. See notes 178, 180 & 194 supra.
214. E.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94
Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
215. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972).
216. Id. at 367, 285 N.E.2d at 295. 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
217. Id.
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performance standards were satisfied. These standards were based on the
availability of designated essential facilities or services, such as sewers, parks,
schools, and roads. 2 18 A development point system was established to deter-
mine when a residential development permit would issue. 2 19 The rationale of
the plan was to coordinate residential growth with the town's orderly plan for
providing facilities and services. 220 Developers were permitted (on their own
initiative) to accumulate development points by providing facilities or services
on their own. In that way, landowners were not locked into the timetable
specified for their parcels in the township's capital improvements program; if
justified by economic circumstances, they could advance the date of develop-
ment by appropriate private investment. 221
The groundwork for the Ramapo plan was extraordinarily well laid. The
town had developed a master plan with funds granted for this purpose by the
federal government. The process of developing the master plan included a
four volume study of existing land uses, community resources and projected
needs. The study proposals were incorporated into the plan, which was
adopted and implemented by a comprehensive zoning ordinance and a capital
improvements program. The sequential growth scheme of special use permits
for residential development was added later as an amendment to the overall
zoning ordinance.
222
It was clear from the opinion that the New York court was impressed by
the town's planning efforts. Judge Scileppi noted that the town's existing facil-
ities were "inadequate to service increasing demands,' 223 and assumed that
the capital improvements program was a legitimate attempt to manage
growth, not a "veiled" attempt at "exclusion. '224 He found the sequential de-
velopment policy to be an "undisputably laudatory" purpose, 225 and charac-
218. Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44.
219. Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144. A proposed residential development
had to accumulate fifteen development points before a special permit would issue. Points were
awarded according to the value assigned to particular improvements. The five essential facilities
or services were sewers, drainage facilities, parks or recreation areas (including schools), roads,
and firehouses. The Town Board could vary the development point requirements if a modifica-
tion or variance would be consistent with the development plan. In addition, other provisions of
the system alleviated potentially unreasonable restrictions. Id.
220. Id. See generally, Freilich, Interim Development Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing Flexi-
ble Planning and Zoning, 49 J. URB. L. 65 (1971).
221. 30 N.Y.2d at 368-69, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144. The Ramapo plan also
provided for a reduction of the assessed value of land for purposes of property taxation during
the period of restriction. Id. at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
222. Id. at 366-67, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142-43.
223. Id. at 366 n.1, 285 N.E.2d at 294 n.l, 334 N Y.S.2d at 142 n..
224. Id. (paraphrasing National Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965)). For a discussion of the effect of a village's refusal to construct an adequate sewage system
while requiring new housing units to be hooked up to the system, see Charles v. Diamond, 41
N.Y.2d 318, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 392 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1977).
225. 30 N.Y.2d at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
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terized the growth plan as "the product of foresighted planning calculated to
promote the welfare of the township. '226
Despite its favorable disposition to the growth management approach
adopted by Ramapo, the New York court was not unaware of the socio-
economic issues involved when local governments impose restrictive land use
controls. Judge Scileppi acknowledged the criticism of "community autonomy
in land use controls because of its pronounced insularism and its correlative
role in . . . crippling efforts toward regional and State-wide problem
solving.1 22 7 Citing the Pennsylvania exclusionary zoning cases, he recognized
the interests of potential residents in the land use activities of a suburban
community. 228 But he felt justified in according local governments the "usual
presumption of validity" 229 in zoning matters because "the povver to zone un-
der current law is vested in local municipalities," and he felt "constrained" to
accept that legislative allocation of authority230 since "matters of land use and
development are peculiarly within the expertise of students of city and subur-
ban planning, and thus well within the legislative prerogative. '23 1 For Judge
Scileppi the propriety of judicial self-restraint in the planning field made
unpalatable the alternative of invalidating a local growth plan, in effect hold-
ing such local initiatives hostage "in the wistful hope" that a regional legisla-
tive planning structure would emerge. 23 2
In approving the Ramapo scheme, the New York court in dictum made it
clear that it would not countenance "community efforts at . . . exclusion. '231
Moreover, citing the Euclid dictum,234 the court indicated that it would con-
sider the impact of land use restrictions on the "general public interest"2 5 as
well as on the community's own general welfare. It recognized that, quite
apart from the benign purpose of a locality in adopting a growth plan, the
court should view as "inherently suspect"2 36 a land use scheme that has the ef-
fect of restricting in-migration. Although the distinction the court was draw-
ing was imprecise, what seemed important was that Ramapo's capital improve-
ments program suggested an accommodation to, not an avoidance of, future
growth.23 7 It was a temporary, albeit lengthy, limitation that was reasonable
226. Id. at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
227. Id. at 374, 285 N.E.2d at 299, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
228. Id. at 375, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
229. Id. at 377, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
230. Id. at 375, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
231. Id. at 376-77, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
232. Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
233. Id. at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
234. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
235. 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
236. Id. at 375, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
237. This had also been a major concern of the Pennsylvania court in National Land and Inv.
Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 528, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (1965) ("Zoning is a means by which a govern-
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given the resources available to the community and the built-in flexibility of
the zoning scheme.
The court's validation of the Ramapo scheme reflected its endorsement of
the goals c' planning;2 38 the Ramapo plan was designed to substitute govern-
mental planning decisions for those of developers as guides for future devel-
opment. 239 Rather than adopting a responsive role for public sector invest-
ment, the Ramapo planners determined in advance the location of and
schedule for public investment, thereby assuming a proactive rather than a re-
active role in channeling development. 240 Moreover, the town accepted the re-
sponsibility of a generalized obligation to accommodate residential develop-
ment, but it did not define this duty in terms of a specific commitment to
particular landowners to accommodate their desire to develop their property.
By accepting the Ramapo approach, the New York court allowed communities
to define whatever affirmative obligations they might have in general terms.
Reasonable capital improvement allocations are all right, even if particular
landowners suffer economic hardship for relatively long periods of time. 241
Subsequent to its Ramapo decision, the New York court had an opportu-
nity to amplify its reasoning with respect to the more traditional exclusionary
zoning claim. In Berenson v. Town of New Castle242 the court dealt with a devel-
oping community that barred multifamily dwellings and set aside most of its
land for one and two acre single-family residences. 24 3 Judge Jasen emphasized
that the Ramapo court had warned that it would not tolerate exclusionary
measures. The Berenson court reached out to develop that Ramapo dictum into
doctrine.2
44
mental body can plan for the future-it may not be used as a means to deny the future.") See
Charles v. Diamond, 41 N.Y.2d 318, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 392 N.Y.2d 594 (1977).
238. The New York Court of Appeals was distinctly less receptive to an amendment to a
zoning ordinance which barred new construction of multiple dwellings throughout a village when
the purpose of the enactment was to "alleviate the burden on the village's sewage disposal plant,
and not because of any requirement of or change in the comprehensive plan for the development
of the village." Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 426, 244
N.E.2d 700, 701, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (1969). See Charles v. Diamond, 41 N.Y.2d 318, 360
N.E.2d 1295, 392 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1977). The coordination between planning and zoning in
Ramapo seems to have been of extreme importance to the court.
239. Some commentators have expressed skepticism about the role of planning in channeling
urban development. See sources cited in note 17 supra. See also Tarlock, Toward a Revised Theory of
Rezoning, 1972 LAND USE CONT. ANN. 141, reprinted in I URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, MANAGEMENT
AND CONTROL OF GROWTH 228 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
240. For discussion of capital improvements as a technique for channeling growth, see
Deutsch, Capital Improvement Controls as Land Use Devices, 9 ENVT'L L. 61 (1978); Hirst & Hirst,
Capital Facilities Planning as a Growth Tool, in 2 URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, MANAGEMENT AND CON-
TROL OF GROWTH 461 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
241. See generally Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land Development,
26 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1974).
242. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
243. Id. at 105, 341 N.E.2d at 239, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
244. In Berenson the lower courts had denied summary judgment. On appeal, the court of
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Implicitly eschewing the New Jersey approach in Mt. Laurel, the New York
court stressed the legislative nature of zoning and the "anomalous" role of a
court that would be "required to perform the tasks of a regional planner. '2 45
As the New York majority did in Ramapo and the New Jersey majority did in
Oakwood at Madison, the Berenson court urged the legislature to establish a
mechanism for regional planning. 246 Simultaneously, the Berenson court reiter-
ated its Ramapo findings-that the development decision cannot rest exclu-
sively in the control of one local community.
The Berenson doctrine included regional factors in the process of judicial
review but was more modest in scope than the New Jersey and Pennsylvania
approaches. With regard to its regulation of land use, a community must pro-
vide a "properly balanced and well ordered plan for the community" that ad-
equately fulfills present and future needs of existing residents.2 47 In addition,
a community must give consideration to regional needs, balancing its own in-
terests with those of the region. 24 8 A reviewing court must "assess the reason-
ableness of what the locality had done,"249 considering the external "effect of
the zoning ordinance on the neighboring communities. '250 In contrast to the
Mt. Laurel approach, however, the court stated carefully that there is no re-
quirement for a community to make room for a use if an appraisal of re-
gional needs indicates that they are being satisfied otherwise. 251 The notion of
community diversity was thus seen as an important value, provided regional
needs were being met satisfactorily.
The New York court's approach in Berenson reflects its sensitivity to the re-
gional issues of suburban land use control cases. In Ramapo that court had ac-
knowledged regional concerns but concluded that Ramapo's phased growth
strategy was a reasonable accommodation of local and regional interests. In
Berenson the court remanded for trial to develop evidence on the issue of rea-
sonableness. By imposing a regional standard without articulating a substan-
tive rule such as "fair share," the New York court entered the suburban
growth control arena more circumspectly than did the New Jersey or
Pennsylvania courts. In essence, the court required local communities to con-
sider regional as well as local welfare concerns in generating their zoning
appeals agreed that factual issues remained to be resolved at the trial level. Instead of routinely
remanding for trial, the court moved to clarify the Ramapo dictum: "In view of the highly signifi-
cant public policy considerations involved, it is necessary that we set forth our views at some
length in order that, upon the trial to be had in this case, the proper factual issues will be consid-
ered." Id. at 107, 341 N.E.2d at 239-40, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
245. Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
248. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
249. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
250. Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
251. Id. at 111,341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
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schemes. The reasonableness standard gives the locality considerable flexibil-
ity, but the court will oversee the process of planning-that regional data are
developed, projections on regional needs made, etc. It sees the locality as
exercising some form of fiduciary responsibility towards its region. This type
of review puts the initial responsibility on communities to determine a fair
balancing of local and regional needs and allows the court to avoid entangle-
ment in the nitty gritty of planning that has surfaced in New Jersey.
B. California
Like New York, California has confronted cases involving growth manage-
ment and claims of socioeconomic exclusion. Like New York's courts, the
courts in California have been sympathetic to the growth limiting actions of
suburban communities, typically declining to characterize restrictive land use
practices as impermissibly exclusionary. Also like New York's courts, the
California courts have recognized the risk of excessive insularity if the local
community is permitted to consider only its own general welfare in exercising
the zoning function.
The California Supreme Court has held valid a variety of building morato-
ria linked to specified performance standards, the type of local activity en-
dorsed in Ramapo. For example, in Builders Association v. Superior Court2 ' the
court sustained an initiative by the voters of the city of San Jose that restricted
rezoning land in certain areas for residential use for two years, pending fur-
ther study of the impact of residential development."' 3 The San Jose initiative
identified certain "impacted" areas of the community based on school enroll-
ments. The goal was to stop further housing construction in areas where
school conditions did not meet performance standards established in the ordi-
nance.
During the two year moratorium, a study was to be commissioned to con-
sider all issues linked to additional residential development. A landowner with
property in an impacted area could be exempted from the moratorium by
agreeing "to provide a satisfactory alternative to permanent school construc-
tion.254 Thus, as in Ramapo, a developer could speed up the development
process by privately meeting the criteria specified in the performance
standards.
In rejecting the challenge to the ordinance, the California court saw "no
reason why the city may not condition approval of the zoning application
252. 13 Cal.3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901
(1976).
253. Id. at 228, 529 P.2d at 583, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 159. For a discussion of the San Jose initia-
tive, see Deutsch, supra note 196.
254. 13 Cal.3d at 228, 529 P.2d at 583-84, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 159-60. Absence of the private in-
vestment alternative is troublesome even for courts that approve moratoria. See Charles v. Dia-
mond, 41 N.Y.2d 318, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 392 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1977).
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upon certification . . .that adequate [school] facilities can be provided. '255 Im-
plicitly, the court indicated that concern with school overcrowding is a legiti-
mate rationale for zoning, and the condition on rezoning was a reasonable
way of coping with the concern.
The court was willing to accept the view that fiscal costs and congestion
costs imposed by new development could properly be exacted from develop-
ers by local, growing communities.2 56 Justice Tobriner, for the majority, cited
(approvingly) an earlier subdivision exaction case for the proposition that a
community can require the dedication of land or a payment of a fee in lieu of
dedication "if the need for increased facilities was attributable to the develop-
er's activities.
25 7
Unlike the New Jersey approach, the California cases do not seem to de-
termine the reasonableness of the cost imposed on the developer in an abso-
lute sense, but examine the reasonableness of the amount imposed in light of
the costs the municipality would likely incur as a result of the development.
In a broad decision that upheld a park land dedication exaction as part of a
subdivision control provision, the court recognized that subdividers may tack
on to the cost of housing the dedication charges, passing along higher costs to
the consumers in the form of higher prices . 2 5 It acknowleged that a commu-
nity might attempt to "prevent the influx of economically depressed per-
sons"2 "9 by setting a charge "unreasonably high," but in contrast to the New
Jersey court's approach, the California court's concept of reasonableness
appears to be related to the notion of marginal cost from new development
-i.e., whether the exaction is fairly traceable to costs imposed by new de-
velopment, both in cause and amount. The Walnut Creek court was aware that
high subdivision exactions could deter construction of low-cost housing, but it
concluded that "these considerations must be balanced against the phenome-
non of the appallingly rapid disappearance of open areas in and around our
255. 13 Cal.3d at 232, 529 P.2d at 587. 118 Cal. Rptr. at 163. Whether subdivision approvals
can be linked to off-site conditions not intrinsic to the development itself has been questioned in
other contexts. See, e.g.. Garipay v. Town of Hanover, 116 N.H. 34, 351 A.2d 64 (1976)
(upholding denial of proposed subdivision on ground of inadequacy of main network of town
roads to handle increased traffic caused by the subdivision). But see Belle Harbor Realty Corp. v.
Kerr, 35 N.Y.2d 507, 323 N.E.2d 697, 364 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1974) (holding that an antiquated sew-
age system did not justify revocation of building permits unless revocation was calculated to alle-
viate or prevent a crisis condition dangerous to public health and municipality was presently
rectifying problem).
256. 13 Cal.3d at 232 n.6, 529 P.2d at 587 n.6, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 163 n.6.
257. Id. The Court cited Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d 633,
484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed. 404 U.S. 878 (1971), and in turn noted
that case's reliance on Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442
(1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
258. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d 633, 648, 484 P.2d 606,
618, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 642 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
259. Id. at 642, 484 P.2d at 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
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cities. '2 60 Consequently, in the subdivision area2 61 and, subsequently, in the
San Jose growth moratorium context,2 6 2 the California court was prepared to
accept the proposition that new growth need not be subsidized, but can be
compelled by developing communities to pay for the costs associated with de-
velopment.
The willingness of the California Supreme Court to permit local units of
government to manage growth by imposing significant development exactions
and requiring that substantial performance standards be met is paralleled by
that court's awareness of the competing values involved. As the New York
Court of Appeals did in Ramapo, the California court has recognized the po-
tential for excessive burdens a community can impose on those not living
within its political boundary at any given time but who consider the commu-
nity part of their relevant housing market.
As the New York court did in Berenson, the California court in Associated
Home Builders v. City of Livermore263 held that if a land use restriction has an
effect beyond the boundaries of the enacting municipality, its constitutionality
depends not only on its effect on the enacting community "but upon the wel-
fare of the surrounding region" as well." The court declined to adopt a rig-
orous standard of review, reaffirming "the established constitutional principle
that a local land use ordinance falls within the authority of the police power if
it is reasonably related to the public welfare." ' 5 It extended the scope of the
relevant constituency whose welfare must be considered to include "the in-
terests of nonresidents who are not represented in the city legislative body
and cannot vote on a city initiative.1
266
A reviewing court in California, under Livermore, is constrained to examine
regional interests, but there is no substantive duty imposed on municipalities
other than being reasonable in their treatment of regional interests, since the
"proper constitutional test is one which inquires whether the ordinance rea-
sonably relates to the welfare of those whom it significantly affects. '26 7 The
court was well aware of the "deep social antagonisms" involved in the "conflict
between the environmental protectionists and the egalitarian humanists. '"266
The competing interests reflect a "collision between the forces that would save
the benefits of nature and those that would preserve the opportunity of peo-
260. Id.
261. See id.
262. Builders Ass'n v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158
(1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
263. 18 Cal.3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
264. Id. at 601, 557 P.2d at 483, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
265. Id. at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 608, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
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pie in general to settle. '2 9 Provided that the municipality's ordinance "repre-
sents a reasonable accommodation of the competing interests" between those
asserting a "vital interest in limiting immigration" and those "[o]utsiders
searching for a place to live in the face of a growing shortage of adequate
housing, ' '27 0 the court will sustain it.
In articulating its reasonableness standard, the court in Livermore noted ex-
plicitly the continued propriety of judicial deference to legislative land use
judgments, 2 71 an approach consistent with that announced in Euclid,272 but in-
consistent with the strict scrutiny approach of the New Jersey2 73 and
Pennsylvania courts.2 74  Nevertheless, in light of the political nonrep-
resentation of regional interests in a suburban community's legislative pro-
cess, 271 the court noted that the reasonableness criterion would not be tooth-
less: "There must be a reasonable basis in fact, not fancy, to support the legis-
lative determination. '276 This statement suggests that the court will not dream
up rationales to support a community's actions, 2 7  but, while the court indi-
cated that "judicial deference is not judicial abdication, ' 27 8 it stated that the
party challenging the validity of the ordinance has the burden of presenting
the evidence and documentation needed by the reviewing court if the general
presumption of validity is to be overcome. 279
In Ramapo the New York court emphasized the temporary nature of the
development restriction, the town's plans for an orderly capital improvements
program, and the ability of developers to obtain development points by pri-
vate construction of specified facilities. 28 0 The California decision in the San
Jose case reflected many of these same considerations. 281 The Livermore ordi-
nance, however, was more far-reaching than either the Ramapo or San Jose
scheme since it did not commit the city to a construction program, had no
time delimitation, and allowed no private construction alternative. Rather, the
269. Id.
270. Id. at 609, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
271. Id. at 609, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
272. 272 U.S. at 388 ("If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be
fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.")
273. See Section III.B. supra.
274. See Section III.A. supra.
275. This factor persuades Professor Ellickson that an activist state court review is appropri-
ate. See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 463-75.
276. 18 Cal.3d at 609, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
277. For a discussion of state court activism in the economic substantive due process area, see
Note, State Economic Substantive Due Process: A Proposed Approach, 88 YALE L. J. 1487 (1979).
278. 18 Cal.3d at 609, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
279. Id.
280. 30 N.Y.2d at 366-67, 368, 379, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95, 296, 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142-43,
144, 153.
281. See Builders Ass'n v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 225, 233, 529 P.2d 582, 587, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 158, 163 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
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ordinance barred the issuance of additional residential construction permits
until educational, sewage and water supply standards were satisfied.
The California Supreme .Court did not rule the ordinance constitutional
but remanded for development of evidence on reasonableness. 282 In the re-
view process, the trial court need only "forecast the probable effect and dura-
tion of the restriction," by ascertaining "the extent to which public facilities
currently fall short of the specified standards .... whether the city or appro-
priate regional agencies have undertaken to construct needed improvements,"
and "when the improvements are likely to be completed. ' 283 Although consid-
erable ambiguity remains on this point, the California rule may be more per-
missive to developing municipalities than the doctrine of Ramapo, in which the
New York court stressed the saving features and the community's commit-
ment to proceeding with capital improvements. Certainly, Livermore did not
suggest, as Ramapo had, that lack of a legislatively adopted plan for coping
with growth by meeting the established performance standards might result in
a holding adverse to the community.2 84 The extent to which California will
impose a judicially defined duty on suburban communities to invest in public
improvements to accommodate growth must await subsequent decisions.
V
FEDERAL COURT TREATMENT OF CHALLENGES TO
RESTRICTIVE LAND USE PRACTICES
In differing degrees, the courts of Pennsylvania,2 8 ' New Jersey,28 6 New
York28 7 and California28 8 have recognized the significance of regional factors
in determining the validity of suburban land use controls. In that sense they
have developed the dictum in Euclid about regional concerns2 89 into substan-
tive doctrine-elaborate and complex in the case of Pennsylvania and New
282. The court required that the ordinance be reasonably related to the public welfare. Since
zoning ordinances have a presumption of constitutionality, they "come before the court with ev-
ery intendment in their favor." 18 Cal.3d at 605, 557 P.2d at 486. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54. Some
other states, notably Virginia, have imposed a more stringent review under the reasonableness
criterion. See, e.g., Matthews v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 218 Va. 720, 237 S.E.2d 128 (1977). See
also Board of Supervisors v. Horne, 216 Va. 113, 215 S.E.2d 453 (1975). The New York courts
have intimated that they might take a tougher stance in the absence of a private investment
alternative and in the absence of a rational growth management plan. See Charles v. Diamond, 41
N.Y.2d 318, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 392 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1977).
283. 18 Cal.3d at 608, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
284. The suggestion in Ramapo was discussed at greater length in Charles v. Diamond, 41
N.Y.2d 318, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 392 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1977).
285. See Section I1.A. supra.
286. See Section IlI.B. supra.
287. See Section IV.A. supra.
288. See Section IV.B. supra.
289. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
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Jersey, 2 9 more tentative and skeletal in New York and California. In part, the
differences in approach reflect the varying perceptions of suburban land use
controls as either exclusionary-a pejorative label and a practice to be
condemned 29 1 -or oriented toward an orderly management of growth and
development-a commendable goal to be looked on with favor.2 92
For state courts sensitive to the exclusionary effect of suburban land use
restrictions, recognition of the regional nature of the problem has been cou-
pled with a growing hostility to zoning purposes considered exclusionary.
Consequently, the Pennsylvania and New Jersey courts have been relatively
unreceptive to suburban claims that "fiscal" or "preservation-of-the-character-
of-the-community" objectives justify exclusionary land use practices. The will-
ingness of these state courts to narrow the range of legitimate or overriding
local zoning objectives has been an important component of their assault on
exclusionary zoning.
2 a
Quite apart from the focus on regionalism and disfavored purposes, the
state courts have also developed a rich body of case law that derives from the
Nectow decision. 294 These cases focus on the harm or injustice done to individ-
ual landowners by the application of a particular land use regulation. The
Pennsylvania and New York courts have been particularly solicitous of land-
owner interests in protecting against perceived governmental overreaching. 29 5
290. For consideration of the problem of complex remedies in cases of exclusionary zoning,
see Ellickson, supra note 9, at 490-93; Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427,
1700-07 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Zoning Development]; Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies
in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 137, at 766-86.
291. Professor Sager, for instance, has described exclusionary zoning as a "deplorable circum-
stance." Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of East Lake v. Forest City
Enterprises, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1420 (1978). Ostensible federal court acquiesence in these
practices is dismissed sarcastically: "[M]ean and self-serving acts of exclusion are apparently to be
received as jeweled exercises of the police power." Id. at 1421. See also Hogue, Eastlake and
Arlington Heights: New Hurdles in Regulatory Urban Land Use?, 28 CASE W. L. REV. 41 (1977); Sager,
supra note 28, at 791 ("What is at issue is a governmental act that strongly reinforces the social
propensity to form tight little islands of residential exclusivity."); Zoning Development, supra note
290, at 1625-32.
292. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972); Freilich, supra note 196.
293. See Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington
Heights, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1217, 1227 (1977) ("The principles used by the state courts to review
the constitutionality of zoning amendments are substantive, not process-oriented; the courts ex-
amine the substantive reasons for granting a zoning amendment, not the process by which an
amendment was granted.")
294. See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
295. See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 591, 350 N.E.2d
381, 383, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 7 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) ("The State may not, un-
der the guise of regulation by zoning, deprive the owner of the reasonable income productive or
other private use of his property and thus destroy all but a bare residue of its economic value.");
Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d
7 (1974); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land and
Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965)
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Despite the articulated deference to local legislative judgments, state courts
have in fact accepted a more aggressive role in reviewing suburban land use
decisions than would be expected by examination of the broad body of recent
federal economic substantive due process cases. 296 This type of interven-
tionism has received support 297 even from those who advocate restraint
with respect to federal judicial intervention.29 '
In this Section federal court developments in the land use control context
will be examined and contrasted with the state court developments analyzed
in the two Sections above. The discussion will examine initially the Supreme
Court's treatment of challenges to local zoning purposes, noting how only
race has been deemed an unacceptable local legislative objective.299 Next, the
analysis will turn to cases in which litigants have urged that the interests of
broader constituencies be considered in adjudicating the validity of local
zoning measures. The Supreme Court has steadfastly declined to develop its
regionalism dictum in Euclid into substantive constitutional doctrine. In Sub-
section C. the restrained federal judicial role in land use adjudication will be
discussed and contrasted with the rather interventionist approaches of the
state courts that have struck out at exclusionary land use practices. In this re-
gard, the analysis will cover the federal role in fashioning remedies, in al-
lowing access to sue, and in reviewing the zoning procedures. Subsection D.
will consider the permissible scope of government regulation of individual
landowners' freedom to use their property, as elaborated by the Supreme
Court.
A. Proper Zoning Purposes
The Supreme Court has not been receptive to challenges of local govern-
mental action based on alleged failure to pursue a valid police power objec-
tive. Whereas state courts articulated the public purpose doctrine as a limita-
("[Z]oning involves governmental restrictions upon a landowner's constitutionally guaranteed
right to use his property, unfettered, except in very specific instances, by governmental restric-
tions") (footnotes omitted).
296. For an indication of the rubber-stamp nature of federal constitutional review under eco-
nomic substantive due process, see North Dakota Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc.,
414 U.S. 156 (1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("We have returned to the
original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs
for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.") For comparable cases under
equal protection, see City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 812 (1976); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356
(1973).
297. See Sager, supra note 291, at 1400-02; Zoning Development, supra note 290, at 1707-08.
298. E.g., Ellickson, supra note 9, at 469-75.
299. See generally Hogue, supra note 291, at 66-81; Mandelker, supra note 293, at 1236-49;
Wright, Constitutional Rights and Land Use Planning: The New Era and the Old Reality, 1977 DUKE
L.J. 841, 861-65.
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tion on state police power activity,3"' the Supreme Court has declined to
interfere with what it deemed a legislative function.
The decision upholding the validity of the urban renewal program3 0 ' set
the tone. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, made it abundantly clear that
no federal counterpart to the state-derived public purpose doctrine existed.
Once the legislative body chose a policy goal and an implementing strategy,
that was conclusive unless some constitutionally protected interest were im-
paired by the governmental action.3 0 2 Berman, therefore, established that the
federal constitution's protection against governmental infringement of indi-
vidual rights (for example, the requirement that it pay just compensation
when it condemns land 3 3) would be the only source of redress for aggrieved
landowners. Restrictions on the source of federal power through a vibrant
public purpose doctrine or by putting teeth into the Fifth Amendment's "pub-
lic use" limitation on the eminent domain power3 0 4 of government were es-
chewed.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas30 5 the Court held valid a local zoning ordi-
nance that restricted land use to single-family dwellings and defined "family"
to include a maximum of two unrelated persons constituting a single house-
keeping unit.3 0 6 Belle Terre had about 700 residents and 250 homes.3 0 7 Lo-
300. E.g., Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Hous. Auth., 304 Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665
(1939); Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin'g Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968).
See 6 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 2, at § 24.09; note 2 supra. See generally, Note Some Legal and Eco-
nomic Aspects of Industrial Development Financing, 22 VAND. L. REV. 159, 174-80 (1968).
301. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
302. Id. at 32.
303. U.S. CONST., amend. V. See notes 550-51 infra.
304. In Berman the Court identified a proper public purpose with the "public use" concept ex-
pressed in the Constitution. In essence, the Court held that condemnation was merely a means of
achieving a permissible governmental goal. Once the legislature determined that there was a
proper public purpose, something about which the federal court would not intervene, the land-
owner's interest was protected merely by payment of just compensation. Berman, therefore,
seemed to eliminate public use as a restriction on governmental eminent domain power. 348 U.S.
at 33.
Although it is often difficult to determine what uses are properly public within the terms of the
fifth amendment, it is not self-evident that the public purpose and public use concepts should be
found to be identical. Thus, our law typically allows a landowner to refuse to sell his land for en-
tirely subjective reasons. This has been labeled a protection of that entitlement by a property
rule. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Ca-
thedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). The fifth amendment permits government to use
its power of eminent domain by the payment of just compensation. That authority transforms the
form of legal protection of a private entitlement from a property rule to a liability rule. Damages
are then paid according to the objective market value of the land at its highest and best use. Au-
tonomous subjective valuation is ignored. It is arguable that the fifth amendment's public use re-
striction should be treated as an independent limitation on governmental power, since the use of
eminent domain is different from typical coercive exercises of police power in that it transforms
the form of legal protection accorded to private entitlements from property rule protection to lia-
bility rule protection. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra.
305. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
306. Id. at 2.
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cated near the Stony Brook campus of the State University of New York,
Belle Terre's land area comprised less than one square mile; the zoning ordi-
nance was apparently designed to exclude boarding houses and fraternity
houses populated by student groups."'
The Boraas plaintiffs alleged that the zoning ordinance "expresse[d] the so-
cial preferences of the residents for groups that will be congenial to them;
that social homogeneity is not a legitimate interest of government .. 0.. ,,309 The
Court concluded that the zoning provision affected no fundamental interest
protected by the federal constitution and did not classify on a suspect basis
such as race. Therefore, Justice Douglas found that only "economic and social
legislation" 0 was involved, and consequently the standard for reviewing that
legislative classification was the extremely deferential rationality criterion.
Recognizing that multiple occupancy in "boarding houses, fraternity houses,
and the like ' 31' can increase congestion and noise, the Court noted:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted
are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This
goal is a permissible one within Berman v. Parker ..... The police power is not
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to
lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet se-
clusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.3 1 2
Consequently, in Boraas the Supreme Court adhered to its permissive view
of governmental goals as expressed earlier in Berman v. Parker. Despite the ex-
clusionary effect of the zoning ordinance, the Court upheld it because it ra-
tionally furthered a legitimate goal.3 1 3 The environmental values espoused by
the village were permissible, and the Court would not overturn the ordinance
because it had the effect of promoting social homogeneity. Federal court in-
tervention would be warranted only if a fundamental interest were in-
fringed3 14 or a suspect classification were involved. Environmental purposes
would be treated with the same kind of judicial deference traditionally
granted to social and economic legislation,3 1 5 even if the result were the exclu-
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 7.
310. Id. at 8.
311. Id. at 9.
312. Id.
313. Apparently, the entire Court was in agreement on this issue. The dissenters argued that
the legitimate goal intruded upon basic freedom of association values. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
314. Whether or not a fundamental interest was at stake seems to be the issue that separated
the majority and the dissent. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-506 (1977)
(plurality opinion).
315. Cf. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (lst Cir. 1972) (upholding
large-lot zoning because of potentially hazardous environmental impact).
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sion of certain groups who might be "uncongenial '3 16 to the residents of Belle
Terre. In short, the federal constitution was no bar to a local community's ac-
tion to preserve its own character.
The extent to which the Supreme Court would accept a character of the
community rationale was demonstrated in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc.3t1 in which the Court held valid Detroit's zoning restrictions on adult
movie theatres. In Young, Detroit sought to disperse adult movie theatres
(those exhibiting sexually explicit films) as part of a campaign to combat
neighborhood deterioration. Presumably, the concentration of certain types of
businesses in an area adversely affects property values and promotes neigh-
borhood instability.31 8
It is not surprising that the Court found the anti-skid row purpose of the
zoning ordinance valid.3 19 Given Euclid and Boraas, it is also not surprising
that the Court would "accord[] high respect" to "the city's interest in at-
tempting to preserve the quality of urban life."3 ' What is dramatic about the
Young decision is that in "requir[ing] adult theatres to be separated rather
than concentrated in the same areas, ' 321 Detroit was drawing a legislative dis-
tinction based on the content of the expressive activity regulated, a practice
that many had thought to be precluded by the First Amendment.3 22
The Court acknowledged that First Amendment values were implicated by
Detroit's zoning ordinance since the materials exhibited in adult movie houses
were not legally obscene. 323 Justice Stevens, for the plurality, concluded that
legislation can classify expressive activity on the basis of content, provided
there is no breach of "government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its
regulation of protected communication, ' 324 and provided further that the
classification can be "justified by the city's interest in preserving the character
of its neighborhoods. 325
The Court resolved Young by using a balancing analysis. Justice Stevens
For state court treatments of environmental factors in a land use context, see e.g., SAVE A
VALUABLE ENVIRONMENT v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash.2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978) (holding
that a municipality has a duty to serve regional welfare when the interest at stake is the quality of
the environmenent); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
316. 416 U.S. at 7.
317. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
318. Id. at 55.
319. Id. at 71. Justice Powell joined the plurality on this point. Id. at 73-74, 80 (Powell, J., con-
curring).
320. Id. at 71.
321. Id.
322. The Court had previously held that "above all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject mat-
ter, or its content." Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). Justice Stewart, for the four
dissenters, called the majority's decision "an aberration." 427 U.S. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
323. 427 U.S. at 62.
324. Id. at 70.
325. Id. at 71.
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disparaged the magnitude of the First Amendment interests involved by noting
that society's stake in the exhibition of erotic materials was much less substan-
tial than its interest in political expression. 32 6 He also noted that the zoning
ordinance did not totally suppress communication, but rather limited the
place where adult films could be exhibited. 2 7 In this way, Justice Stevens (and
Justice Powell in his pivotal concurring opinion 32 8) diminished the weight to
be accorded the interests in free expression that were impaired by the Detroit
ordinance.
At the same time, Justice Stevens was studiously vague in determining how
important the city's interests had to be in order to justify infringement of
even the diminished First Amendment interests involved.329 The Court's plu-
rality opinion simply stated that the Court would not "appraise the wisdom3 50
of the ordinance but that "the [c]ity's interest in the present and future char-
acter of its neighborhoods adequately supports its classification of motion pic-
tures."3 3 ' The opinion refrained from endorsing the entirely permissive
standard applied to social and economic legislation adopted in Boraas, but it
articulated only the conclusory finding that the city's justification was "ade-
quate."322
The Young decision is significant in the context of this Subsection because
of its broad deference to governmental zoning goals and its willingness to
permit these objectives to prevail even in the face of a confrontation between
zoning and fundamental First Amendment values. Both the Stevens plurality
326. Id. at 70. As Justice Stevens put it, "few of us would march our sons and daughters off
to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theatres of
our choice." Id. The dissent sharply criticized "such majoritarian limitations on individual liberty,"
stating that, "if the guarantees of the First Amendment were reserved for expression that more
than a 'few of us' would take up arms to defend, then the right of free expression would be de-
fined and circumscribed by current popular opinion." Id. at 86 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 71.
328. Id. at 77-78 (Powell, J., concurring).
329. Justice Powell avoided this form of balancing by adopting the four-part test of United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), a draft-card burning case. Under O'Brien, govern-
mental regulation is justified, despite incidental impact on speech interests, " 'if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and it
the incidental restriction on . . . First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.' " 427 U.S. at 79-80, (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting 391 U.S. at
377). Justice Powell concluded that the zoning regulation passed constitutional muster under
these criteria. 427 U.S. at 80.
330. Id. at 71.
331. Id. at 72.
332. Id. Certainly Justice Stevens steered far clear of the compelling interest formula that
might be expected in a first amendment context. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972). Cf. Linmark Assocs. Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977) (ban on real
estate "For Sale" signs, which had an impact on the free flow of public information, must be
justified by an overriding governmental objective); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (cam-
paign finance law, which implicated fundamental first amendment interests, could be sustained
only if government showed a sufficiently important interest and used narrowly drawn means).
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and the Powell concurring opinions evince great deference to a city's use of its
zoning authority to combat "serious problems ' 333 and to promote interests
that are "both important and substantial. 3 34 In the face of serious First
Amendment questions, Young makes it clear that the Court is disinclined to in-
tervene in the zoning process, absent more direct and pervasive intrusion on
basic constitutionally protected interests. 335
The deference to governmental land use decisions reflected in Euclid,
Boraas and Young indicates that the Supreme Court is unwilling to develop
Constitutional doctrines that would limit local growth management initiatives
by aggressively barring exclusionary land use practices. It is only with respect
to decisions based on racial criteria that the Court has agreed to intervene.3 3 6
The Court's concern about race-based zoning dates to its 1917 decision in
Buchanan v. Warley, 337 in which the racial grounds of classification in the land
use scheme were explicit. After the desegregation cases, 338 it comes as no sur-
prise that an identifiably racial criterion for governmental action would be
treated as suspect, reversing the ordinary presumption of validity and shifting
the burden onto the locality to show that use of a racial classification was nec-
essary to promote a compelling or overriding governmental interest. 339 The
issue in the zoning context was what standard would be applied to determine
whether or not a measure was racially discriminatory. 340
It is here that the adoption of either a purpose or an effect test is so im-
portant. Some federal cases had suggested that "the substantially dispropor-
tionate racial impact of a statute or official practice standing alone and with-
out regard to discriminatory purpose, suffices to prove racial discrimination
.... ,,341 In Washington v. Davis34 2 the Court rejected the unequal impact rule 343
as a means of establishing racial discrimination. Justice White, for the major-
333. 427 U.S. at 71 (per Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion).
334. Id. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring).
335. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a zoning law
that had the effect of prohibiting extended families from living in the same dwelling unit);
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (invalidating a ban on real
estate "For Sale" signs, which was designed to promote stable, integrated housing, because ordi-
nance impermissibly interfered with the flow of commercial communication).
336. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
But see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). Moore, which is
idiosyncratic, is not without its racial overtones. See id. at 508-10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
337. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
338. E.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I
(1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
339. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1101 (1969) [herein-
after cited as Equal Protection Development].
340. See generally Mandelker, supra note 293, at 1236-42.
341. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 (1976).
342. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
343. Id. at 247-48 and n.14.
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ity, concluded that proof of discriminatory purpose was a necessary ingredi-
ent in a finding of racial discrimination.3 44 The Washington Court declined to
hold suspect a "statute designed to serve neutral ends ... if in practice it ben-
efits or burdens one race more than another .... 345
A year prior to the Washington decision, the Supreme Court had dismissed
a broad challenge to a suburban land use scheme on the ground that the
many and varied plaintiffs lacked standing.3 46 That often criticized opinion,
347
to be discussed in Subsection C.2. 348 can be seen in retrospect as some-
thing of a holding action, signaling the Court's unwillingness to adjudicate
broad-scale social issues in the suburban zoning context, at least until a con-
sensus had been forged on substantive doctrine. This was recognized by
Justice Douglas, who in dissent thought the majority "read[] the complaint
and the record with antagonistic eyes, ' 3 49 and by Justice Brennan, who noted
in dissent that "[w]hile the Court gives lip service to the principle . . . that
'standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that
particular conduct is illegal,' . . . in fact the opinion . . . can be explained only
by an indefensible hostility to the claim on the merits."3 5
The standing requirement in Warth-that a zoning challenge be project-
based-was consistent with the purpose analysis subsequently adopted in
Washington for proving racial discrimination. The Court, in the term following
the Washington decision, had the opportunity to apply its criteria in the land
use setting. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp." ' involved a challenge to a suburb's refusal to rezone a fifteen acre
parcel from a single-family to a multifamily classification, a change that would
accommodate a proposed housing development for low and moderate income
tenants. 352 The existence of a project proposal and the leasing of a specific
site satisfied the Warth standing criteria, 35 3 and the Court proceeded, on the
merits, to rely on Washington's holding "that official action will not be held
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate im-
pact. '354 In order to find a federal constitutional violation of equal protection,
"[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required. 35
344. Id. at 239-48.
345. Id. at 248.
346. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
347. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-21 (1978) ("[O]ne can only regard as
aberrational in the extreme the decision in Warth v. Seldin. ... ); Sager, supra note 291, at
1376-1402.
348. See Section V.C.2. infra.
349. 422 U.S. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
350. Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion, id. at 500).
351. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
352. Id. at 254.
353. See Section V.C.2. infra.
354. 429 U.S. at 264-65.
355. Id. at 265.
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Arlington Heights makes explicit in the land use area that, as a matter of
federal constitutional law, no affirmative duty exists for suburban communi-
ties to accommodate multifamily dwellings. All that plaintiffs can expect from
federal courts is that they will police suburban land use practices intended to
discriminate against racial minorities.
Arlington Heights indicates that a plaintiff need not prove that a "chal-
lenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. . . . or even
that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one. '35 6 On the
other hand, a showing that "a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating
factor in the decision '3 57 does not end the analysis. A community still has the
opportunity to establish that the "same decision would have resulted even had
the impermissible purpose not been considered. '358 Consequently, the dis-
criminatory purpose must indeed be the proximate cause of the challenged
action, but, once a prima facie case is established, the burden of persuasion
on the issue of causation rests with the local government.
3 59
The prima facie case of discriminatory purpose can be established in a va-
riety of ways. Where "a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than
race, emerges from the effect of the state action, ' 360 an inference of imper-
missible purpose is possible, but Justice Powell noted that "such cases are
rare"361 and made it clear that the pattern of proof must be "stark. '362 Other
factors to consider are the historical background, the "specific sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision,' 363 a deviation from normal pro-
cedural practices, a departure from substantive criteria applied elsewhere, and
the legislative or administrative history (including minutes of meetings or leg-
islative reports).3 64
356. Id.
357. Id. at 265-66.
358. Id. at 270 n.21.
359. Id. This is the analytical mode established in Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274 (1977). There, the Court indicated that when a teacher made out a prima facie case that
his termination by the school board had been impermissibly motivated by considerations barred
by the first amendment, the school board still had an opportunity to show that the teacher would
have been fired on permissible grounds. That is, the initial burden is placed upon a plaintiff to
show improper motivation. If this is satisfied, the government must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have acted in the same manner on totally permissible grounds. Id. at
287.
360. 429 U.S. at 266.
361. Id.
362. Id. Justice Powell cited the decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), to in-
dicate just how stark the facts must be. In Gomillion a state legislature redrew a city's boundaries,
altering the shape from a square to an irregular twenty-eight-sided figure. Id. at 340. The gerry-
mandering removed from the city all but a handful of its 400 black voters while not a single
white voter was affected. Id. at 341. This deprivation of the blacks' preexisting municipal vote was
found to violate the fifteenth amendment. Id. at 346.
363. 429 U.S. at 267.
364. Id. at 266-68.
[Vol. 43: No. 2
Page 5: Spring 1979]
Specification of the factors that can lead to a finding of racially discrimina-
tory purpose has both attractions and drawbacks from a complainant's per-
spective. It does provide guidance with respect to presenting proof and indi-
cates that circumstantial evidence is probative. 36 1 It also, however, furnishes
well-counseled municipalities with a virtual handbook for duplicity, allowing
communities to excise reference to race from the public record and encourag-
ing them at the same time to fill the record with boilerplate so that, if a prima
facie case is established, ample rebuttal evidence on proximate causation will
be available.
The narrowness of the Washington-Arlington Heights doctrine is apparent.
Disproportionate impact, what the Court has labeled the "naked statistical ar-
gumen ,"366 will not permit judicial intervention even if the disproportionate
effect on racial or certain socioeconomic groups is foreseeable. 36 7 Thus, the
Court has rejected a claim that a program that treated Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients (predominantly blacks and Mexican-
Americans) worse than other categorical assistance beneficiaries resulted in a
racial classification. 368 It has declined to infer race discrimination from a ref-
erendum requirement for approving the construction of low income housing,
refusing to draw the nexus between socioeconomic status and race. 36 9
Justice Stewart recently noted, in a claimed gender-based discrimination
context, that "[t]he calculus of effects, the manner in which a particular law
reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility. '3 0
That comment characterizes accurately the approach of the Supreme Court in
reviewing legislative classifications in the land use field. 371 The Court has
been extremely reticent to intervene, restricting its role to policing against
race discrimination. Even then, it has applied a narrow interpretation of what
constitutes race discrimination. It has required a showing that a course of con-
365. Justice Stevens emphasized this point in his Washington concurrence. 426 U.S. at 253.
And, presumably, this explains the partial concurrence by Justices Marshall and Brennan in
Arlington Heights. See 429 U.S. at 271-72 (Marshall, J., concurring).
366. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972).
367. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2295-96 (1979).
368. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
369. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)
(explicit racial classification). For further discussion of these points, see Blumstein, Constitutional
Prespectives on Governmental Decisions Affecting Human Life and Health, 40:4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.,
Autumn 1976, at 231, 289-93 (1976); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories
of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 43-50 (1977); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 582-89 (1977).
370. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2292 (1979). For a discussion of gender-
based discrimination prior to and consistent with Feeney, see Blumstein, supra note 369, at 293-97.
371. Some courts have recognized the implications of the intent-based standard for proving
race discrimination and have found such a view to be excessively narrow in interpreting the fed-
eral Fair Housing Act. See, e.g., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). See also Section VIA.
infra.
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duct was pursued "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its ad-
verse effects upon an identifiable group. '37 2 The Court has also provided am-
ple opportunity to local governments to develop an antiseptic record that can
either refute an inference of racial motivation or can justify their actions
(even if race discrimination is actually found as a motivating factor). Clearly,
concern with the effects of legislative actions on low and moderate income
groups is deemed a political matter not warranting federal judicial interces-
sion. The scrutiny of legislative purposes is minimal and the deference to leg-
islative judgments is extraordinary except where there is proof of racially
discriminatory motivation, in which case such deference "is no longer
justified. 37 3
B. The Scope of the Appropriate Constituency
Despite the dictum in Euclid that regional interests might require, in some
circumstances, the subordination of local welfare to that of a broader public,
the Supreme Court has declined to expand the scope of the relevant constitu-
ency in reviewing local land use cases. This general reticence to broaden the
scope of the appropriate constituency beyond state-defined geographical
boundaries is also reflected in the analogous voter qualification cases. This
Subsection will consider both lines of cases.
In Boraa 3 74 the village-imposed zoning limitation on households having
more than two unmarried persons was considered entirely within the context
of the general welfare of the village of Belle Terre, the enacting community.
This lesson of Boraas was not lost on the ninth circuit when it heard a challenge
to the growth limitation plan adopted by the California city of Petaluma.3 75
Facing rapid population growth as it became part of the San Francisco Bay
Area metropolitan housing market, Petaluma temporarily froze develop-
ment.37 6 After a study of the recent housing growth in the community, the
city imposed (ostensibly for a five-year period) a housing development cap at
500 dwelling units per year.377 The trial court found that the growth limita-
tion was enacted to restrict the rate of increase in new housing and to control
the rate of population growth through in-migration.3 78 The evidence indica-
372. 99 S. Ct. at 2296.
373. 429 U.S. at 266.
374. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
375. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897. (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 934 (1976).
376. Id. at 900.
377. Id. at 901. The city's growth plan also provided for the following: a "greenbelt" to circle
the city and contain expansion; an intricate point system whereby a builder obtained building
permits by conforming to city environmental, social, aesthetic and recreational goals; an even geo-
graphical distribution of development; and a guaranteed amount of low and moderate income
housing. The city also solicited the county to take appropriate measures in areas outside the city
in order to facilitate the city's plans. Id.
378. Id. at 902 (citing Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 576
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ted that if Petaluma's program were enacted by other municipalities through-
out the region, "the impact on the housing market would be substantial."3 '9
With respect to the city of Petaluma alone, however, no decrease in housing
opportunities for low and middle income persons would result because the
plan increased the availability in Petaluma of multifamily units.3 8 0 Since the
trial court found that Petaluma enacted the growth control cap for the pur-
pose of excluding people who otherwise would have moved to the city and
that the cap had that exclusionary effect, plaintiffs argued that the plan was
invalid. 31 The ninth circuit, however, concluded that a finding of exclusion-
ary purpose or effect did not end the analysis. Rather, the panel proceeded to
"determine ... whether the exclusion bears any rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state interest. '3s2 If the housing cap promoted a legitimate interest of the
enacting community, the court would defer to the legislative judgment.3 3
Relying on Boraas3s * the court held that preserving the small town charac-
ter of the community and avoiding "uncontrolled and rapid growth" were
within the police power as "within the broad concept of 'public welfare'." 385
Even though Petaluma's action adversely affected regional housing condi-
tions by curtailing increases in supply, the ninth circuit declined to invalidate
the Petaluma plan because of its regional impact.
[Ulnilateral land use decisions by one local entity affect the needs and re-
sources of an entire region. [citations omitted] It does not necessarily follow,
however, that the due process rights of builders and landowners are violated
merely because a local entity exercises in its own self-interest the police power
lawfully delegated to it by the state. [citations omitted] If the present system
of delegated zoning power does not effectively serve the state interest in fur-
thering the general welfare of the region or entire state, it is the state legisla-
ture's and not the federal court's role to intervene and adjust the system.3 6
(N.D. Cal. 1974)). The 500-unit cap reflected a fifty percent reduction in the rate of increase in
the two years immediately prior to adoption of the plan. That figure may be exaggerated, how-
ever, because the cap excluded residential developments of fewer than five units. 522 F.2d at
901-02.
379. Id. at 902.
380. Id.
381. See text accompanying notes 341-73, 378-79 supra.
382. 522 F.2d at 906 (italics in original).
383. Id. The plaintiffs in Petaluma, two landowners and a building association, asserted a con-
stitutional right to travel claim. As the court found that the plaintiffs' legitimate economic inter-
ests fell "outside the zone of interest to be protected by any purported constitutional right to
travel," id. at 904, that claim fell within the prudential limitation on standing established by the
Supreme Court in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). (See text accompanying notes 445-54 in-
fra.) Plaintiffs were barred from asserting the rights of newcomers in order to obtain relief from
injury to themselves. This could be done only by "those individuals whose mobility is impaired."
522 F.2d at 904.
384. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See also Ybarra v. City of Los Altos
Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
385. 522 F.2d at 906.
386. Id. at 908.
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Thus, the ninth circuit explicitly declined to expand the scope of its analysis
of the public welfare concept to incorporate regional as well as local interests.
It refused to place itself in the position of determining "the point at which le-
gitimate local interests in promoting the welfare of the community are out-
weighed by legitimate regional interests,' 3 7 implicitly rejecting the invitation
suggested by the dictum in Euclid.
The extent of the Supreme Court's refusal to establish a locality's duty to
accommodate broader regional interests is reflected not only in its willingness
to impose regional criteria in reviewing local land use regulations but also in
its recent decisions in the analogous voting rights area.3 8 8 Despite the evolution
of a strict standard of review in cases where residents are selectively excluded
from the franchise, the Court has been unwilling to extend the doctrine of
the voter qualification cases to recognize interests of nonresidents. Even when
a city has legislative police power authority over an extraterritorial area whose
geographical boundaries are definitively established by state legislation, the
Court has declined to apply the rationale of the voter qualification cases. Con-
sequently, residents in extraterritorial areas, who are bound by municipal de-
cisions but who do not participate in municipal elections, have not been ac-
corded the benefit of the stricter standard of review applied in voter
qualification cases. Because of the close analytical parallels between the extra-
territorial voting rights situation and the regional focus in the land-use con-
text, the voting rights developments are worthy of attention in considering
the Court's treatment of the constituency issue.
In a line of cases commencing with Carrington v. Rash38 9 in 1965, the Su-
preme Court held invalid a variety of restrictions on voter qualifications. In
Carrington, Texas had precluded servicemen from ever acquiring resident
status for voting purposes if, prior to entering the service, they had not been
Texas residents. 39 ° The Court held that this form of classification-based on a
"conclusive presumption that their necessarily transient status precluded them
from being bona fide residents"3 9 1-violated equal protection since it affected
the ability of servicemen to vote-that is, to exercise their fundamental inter-
est in participating in the political process.
Carrington was followed by a series of cases 3 92 that established the general
387. Id. The Court was adamant in its refusal to sit as "a super zoning board." Id. Although it
recognized that present methods of supplying housing in metropolitan areas were inadequate, the
Court found the extensive controversy aroused by the Petaluma litigation to be "compelling evi-
dence that resolution of the important housing and environmental issues raised here is exclu-
sively the domain of the legislature." Id. at 909 n. 17. See generally Note, supra note 241, at 605-11.
388. See generally Blumstein, The Supreme Court and Voter Eligibility, in ISSUES OF ELECTORAL
REFORM 74 (R. Carlson ed. 1974).
389. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
390. Id.
391. Town of Lockport v. Citizens For Community Action, 430 U.S. 259, 267 n.12 (1977).
392. E.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); City of
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proposition that since "statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foun-
dation of our representative society, ' 393 such statutes are subject to "exacting
judicial scrutiny. ' 394 Consequently, where a statute selectively distributes the
franchise, the exclusion of some potentially qualified voters can only be
justified if "necessary to promote a compelling state interest,"395 the tradi-
tional formula for strict scrutiny.
3 96
These voter qualification cases recognized that the state could limit partici-
pation in an election to those "primarily interested" or "primarily affected, ' 3 9 7
and they all involved situations where the challenge was brought by a poten-
tial voter who met the basic age, citizenship and residency requirements for
voting.3 98 Nevertheless, recognition of the stake of potential residents in the
land use decision making process of local governments 399 led some to the con-
clusion that the voter qualification cases offered a mechanism for the Court to
impose a broader voting constituency on local governments, at least in situa-
tions where external interests in local land use decision-making were discerni-
ble.400 Such expansion of the voting constituency would presumably increase
the legitimacy of the locality's land use decisions.
Even proponents of the use of the voter qualification cases in the local
zoning context acknowledged that the appropriate remedies-"provid[ing]
outsiders access to suburban communities or ...enlarg[ing] the constituency
by drawing new jurisdictional lines"°-were cumbersome for courts to order.
Instead, the recommendation was that a court hold invalid the existing sys-
tem, "explain the principles upon which it bases it decision,"40 2 and allow the
legislature to provide a solution within the framework enunciated by the
court.
4 03
One of the major practical difficulties in fashioning judicial relief in such a
hypothetical challenge is to determine the scope of the affected constituency
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
But see Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improv. Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973);
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). See generally Blumstein, supra note
388.
393. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
394. Id. at 628.
395. Id. at 627 (citing to Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)).
396. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972). See generally Equal Protection Develop-
ment, supra note 339, at 1120-22.
397. 395 U.S. at 632. See Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improv. Dist., 410
U.S. 743 (1973); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
398. E.g., 395 U.S. at 625.
399. See Note, supra note 193.
400. See Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 (1970).
401. Id. at 923.
402. Id. at 924.
403. Id.
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beyond the local unit's boundaries. 4°4 Applying the strict scrutiny standard with-
in a fixed, legislatively determined geographic area is considerably more man-
ageable than ranging into the fine calculations necessary to determine who
should participate in the political process of a community because she is affected
by its decisions.40 5
In a real sense, then, if the voter qualification cases were to be applied to a
claim by nonresidents that they be permitted to participate in a community's
political process, the most likely candidate for success would be a situation in
which the legislature had exhaustively defined the geographical limits of the
extraterritorial area. Specifically, where a city is granted extraterritorial police
power over a defined area whose residents have no voice in the city's political
arena, one would think that extension of the rationale of the voter qualifica-
tion cases would be most acceptable from the perspective of judicial managea-
bility. Although the existing political constituency would be expanded, the
courts would have clear, legislatively-determined boundaries to confine the
scope of judicial discretion in formulating a remedy.40 6
The Court's reluctance to interfere with the autonomy of the political
structure of local units of government, 40 7 even in the most favorable para-
digm case, was evidenced recently in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa 408 in
which the Court rejected a challenge by nonresidents of Tuscaloosa to the
city's exercise of the police power over them. Alabama statutes granted
Tuscaloosa specified police powers over nonresidents living within three miles
404. This, of course, has been a major difficulty for the states that have adopted the regional
fair share concept. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.3d 582, 608,
557 P.2d 473, 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 56 (1976); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 498-500, 371 A.2d 1192, 1200-01 (1977); Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 189-190, 336 A.2d 713, 733 (1975), appeal
dismissed, 414 U.S. 12 (1975). For federal treatment of similar issues see Kollar v. City of
Tucson, 319 F. Supp. 482 (D. Ariz. 1970), aff'd mem., 402 U.S. 967 (1971). The problem of
defining a "region" has elicited a considerable amount of commentary. E.g., Ackerman, supra
note 134, at 24-27; Rose, supra note 137, at 717-20.
405. This point was emphasized in the voter residency litigation. See Appellee's Brief at 26-28,
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
406. Cf Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (city school district not allowed to
secede from county system when to do so would impair effectiveness of court-ordered
desegregation of county system). The Court's task was made easier by the state's definition of the
county as the appropriate original jurisdiction for a school district. See also United States v.
Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
407. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) ("Municipal corporations
are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the
governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them .... [T]he State is supreme, and
... may do as it will [with these corporations], unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of
the United States.") But cf. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 n.10 (1969)
("[Sitatutes structuring local government units receive no less exacting an examination merely be-
cause the state legislature is fairly elected."); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 481 n.6
(1968) ("Inequitable apportionment of local governing bodies offends the Constitution.
408. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
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of the city, provided the areas were unincorporated; these nonresidents were
ineligible to vote in city elections.
In upholding the Alabama statute the Court noted that the voter qualifica-
tion cases all had a "common characteristic,"4" 9 namely "the challenged statute
in each case denied the franchise to individuals who were physically residents
within the geographic boundaries of the governmental entity concerned."41 0
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, was clearly concerned with the practical
difficulties of abandoning the residency criterion that had been accepted in
prior cases.4"1 He did not even mention the three-mile geographical limitation
contained in the Alabama statute, concluding instead that the voting qualifica-
tion cases would be confined to situations where the potential voter is a resi-
dent of "the geographical boundary of the governmental unit at issue.
1 12
In this way, the issue in Holt was "stripped of its voting rights attire,
' 413
and the Court proceeded to emphasize its reluctance, despite the reapportion-
ment and voting qualification cases, to intrude on "the extraordinarily wide
latitude that states have in creating various types of political subdivisions and
conferring authority upon them. 41 4 Accordingly, the Court applied its most
deferential form of rationality standard 4 1  and concluded that the statute's
provisions were rational.
Justice Brennan noted in dissent that "[tihe criterion of geographical resi-
dency is ...entirely arbitrary when applied to this case." '4 16 By refusing to ap-
ply the strict scrutiny of the voting qualification cases, he argued, "the court
cede[d] to geography a talismanic significance contrary to the theory and
meaning of our past voting rights cases. ' 41 7 The criterion of residency was ap-
proved in earlier cases, according to Justice Brennan, because it helped define
the relevant political community. Since such a community depends, for its le-
gitimacy, on "the notion of a reciprocal relationship between the process of
government and those who subject themselves to that process by choosing to
409. Id. at 86.
410. Id. An interesting parallel, not mentioned by the majority or the dissent, is the racial
gerrymandering of Tuskegee, Alabama, held violative of the fifteenth amendment in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). If a nonresident has no constitutionally-protected interest in
voting in a particular geographic constituency, it is difficult to see how this fifteenth amendment
right to vote has been impaired by a racial gerrymander. See note 362 supra.
411. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419,
422 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965).
412. 439 U.S. at 70.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 71.
415. According to the Court "[a]uthority to make those [governmental structure] judgments
resides in the state legislature, and Alabama citizens are free to urge their proposals to that body.
... Our inquiry is limited to the question whether 'any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify' Alabama's system of police jurisdictions. Id. at 74 (citations omitted).
416. Id. at 89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
417. Id. at 81.
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live within the area of its authoritative application, ' 418 the dissent argued that
"[s]tatutes ...which fracture this relationship by severing the connection be-
tween the process of government and those who are governed in the places of
their residency .. .undermine the very purposes . . . [for approving] . . .
bona fide residency requirements. ' 419
Moreover, pragmatically, the plaintiffs actually lived within the geographic
boundaries established by the state for the exercise of extraterritorial author-
ity. In that sense, the challengers had, for the dissent, a valid claim to resi-
dency status within the area of Tuscaloosa's police power authority.
If the Court were inclined to extend the doctrine established in the voting
qualification cases, Holt would have been a good candidate for many of the
reasons voiced by Justice Brennan in his cogent dissent. The depth of the
Court's disinclination to impose obligations on localities to nonresidents is evi-
dent from the extraordinarily restrained review applied in Holt, reminiscent
of the highly deferential formulation in Boraas.420 Consequently, in both the
zoning and the voting qualification contexts the Court has been unwilling to
intervene to curtail local autonomy in the name of those whose interests are
affected but who are not participants in the local unit's political process.421
Quite clearly, this federal judicial posture is at odds with the stance adopted
by the courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and even by the courts in New
York and California.
C. Remedial and Procedural Issues
Substantively, the Supreme Court has been extremely reticent to intervene
in local land use decisions. Only racial classifications have been more than
minimally scrutinized 422 and the Court has steadfastly declined to infer racial
classifications from evidence of disproportionate impact.42 3 In addition, the
418. Id. at 82.
419. Id.
420. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). Holt was not, however, a com-
plete blank check approval of municipal extraterritorial power over bordering areas. See 439 U.S.
60, 72-73 n.8 (1978). The Court suggested that the extraterritorial powers of cities might not
"pass constitutional muster" if they included "the vital and traditional authorities of cities and
towns to levy ad valorem taxes, invoke the power of eminent domain, and zone property for
various types of uses." Id. The dissent would have characterized the Holt situation as such a case,
see id. at 82 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting), since the challenged statute "sever[ed] the connection
between the process of government and those who are governed in the places of their residency
.... " Id. at 82.
421. For another example of deference to state structural decisions in the voting context, see
Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977) (upholding dual city
and county majority for adoption of charter). Cf. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (showing
deference to county political boundaries in a reapportionment context); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S.
182 (1971) (permitting deviation from one person, one vote standard because of historical func-
tional interdependence of county and town subdivisions in New York).
422. But see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Zoning Development, supra
note 290, at 1568-74.
423. See text accompanying notes 366-67 supra.
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Court has refused to impose a duty on local governments to accommodate re-
gional interests. These developments in the evolution of substantive doctrine
are paralleled in the Court's narrowing of its role: (1) in ordering remedies
for constitutional violations of a municipality beyond its borders; (2) in al-
lowing litigants standing to challenge the validity of allegedly unconstitutional
local zoning ordinances; and (3) in sustaining zoning procedures that may
adversely affect the interests of landowners and potential residents by com-
mitting zoning decisions to the vicissitudes of ad hoc political decision making
through the referendum process. Decisions in each of these areas will be con-
sidered in turn.
1. Extraterritorial Remedies
In declining to impose regional obligations on local governments, the
Court has narrowly circumscribed its role in reviewing local government land
use decisions. Even where local governments have acted in an unconstitutional
way, the Court has been extremely reluctant to impose a remedy that disre-
gards political boundaries established by the states.4 24
Although the principles of one person, one vote necessarily resulted in the
judicially imposed redrawing of legislative district lines,42 5 the Court has been
sensitive to the peculiar needs of local units of governments, permitting
greater deviations from strict mathematical precision in order to respect polit-
ical boundaries4 2 6 and local functional arrangements. 42 7 It has recognized the
desirability of encouraging local accommodations 428 and bent over backwards
to facilitate creation of special, limited function units of government by essen-
tially immunizing them from basic voting rights principles. 429 In short, the
Court has continued to respect its early view 430 that states should have consid-
erable freedom in structuring their system of local governments. 431
In Milliken v. Bradley432 the Court reversed a lower court's order for a
school desegregation remedy beyond the boundary of Detroit. 433 The district
judge assumed that school district lines were not insurmountable obstacles to
424. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
425. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
426. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
427. See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
428. E.g., Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977); Dusch v.
Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
429. See Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improv. Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973);
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). But see Hadley v. Junior College
Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
430. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
431. See Town of Lockport, 430 U.S. at 271-72.
432. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
433. The lower courts had found de jure segregation within the Detroit school system. Id. at
724-28, 734-35. This finding was not seriously challenged in the Supreme Court. Id. at 738 n.18,
748.
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federal judicial equitable power. 434 In his view, effective desegregation re-
quired a remedy beyond the Detroit system; that view was influenced by the
district judge's apparent perception that desegregation required, as a substan-
tive matter, a certain degree of actual racial mixing. Without an interdistrict
order, there simply were not sufficient white children to result in significant
racial mixing.
43 5
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion emphasized that racial balance is
not an affirmative constitutional guarantee. 43 6 Moreover, local autonomy in
education was an important value that federal courts could not ignore. In or-
der to justify an interdistrict remedy, the Court required a showing either
that the district lines were drawn deliberately on a racial basis or that the ra-
cial discrimination of a local district actually caused interdistrict segrega-
tion.4 37 Those narrow grounds for an interdistrict remedy circumscribe the
434. Id. at 741.
435. Justice Marshall took this position in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 783-90, 803-05
(Marshall, J. dissenting).
436. Id. at 740-41. The majority opinion relied upon Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).
437. 418 U.S. at 745. The decision in Milliken imposed a duty on plaintiff to show either in-
tentional segregation in the structuring of districts or discriminatory acts of one district which
had a causal relationship to segregation in an adjacent district. Id. Thus, plaintiff had the burden
of showing, through demographic and other data, that there had been a racially discriminatory
impact beyond the district in which the showing of deliberate segregation had been made.
In the earlier decision of Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the Court had estab-
lished a very different burden of proof. Within a single district, a plaintiff need only show inten-
tionally segregative acts within a meaningful portion of the district. That showing constitutes a
prima facie case of reciprocal segregative effects beyond the area, but still within the district. Id.
at 208. The school district then must show, to defeat a finding of liability, that these presumed
reciprocal effects did not materialize. Id. at 204-05, 213. This could be proven if, for example,
the area in which the segregative intent occurred was shown to be a "separate, identifiable and
unrelated unit" of the district. Id. at 203, 205, 213.
With respect to the finding of intent, once a plaintiff shows an intent to segregate in a signifi-
cant portion of a single district, the Court will presume that defacto segregation in the rest of the
district was not accidental, but arose from that same discriminatory intent. Id. at 208-10, 213.
That element in the finding of Keyes drew a stinging rebuke from Justice Rehnquist in dissent.
He labeled that presumption as analogous to the doctrine of "taint" which was still to be found in
some "primitive" legal systems. Id. at 257 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Under the Keyes presumption formulation, the school district theoretically has an opportunity
to disprove the presumption, but the burden of proof is virtually insurmountable. See, e.g.,
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2971 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
99 S. Ct. 2971, 2982 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The district must prove a negative-
namely, that there was no discriminatory intent or that the segregation would have arisen in any
case despite the actions of the school board. 413 U.S. at 211, 213-14.
In Milliken, neither of the Keyes presumptions was applied. The common sense basis for the
presumption about intent-that a single school district was involved-did not exist. With respect
to the reciprocal effect analysis, the Court concluded that deference to political boundaries of
school districts was a matter of great importance. Presumably, using the Keyes reasoning, a politi-
cal school district line created a separate, identical, and unrelated district, unless the plaintiffs
could prove otherwise.
The dissenters in Milliken argued that the State of Michigan was implicated in the discrimina-
tory behavior. 418 U.S. at 790-98 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For that reason, they concluded that
the Keyes analysis was much more appropriate than the majority suggested. Id. at 793-98.
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Court's equitable authority where the structure of local governments is at
stake.
The Milliken doctrine is consistent with the Court's refusal, in the land use
area, to impose affirmative regional duties on municipalities. Because Milliken
"was premised on a controlling principle governing the permissible scope of
federal judicial power, ' 438 it has broad application beyond the school de-
segregation context. It was not merely the consequence of a balancing pro-
cess among competing equitable principles; rather, it "was based on basic limi-
tations on the exercise of the equity power of the federal courts.143 9 As such,
Milliken's principles of interdistrict relief, even where racial discrimination
against a municipality has been found, are presumably applicable in a land
use context.44 ° The narrow range for interdistrict relief is further evidence of
the Supreme Court's disinclination to impose regional duties or remedies on
local units of government, whose authority and jurisdiction have been estab-
lished under state law.44 '
2. Standing
The Court's reluctance to countenance sweeping remedies that transcend
local boundaries, to narrow the range of permissible zoning purposes, or to
develop substantive doctrines that establish regional obligations for local units
of government is manifest in its restrictive interpretation of standing doctrine
in the exclusionary zoning context.
Warth v. Seldin 442 involved a broad systemic challenge to the zoning scheme
of Penfield, a suburb of Rochester, New York. The plaintiffs, in what was ob-
viously a major law reform lawsuit, have been described by a sympathetic
commentator as having the "mutually supportive qualities of a troop deploy-
ment. ' 443 They included individual nonresidents who alleged that the zoning
438. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 294 n.Il (1976).
439. Id. at 294.
440. In Hills, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the Milliken analysis could not be con-
fined to a school district setting. Id. at 294-95. Nevertheless, the Hills Court awarded a remedy
which extended beyond the local unit of government.
The unanimous Court based the broader relief on a finding that the federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was guilty of racially discriminatory actions. Id. at 289.
HUD had areawide jurisdiction that extended beyond the city limits as did the Chicago Housing
Authority (CHA), which had also been found guilty of racial discrimination. Id. at 286, 298.
Furthermore, HUD did not need local governmental approval for construction of low-cost
housing in a suburb except in certain specified instances. Id. at 304. The Court, therefore, felt no
discomfort in ordering HUD to exercise authority it already had under governing federal law
and in ordering the CHA to exercise similar authority granted by state law.
441. Where the geographical jurisdiction is so defined as to further racially discriminatory ob-
jectives, Milliken allows judicial rejection of state-drawn boundaries. See note 437 supra. For an ex-
ample of racial boundary drawing, see United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484
(1972).
442. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
443. Sager, supra note 291, at 1376 n.9.
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practices of Penfield had the effect of excluding them from living in the com-
munity. 444 Without deciding the merits, the Court held that none of the plain-
tiffs had standing. For the five-to-four majority, Justice Powell distinguished
between two types of standing: constitutional and prudential. 445 The constitu-
tional doctrine of standing is a threshold inquiry mandated by the "case or
controversy" requirement of Article 111.446 In this sense, "standing imports
justiciability," that is "whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide
the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. '447 The constitutional limita-
tion, therefore, "determin[es] the power of the court to entertain the suit,"448
whether federal jurisdiction can be invoked by a given plaintiff who seeks the
"exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf. '449
The prudential limitations on standing announced in Warth, "essentially
matters of judicial self-governance,"4 5 ° are imposed because of the Court's
concern about its legitimacy which stems from its unelective nature and the
life tenure of its members. 45 ' Justice Powell made it clear that the prudential
limitations on standing allowed courts to shun "abstract questions of wide
public significance" where "judicial intervention may be unnecessary to pro-
tect individual rights." '45 2
In the factual context of Warth, the major example of a prudential limita-
tion on standing was the requirement that a plaintiff assert his own legal
rights and interests, not those of third parties. 4 3 That disposed of the claims
444. Other plaintiffs included Rochester property owners and taxpayers who alleged that the
exclusionary practices resulted in higher tax rates within the city, a builders' association which al-
leged that the exclusionary practices resulted in loss of profits and business opportunities on the
part of its members, a nonprofit housing council which was interested in developing low and
moderate cost housing, and Metro-Act, a citizens' action group which sought to alleviate the hous-
ing shortage in Monroe County. 422 U.S. at 493-517 passim. For a discussion of the standing re-
quirements as applied to these plaintiffs, see The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47,
189-95 (1975).
445. Justice Powell first made this distinction in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
181 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
446. "The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Con-
stitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties . . . [and] to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party .... U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
447. 422 U.S. at 498.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 498-99.
450. Id. at 500.
451. Justice Powell had earlier warned of this concern. "Relaxation of standing requirements
is directly related to the expansion of judicial power .... We should be ever mindful of the con-
tradictions that would arise if a democracy were to permit general oversight of the elected
branches of government by a nonrepresentative, and in large measure insulated, judicial branch."
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). But see Wright, Professor Bickel,
The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
452. 422 U.S. at 500.
453. Id. at 499. Justice Powell also wrote that "[wihen the asserted harm is a 'generalized
grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone
normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction." Id. This is the traditional requirement that "a
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of residents of Penfield, who were asserting the rights of allegedly excluded
nonresidents. 454 One important feature of a prudentially-imposed standing
rule is that it can be overturned by an explicit legislative judgment that the
courts should take on the case. 45 5 Provided the Court, out of self-restraint, de-
clines to hear a case because of the absence of legislative authorization, it fol-
lows that the Court can adjudicate an issue when standing is statutorily
conferred.
At least with respect to the prudential standing component of Warth, a
remedy lies with the legislature. More serious from a plaintiff's perspective
is the Article III component of Warth, which held that nonresidents did not
satisfy the basic constitutional minimum to pass the "case or controversy"
threshold. 45 6 That decision, resting on the Constitution, is not so readily al-
tered by legislative action.
Warth identified two components to the "injury in fact" that is necessary to
achieve constitutional standing. 457 First, a plaintiff must allege a "distinct and
palpable injury to himself;"4 8 that is, a nonresident plaintiff must allege "spe-
cific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him. 459
Second, the plaintiff must show that there is a "substantial probability" 480 that
he will "personally . . .benefit in a tangible way from the court's interven-
tion.1'4 t Thus, in addition to harm, a plaintiff must show that there is a causal
relationship between the Court's action and some tangible personal benefit. 4 62
plaintiff must allege some particularized injury that sets him apart from the man on the street."
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 194 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). That prong of the
Warth decision seems to have been somewhat undermined by the recent decision in Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), in which the Court de-
clined to apply the limitation "to all cases as a matter of course." Id. at 80. Where the constitu-
tional standing requirements are met and "[w]here a party champions his own rights, . . . the
basic practical and prudential concerns underlying the standing doctrine are generally satisfied
.... " Id. at 80-81.
454. 422 U.S. at 514.
455. Id. at 509. For an example of a broad interpretation of a statutory conferral of standing,
see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing third party standing
under Fair Housing Act). Accord, Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
456. 422 U.S. at 502. The New Jersey Supreme Court's approach to standing, like its ap-
proach on the substantive issues, is strikingly at variance with federal standing doctrine. See
Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 159 n.3, 336 A.2d
713, 717 n.3 (1975).
457. The Court in Warth did not mention the traditional requirement that a plaintiff's claim
come within the zone of interest protected by the constitutional or statutory provision involved.
For discussion of this requirement see Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318,
320-21 n.3 (1977); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164-66 (1970); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-54 (1970); L. TRIBE, supra note 347, at § 3-22; Sager,
supra note 291, at 1377-81.
458. 422 U.S. at 501.
459. Id. at 508 (emphasis in original).
460. Id. at 504.
461. Id. at 508.
462. The causal nexus requirement was elaborated on in the subsequent case of Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39, 44-46 (1976).
PROLEGOMENON
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Despite Justice Powell's assertion that standing does not turn on the mer-
its, 463 he conceded that it often does depend on the "nature and source of the
claim asserted."' 4 64 The dissenters perceived that the constricted view of cau-
sality in Warth must stem from hostility to judicial involvement in such matters
of local political structure, which have significant socioeconomic overtones.
465
That view is shared by those who observe that "[t]he remedy-injury nexus ...
reflects the Court's reluctance to decide abstract social issues or to determine
complex claims of cause and effect."
4 6
The Warth decision has come in for considerable criticism, 467 with Professor
Sager labeling the Warth causality rule "an analytical embarrassment, ' 468 and
Professor Tribe calling the result "aberrational 46" and "harsh and bizarre.
47 0
Careful, and even casual, readers of Warth must be struck by the theme of
judicial self-restraint that Justice Powell first introduced into the law of stand-
ing in his concurrence in United States v. Richardson.471 To the extent that mat-
ters of grave public policy are brought into federal court by an expansively
defined law of standing, the courts are bound to come into increasing conflict
with the political decisions of popularly elected officials.472 For Justice Powell,
the intellectual heritage of Justice Frankfurter and Professor Bicke14 73 coun-
sels caution before allowing judicial intrusion in broad political matters.
The prudential standing doctrine, with its emphasis on deference to legis-
latively conferred standing, conforms closely to the Powell view that the Court
should enter a cooperative political dialogue with the legislative branch, im-
posing limits on its own authority but accepting expansion of its role at the
behest of Congress.
The causality requirement in Warth, viewed sympathetically, may be an at-
463. 422 U.S. at 500.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority
openly admitted its reluctance to interfere in the political process. See id. at 508 n. 18 ("[Zoning
laws] are . . .subject to judicial review in a proper case. But citizens dissatisfied with provisions of
such laws need not overlook the availability of the normal democratic process.").
466. Zoning Development, supra note 290, at 1663. According to that commentator, "[i]n the
majority's view, to reach the merits of the alleged constitutional violation in Warth would be to in-
vite judicial participation in a complicated reordering of perceived local decision making." Id.
See also Sager, supra note 291, at 1389 ("IT]he Court is reluctant to have the federal judiciary as-
sume the prominent role in the process of land use planning which the adjudication of far-
reaching claims of zoning exclusion would require"); Zoning Development, supra, at 1663 n. 159.
467. E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 347, at § 3-21; Note, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Land Use
Devices in Federal Courts after Warth v. Seldin, 29 STAN. L. REv. 323, 345-49 (1977).
468. Sager, supra note 291, at 1388 (footnote omitted).
469. L. TRIBE, supra note 347, at 96.
470. Id. at 97.
471. 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974). See also note 451 supra.
472. 418 U.S. at 188.
473. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREMF COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); Bickel, The
Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). See also
Blum stein, The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction-Reform Proposals, Discretionary Review, and Writ Dismissals,
26 VAND. L. REV. 895, 901-16 (1973); Wright, supra note 451.
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tempt to channel constitutional challenges into what Professor Sager has
called the Marbury model4 7 4-that is, constraining judicial review by limiting
it to the personal rights of individual litigants.47 5 The classic justification for
judicial review has been the notion that courts, almost against their will, are
dragged into constitutional adjudication only as an incident of their core role
of vindicating individual rights. A requirement that a judicial decree benefit a
plaintiff in a tangible way is a reasonably faithful adaptation of the law of
standing to the principles of Marbuy-at least one version of Marbury.4 76
The problem in Warth is the "substantial probability" language and the al-
most tortured and speculative basis of the Court's analysis of the interests of
nonresident plaintiffs. This is most glaring in an extended footnote in which
Justice Powell attempted to rebut the causal relationship between a judicial in-
validation of the zoning ordinances and the nonresident plaintiffs' potential to
benefit from such a decree.4 77 After all, it does seem likely that if restrictive
land use regulations are stricken, at least the filter down rationale of Oakwood
at Madison4 71 would suggest expanded opportunities for low and moderate in-
come persons.
4 79
The basic question for the Powell analysis, however, is whether the invoca-
tion of the Court's authority is appropriate when only a structural change in
the housing market will come about and the resulting benefit would be of a
"statistical" rather than an "identifiable" variety.4"' One can understand why a
court seeking to uphold the Marbury model might well conclude that the
broad systemic challenge represented by Warth should be narrowed so that
the range of issues to be considered by a court can be more narrowly con-
fined to those of more immediate benefit to identifiable individuals.
Nevertheless, even if one is understanding toward the Court's "bias against
systemic zoning attacks,"4 s t one must conclude that Warth's standard ("sub-
474. Sager, supra note 291, at 1377-81.
475. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
476. For a thorough discussion of the various possible interpretations of Marbury, see Van
Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
477. 422 U.S. at 506 n. 16. See Zoning Development, supra note 290, at 1663 nn. 158 & 161.
478. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 513-14, 371 A.2d 1192,
1208 (1977). See notes 161 & 163 supra and accompanying text.
479. Compare the rigorous causality requirement in Warth with the more permissive standard
in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.. 438 U.S. 59, 80-81 (1978). It
was clear that a majority of the Duke Power Court wished to reach the merits of the claim, as was
duly noted by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 95 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
480. These terms are derived from the medical services context. They describe the ability of
society to cope with statistical lives-the lives lost through higher speed limits or lax safety
requirements-more easily than it copes with identifiable lives-the balloonist lost at sea or the
astronaut lost in space. See Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1969); Havighurst &
Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L.
REV. 6, 21-23 (1975); Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovbjerg, Strategies in Underwriting the Costs of Cat-
astrophic Disease, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1976, at 122, 140-45.
481. Sager, supra note 291, at 1393 n.68.
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stantial probability" of achieving an ultimate benefit) is excessively strin-
gent.48 2 The Court's rapid reformulation of that rule in subsequent deci-
sions48 3 suggests that Warth is best read as an interstitial decision, articulating
for a majority the twin concepts of constitutional and prudential standing and
introducing the causality concept as a component of constitutional standing.
Arising in a land use context, Warth preceded the decision in Washington v.
Davis,48 4 which crystallized federal constitutional doctrine in reviewing local
land use decisions. In this regard, perhaps it is worth more prominent atten-
tion that the majority treated the claim as one of economic discrimination. 485
Although Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion treated the complaint as
alleging purposeful racial discrimination, the majority consistently regarded
the case as one involving at most purposeful exclusion of low and moderate
income persons.
48 6
Given the ambiguity in the contemporaneous development of substantive
doctrine, 487 Warth may best be seen as a holding action, barring broad sys-
temic challenges until such time that substantive doctrine could be elaborated
and clarified through an evolving consensus. Of course, there is ample room
for criticism of that type of ruling,4 88 but it does conform to the ascendant ma-
jority's general deference to and faith in legislative processes,48 9 its somewhat
romantic conviction that democratic processes will function fairly without judi-
cial oversight, 49 ° and its general aversion at ordering major institutional
restructuring. 4 9 1
That Warth's barrier to exclusionary zoning litigation was not insuperable
was made manifest less than two years later, after the Washington49 decision
established the analytical framework for determining how racial discrimina-
tion was shown in a constitutional context. In the Arlington Heights49 3 case, the
Court found standing for a nonresident plaintiff.4 94 There was a specific pro-
ject involved, and so the focus of analysis was narrowed. The nonresident
plaintiff lived twenty miles from Arlington Heights but worked in a factory
482. The standard also seems malleable and subject to the Court's perception of the merits of
a complaint. See note 479 supra. Compare Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26
(1976) with Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
483. E.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
See note 453 supra.
484. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
485. 422 U.S. at 513 & n.21; Zoning Development, supra note 290, at 1664 n. 162.
486. 422 U.S. at 493, 495, 496, 502, 507, 512-13 & n.21; Sager, supra note 291, at 1376 n.8.
487. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976).
488. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 291, at 1390; Zoning Development, supra note 290, at 1663
n.159.
489. See Blumstein, supra note 153, at 477 n.13.
490. E.g., Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 506 n.23 (1977).
491. E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
492. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See text accompanying notes 343 & 344 supra.
493. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
494. Id. at 264.
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there. He alleged that, if the project were built, he would be eligible to move
there, closer to his job.49 5
The Court decided that the nonresident individual had standing because
he would probably benefit if the project were built and if the Court granted
relief the project would actually be built. This chain of causation is far from
certain49 6 and the standard seems less rigorously applied than in Warth.4 97
Moreover, with respect to the nonprofit housing developer, the Court seemed
to apply not a standard of "substantial probability" but a somewhat more leni-
ent "like[lihood]" criterion.4 98
The existence of a specific project and the decision in Washington that set
out an analytical framework made the Arlington Heights situation more con-
tainable from the perspective of Justice Powell. Applying the intentional dis-
crimination test of Washington, the Court found no substantive violation.49 9
The application of Washington to the land use context makes it seem more
plausible that Warth was indeed a holding action. After the anlysis in Arlington
Heights, it would appear difficult if not impossible as a practical matter to
make out a claim of racial discrimination in zoning, especially using a "sys-
temic" theory. However, if a community is sufficiently blatant in its racist ap-
proach, it is likely to be manifest in one or a set of identifiable projects. In
such a case, a plaintiff need not be excessively intimidated by the more out-
landish speculations of Warth. Given Arlington Heights and the clarification of
substantive doctrine, lawsuits in the "proper" mold will not likely face the
same type of hostility that the plaintiffs in Warth endured. Systemic reform-
ers, on the other hand, seeking to undermine the purpose approach of
Washington and Arlington Heights by promoting an impact rationale,5 00 are
likely to face resistance, if not on standing grounds then on the merits. Those
efforts are likely to continue and just as likely to breed frustration.50 '
3. Popular Referenda
Efforts to invoke Supreme Court assistance in limiting the procedures by
which local land use decisions are made have been as unsuccessful as other
similar reformist initiatives have been. The Court is apparently satisfied with a
495. Id.
496. See Sager, supra note 291, at 1385 n.41.
497. See notes 479 & 482 supra.
498. 429 U.S. at 262 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38
(1976)).
499. The Court decided the case on the merits. 429 U.S. at 268-71. It did not remand, al-
though the lower courts had not been operating under the governing constitutional standard. Id.
at 268. That decision prompted dissents from Justices Marshall and Brennan, id. at 271, and Jus-
tice White, id. at 272. The case was remanded for consideration of a statutory question. Id. at
271. See Section VI.A. infra.
500. For critiques of the purpose approach, see, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 369, at 57-62,
79-83; Perry, supra note 369, at 582-85.
501. E.g., Sager, supra note 291, at 1384-85 nn. 40 & 41.
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Euclid-Nectow style of substantive review for arbitrariness after the fact;.. 2 it
has declined to impose standards of procedural or structural due process on
local land use decision making,5 z absent a finding of purposeful or facial ra-
cial discrimination. 5
0 4
In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 50 5 the Court upheld the va-
lidity of a city charter amendment that required popular approval of any
zoning changes approved by the city council.5 0 6 For the six-to-three majority,
Chief Justice Burger rejected the twin claims of impermissible 0 7 and stan-
dardless 50 8 delegation of legislative authority. By framing the issue in that
way, the Chief Justice was able to avoid dealing with "a serious issue of demo-
cratic theory,' 50 9 which was in the case if sympathetically viewed.
The Court's analysis of the Eastlake claims was disarmingly simple. The
majority dismissed, almost out of hand, the contention that "a zoning referen-
dum involves a delegation of legislative power. "510 The reason, straightfor-
ward enough, was that a referendum is a "reservation" of power by the people,
from whom "all power derives, ' 5 1  and cannot properly be "characterized as a
delegation of [legislative] power" at all. 512
502. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 677 (1976).
503. Id. at 679. For a discussion of the structural due process approach, see Sager, supra note
291, at 1411-12. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 347, at §§ 17-1 to -3; Linde, Due Process of Law
Making, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
269 (1975).
504. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See generally Mandelker, supra note 293; Wright, supra
note 299.
505. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
506. For critics of the decision, "Eastlake raises the spector of a popular veto of any municipal
effort to accommodate unpopular use of land through relaxation of zoning restraints and, more
particularly, of the chronic electoral exclusion of proposed lower income housing construction."
Sager, supra note 291, at 1402. Since "[p]rovisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to de-
mocracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice," James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971),
the critics of using this form of popular democracy apparently are concerned with the reduced
role for political compromise and judicial review. The decision is seen as a "disturbing portent"
because it is a "setback in the fight against exclusionary zoning." Hogue, supra note 291, at 42.
In fact, the Court treated the Eastlake referendum provision as a property rights lawsuit, not an
exclusionary zoning case. Two of the three dissenters in the public housing referendum case,
James v. Valtierra, supra, (Justices Marshall and Blackmun) were in the Eastlake majority and Jus-
tice Powell, who dissented in Eastlake, made clear his concern with the "disquieting opportunities
for local government bodies to bypass normal protective procedures for resolving issues affecting
individual rights." 426 U.S. at 680. The right of a landowner, who seeks a change in the land use
category applied to his property, to a "fair procedure" to protect his "interest in making legitimate
use of his property" was also the basis of Justice Stevens' dissent. Id. at 682. Had the plaintiffs
been able to marry the property rights component of their complaint with the interests of the po-
tentially excluded newcomers-something done by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see Section
III, A. supra-they might well have swung the critical votes of Justices Marshall and Blackmun.
507. 426 U.S. at 672.
508. Id. at 675.
509. Sager, supra note 291, at 1403.
510. 426 U.S. at 672.
511. Id.
512. Id.
[Vol. 43: No. 2
Page 5: Spring 1979]
On the question of standards, the claim was that "no mechanism existed
nor indeed could exist, to assure that the voters would act rationally in
passing upon a proposed zoning change. 5 1' 3 The Court's short answer to that
proposition was that the need for standards existed only where legislative au-
thority was delegated by the legislature to a regulatory body, not where it was
"reserved by the people to themselves." 51 4 The reason for requiring standards
where authority is delegated to a regulatory body is that it is "not directly re-
sponsible to the people."5 5 Consequently, the requirement of "discernible
standards" is a means of ensuring accountability, providing a mechanism for
measuring an agency's actions "for its fidelity to the legislative will."'5 ,6 When
the original source of authority retains that power for itself, there is no simi-
lar need to build in a method for checking on accountability.
The Eastlake analysis is not wrong as far as it goes, but its simplicity is de-
ceptive and ultimately unsatisfying because the Court has not come to grips
with the core issue in the case-whether, as a matter of federal constitutional
law, the decision on rezoning a single parcel of land can be committed to a
political (i.e., legislative) process. 51 7 The Court avoided grappling with that ba-
sic issue by relying on the Ohio Supreme Court's characterization of rezoning
as a legislative matter under state law. 1 ' That characterization is important
under Ohio law, 519 as it is in many states5 2 ° because the state courts have dis-
tinguished between legislative matters, which are subject to the referendum
process, and administrative matters, which are not.5 21
Yet, the characterization of rezoning as a legislative action effectively ends
the analysis since traditionally notice and hearing and other procedural pro-
tections are required only in an administrative context. 52 2 In short, if the
claims of the plaintiff are to be listened to sympathetically, the Court must be
willing to determine, as a constitutional matter,5 23 whether the nature of the




517. Cf. Sager, supra note 291, at 1403 (The fundamental issue is "whether there are limits to
the range of legislative functions which legitimately can be discharged by the electorate as op-
posed to deliberative governmental bodies") (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 1403 n.104.
518. 426 U.S. at 673.
519. Ohio cases which draw that legislative/administrative distinction include Forest City En-
terprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975) and Berg v. City of
Struthers, 176 Ohio St. 146, 198 N.E.2d 48 (1964).
520. See Zoning Development, supra note 290, at 1529 n. 131 (cases collected).
521. See generally id. at 1528-36.
522. Id. at 1530.
523. One commentator has gone so far as to assert that "whether rezoning a specific parcel of
land is an administrative decision which therefore requires due process safeguards . . . is a matter
of constitutional, not state, law." Id. at 1540. This point is argued by Justice Stevens in his dis-
senting opinion in Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 686. Justice Stevens, however, found state law controlling
when writing the majority opinion in the contemporaneous decision in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
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governmental action involved is susceptible to determination by a process that is
political-i.e., not subject to procedural safeguards nor to reliance on neutrally
and fairly applied standards that govern outcomes. Moreover, as Professor
Sager has argued, there is the further question whether the type of political
decision used by Eastlake-namely, the referendum rather than a representa-
tive, deliberative political institution-is an appropriate form of political de-
vice that can be used in the rezoning situation.5 24
The Eastlake majority opinion failed to recognize that the state courts have
wrestled with the distinction between legislative and administrative functions
in the zoning process.5 25 These courts have noted the difference between the
process of establishing general zoning policies in the comprehensive plan and
in the general zoning ordinance on the one hand and in the fine-tuning of
the land use scheme through individual lot rezoning on the other.52 The
body performing the task is not the critical variable; instead, the nature of the
function is determinative.5 27 These courts have concluded that a rezoning
amendment is much closer in functional terms to a variance than to the initial
adoption of a comprehensive zoning ordinance.
Accordingly, in the well known Fasano case,528 the Oregon Supreme Court
341 (1976), in which the sufficiency of a claim of "property interest" was "decided by reference to
state law." Id. at 344. In Bishop Justice Stevens disparaged Justice Brennan's "innovative sugges-
tion that we develop a federal common law of property rights ...." Id. at 349 n. 14.
In contrast to his position on the source of the definition of property in the procedural due
process context, Justice Stevens has viewed the "liberty" described in the fourteenth amendment
as a term defined by federal constitutional norms. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This dichotomy-between the source of property entitlements and
liberty interests-seems to command a majority of the Court, despite some earlier indications to
the contrary in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
Since, presumably, a property right is at stake in Eastlake, the earlier distinction drawn in the
procedural due process context poses a problem for the Stevens position in Eastlake. Perhaps the
Stevens and Powell dissents in Eastlake suggest a possible rethinking of the rigid rule that defines
property rights entirely by reference to state law. But see Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal
and Correctional Complex, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). See also
Blumstein, supra note 369, at 241-46 nn.50, 55, 63, 64, 70, 78, 79 & 81.
524. Sager, supra note 291, at 1402-23.
525. Justice Stevens' Eastlake dissent, however, noted the state court efforts. 426 U.S. at 683.
526. E.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Fleming v.
City of Tacoma, 81 Wash.2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972). See generally Zoning Development, supra note
290, at 1508-13.
527. Contra, Berg v. City of Struthers, 176 Ohio St. 146, 198 N.E.2d 48 (1964); State ex. rel.
Hunzicker v. Pulliam, 168 Okla. 632, 37 P.2d 417 (1934). See Zoning Development, supra note 290,
at 1509. An overly formalistic approach, one that views the nature of the decision making body as
determinative, is "inappropriate because it permits the availability of procedural rights to turn
upon the legislative allocation of zoning power among city councils, zoning boards, and other
governmental entities-an allocation guided by considerations of administrability and political ex-
pediency rather than by the functional interests underlying due process." Id. at 1510 (footnote
omitted). See also Ward v. Village of Skokie, 26 Ill. 2d 415, 424-25, 186 N.E.2d 529, 534 (1962)
(Klingbiel, J., specially concurring) ("[Blasic constitutional protections can readily be circumvented
by the simple expedient of placing quasi-judicial functions in a legislative body").
528. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs. 264 Ore. 574. 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
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held that rezoning decisions would be reviewed more strictly than legislative
actions because the nature of the rezoning process necessitates more of the
procedural safeguards of an adjudicative process in order to assure fair-
ness.5 29 Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that a zone change is
not subject to a referendum because that process can be used only with re-
spect to legislative acts, whereas rezoning was "in substance an administrative,
not legislative act."53 While other state courts might treat these matters dif-
ferently, 531 the point is that they have acknowledged that a difference exists
between acts that are functionally legislative and those that are functionally
administrative or adjudicative. These distinctions are important because they
determine the propriety of using a political process and of deferring to the
outcome of those decisions.
Sympathetically viewed, the plaintiff's complaint in Eastlake was that the
rezoning process had the functional elements of an administrative or adjudi-
cative proceeding and, therefore, use of the political decision making mode
was constitutionally inappropriate. The risk of abuse and unfair treatment
was excessive, and procedural protections were necessary. 532 At a minimum,
pursuing the Sager argument, a more structured political forum was required,
where a legislative body could conduct fact-finding hearings, accept evidence,
hear the interested parties, and make an informed, albeit political, decision
based on the data it assembled.5
33
The Court's response was to ignore these issues by taking as given the
Ohio Supreme Court's characterization of the process as "legislative in na-
ture." 534 Presumably, the Court is unwilling to determine, by functional analy-
sis, the nature of different facets of the zoning process. That would conform
to its general unwillingness to intervene in the area and its overall deference
to state courts to define as a state law matter concepts that have clear constitu-
tional significance.5 35 Perhaps the closest parallel is the Court's persistent in-
sistence that the term "property" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment be de-
fined as a matter of state law in procedural due process cases.5 3n Apparently,
the Court is similiarly inclined to allow states to determine what is legislative
by reference to principles of state law. In Eastlake it declined an opportunity
529. Id. at 587-88, 507 P.2d at 29-30.
530. E.g., West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 461, 221 N.W.2d 303, 304 (1974).
531. E.g. San Diego Bldg. Contractors v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
532. Accord, 426 U.S. at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
533. Sager, supra 291, at 1402-23.
534. 426 U.S. at 673.
535. See note 523 supra. See also Blumstein, supra note 369, at 241-46.
536. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 99 S. Ct.
2100 (1979); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) ("[T]he sufficiency of the claim of
entitlement must be decided by reference to state law"). See generally Blumstein, supra note 369, at
241-42.
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to develop federal constitutional principles for classifying functions as legisla-
tive or administrative137 in nature.
537. The Eastlake opinion considered the Court's earlier decisions in Eubank v. City of
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912), Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917), and
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928). In Eubank the Court held
invalid a city ordinance that allowed owners of two-thirds of the property abutting any block to
establish building setback lines. In Cusack the Court upheld a provision that permitted neighbor-
ing property owners to waive a billboard ban. In Roberge the Court held invalid an ordinance that
permitted old-age homes in a residential zone but only with the written approval of the owners of
two-thirds of the property within 400 feet of the building.
The Chief Justice distinguished Cusack on the ground that "[s]ince the property owners could
simply waive an otherwise applicable legislative limitation, the Court in Cusack determined that
the provision did not delegate legislative power at all." 426 U.S. at 677-78 n.12. With regard to
Eubank and Roberge, he observed that they did not involve a referendum procedure but rather a
"standardless delegation of power to a limited group of property owners .... " Id. at 678. That is,
unlike the reservation of power to the people in Eastlake's referendum, Eubank and Roberge in-
volved delegation by the legislature "to a narrow segment of the community, not to the people at
large." Id. at 677 (emphasis in original).
Eubank and Roberge can be understood in two different ways. First, the Court may have implic-
itly concluded that establishing setbacks or approving old-age homes was an administrative deci-
sion. Thus, the absence of "discernible standards" would be fatal. Cusack could be reconciled with
these cases on that reading by concluding that waiver of the ban of billboards was a political judg-
ment. The legislature had defined the entitlement in favor of the neighborhood, and, at their dis-
cretion, the beneficiaries were entitled to show their magnanimity by conferring that benefit on
the billboard owner. It is not self-evident why the decision in Cusack should be characterized as
political while the others should be deemed administrative, but that distinction, which would
harmonize the cases, is consistent with the delegation/non-delegation language of the Eastlake ma-
jority.
A second way of viewing the Eubank- Cusack-Roberge trilogy would be to characterize them all as
involving political decisions. The delegation language, on that reading, did not mean delegation
of legislative authority to an administrative entity but was used in the sense that state legislatures
delegate legislative authority to city councils, which exercise delegated (but clearly legislative)
power.
On that reading the delegation issue in Eastlake becomes very different. That interpretation of
the early cases indicates that they should be given meaning in a modern context by reference to
voter qualification cases such as Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See text ac-
companying notes 389-421 supra. Thus, Eubank and Roberge would be explained as holding that
voting on setbacks for a block or on the permissibility of an old-age hone could not be confined
to property owners in the immediate neighborhood. That is, other voters had a strong interest in
those decisions, and committing the decisions to the narrow constituency was unconstitutional.
Cusack would then be harmonized by concluding that property owners in the immediate block
were primarily affected by the existence of a billboard, and they could properly be given author-
ity to vote on a waiver. See Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improv. Dist., 410
U.S. 743 (1973); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
Viewed in a voting rights context, Eubank-Cusack-Roberge suggest that the proper issue in
Eastlake was the constituency formation question posed by Justice Stern's concurrence in the Ohio
Supreme Court: whether it is legitimate to allow everyone in a large city to vote on rezoning a
corner gasoline station. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187,
199-200, 324 N.E.2d 740, 748-49 (1975) (Stern, J., concurring). That is a question never an-
swered in the voting qualification cases-whether the franchise has been extended to an exces-
sively broad constituency. See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 404-05 and nn.46-47. That line of cases
only dealt with challenges to narrowly drawn voting qualifications. However, seen as a voting
qualification case, Eastlake raises the novel issue of an arguably overinclusive class of voters. The
Court's "consciously narrow decision," Zoning Development, supra note 290, at 1536, in Eastlake did
not touch on that potentially interesting question.
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The Eastlake decision leaves unanswered the question whether any "limits
exist upon the use of initiatives or referenda to decide even indisputably
administrative issues. 15 3 8 The Chief Justice quo'ted a passage from a local gov-
ernment law treatise to the effect that "[t]he power of initiative or referen-
dum may be reserved or conferred 'with respect to any matter, legislative or
administrative, within the realm of local affairs . . .' ."' He noted that under
Ohio law only land use changes approved by the Council "when acting in a
legislative capacity were subject to the referendum process. '540 Consequently,
hardship variances, which were administrative under state law, would not be
subject to the referendum process.5 4 1
That is an interesting conclusion about the functioning of Ohio law, but it
is not a definitive answer to the question in a state that chose to submit hard-
ship variance decisions to a popular voting process. Because the Eastlake opin-
ion relies exclusively on state court characterization of a procedure as legisla-
tive or administrative, a strict reading of the case would suggest that use of an
initiative or referendum in such circumstances would violate no federal consti-
tutional rights even though no evidence would have been taken, no hearing
provided, no impartial decision making involved, and no criteria articulated.5 41
One commentator has concluded that "[s]uch an expansive reading . . . is
unwarranted,' 54 3 but nothing in the Eastlake decision itself is reassuring or
conclusive on the matter.
5 44
538. Zoning Development, supra note 290, at 1539.
539. 426 U.S. at 674 n.9 (quoting 5 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 2, at § 16.54).
540. 426 U.S. at 674 n.9 (emphasis in original).
541. Id.
542. See Zoning Development, supra note 290, at 1539.
543. Id.
544. Id. That commentary draws the following conclusion:
"If a clearly administrative decision involving protected property interests were submitted to
popular vote, the Court would have strong reason to hold the decisionmaking procedure
unconstitutional. It would be impossible to convene the electorate to hold hearings prior to the
election; the interests served by due process would be unfulfilled by either a hearing before the
city council or'a 'hearing' in the political arena; the voter decision could not comply with either
the requirement of impartial decisionmaking or the insistence upon a reasoned decision using
articulable standards." Id. at 1540 n. 197 (citation omitted). For further discussion on the compati-
bility of procedural due process and the popular vote, see id. at 1525-28, 1530-34.
The Court's decision in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), suggests an alternative ana-
lytical approach for reconciling the concepts of due process and popular voting. In Ingraham, the
Court permitted a potential state law damage action to serve as an adequate alternative to hearing
or notice. Ingraham involved a case of corporal punishment meted out by public school personnel.
The Court conceded that a liberty interest was being infringed, but it declined to impose tradi-
tional due process standards of hearing and notice because of the existence of a state court rem-
edy for excessive infliction of physical harm. Building on the Ingraham concept, the Court could
conclude that the existence of a public referendum (which has received judicial endorsement,
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)), is an adequate process or an acceptable alternative to
the traditional due process criteria. At present, Ingraham stands alone as an analytical mode of
determining what process is sufficient. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Whether Ingraham could or would be expanded in the manner suggested is far from certain at
this point.
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D. Limits on Governmental Power to Restrict Private Use of Property
In upholding the comprehensive zoning scheme in Euclid against a facial
challenge, the Supreme Court articulated two principles of limitation: (1) spe-
cific applications of generally valid zoning measures could be arbitrary and,
therefore, invalid; and (2) at some point, local governmental authority over
zoning might have to yield to broader regional interests.5 45 The Supreme
Court's unwillingness to develop the regionalism language has already been
discussed. 546 It is now appropriate to consider the Court's treatment of
arguably excessive or unfair regulation of individual parcels of land.
The fundamental problems are to identify the permissible scope of gov-
ernmental regulatory authority and under what circumstances and in what
amounts government must compensate private landowners when governmen-
tal action infringes on their property interests. The task is made more diffi-
cult by the presence of two seemingly distinct sources of authority for govern-
mental action-the police power and the eminent domain power; over time,
these ostensibly clear distinctions have become blurred through judicial inter-
pretation.5
4 7
Traditionally, under a police power analysis, the remedy for governmental
overreaching has been declaratory and injunctive relief-a declaration that a
challenged law, as applied, violates economic substantive due process and an
injunction against its enforcement.5 4 Damages have not been awarded.54 9 Un-
der the eminent domain power, the Fifth Amendment 50 requires that "just
compensation" be paid when "private property" is "taken" by government
"for public use. 551 Although these two sources of authority seem distinct, am-
biguity arises for at least three separate reasons.
545. See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
546. See Section V.B. supra.
547. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 10; Berger, The Accommo-
dation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 799 (1976);
Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARV. L. REV. 402
(1977) [hereinafter cited as The Disparity Issue]; Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation
Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controls, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1201 (1975). [here-
inafter cited as "Fair" Compensation].
548. See The Disparity Issue, supra note 547, at 403-05; -Fair" Compensation, supra note 547, at
1033-34. See also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324. 366 N.E.2d
1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
549. See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 490-93. Professor Ellickson has described this as "[t]he most
pervasive judicial error in American land-development law." Id. at 490. See also HFH, Ltd. v. Su-
perior Court, 15 Cal.3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904
(1976); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
550. The eminent domain component of the fifth amendment applies to the states by virtue
of its incorporation under the fourteenth amendment. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978); id. at 141 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
551. The fifth amendment reads in part: "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST., amend. V.
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First, increasingly the Supreme Court has eschewed judicial intervention
under the economic substantive due process umbrella. 5 2 The Euclid decision
held that governmental regulation of land use was permissible, even if the
value of the property was thereby diminished. When acting validly under the
police power, government incurred no obligation to compensate the land-
owner for the decrease in value. Euclid allowed for individual challenges to
generally valid zoning measures, but it noted that "[i]f the validity of the legis-
lative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative
judgment must be allowed to control. '55 3 Provided that the zoning exclusions
"bear[] a rational relation to the health and safety of the community," '5 54 they
are valid.
In the subsequent Nectow case,5 5 5 a unanimous Court held a zoning ordi-
nance invalid under Euclid. Using an arbitrariness standard, Justice Suther-
land concluded that the ordinance as applied was not reasonably related to
police power purposes, relying on a factual finding by a master that the land
use restriction would not benefit the residents of the relevant area.5 56
Taken together, Euclid and Nectow have been extremely influential in
building a framework for analyzing land use regulations. When they were de-
cided, an economic substantive due process mode was compatible with ex-
isting doctrine in related police power areas. 5 7 A decade after Nectow, how-
ever, the Court steered an entirely different course in the economic
substantive due process field, 5 5  virtually withdrawing federal constitutional
oversight of state economic regulation on substantive due process grounds. 5 9
At the same time, for about thirty-five years the Court declined to hear an-
other zoning case,5 60 thereby leaving state courts to develop substantive due
552. E.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963).
553. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
554. Id. at 391.
555. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
556. Id. at 188.
557. Justice Peckham, for instance, wrote in Lochner:
It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police
power by the State . . . Otherwise the Fourteenth Amendment would have no efficacy
and the legislatures of the States would have unbounded power, and it would be enough
to say that any piece of legislation was enacted to conserve the morals, the health or the
safety of the people; such legislation would be valid, .z matter how absolutely without
foundation the claim might be. The claim of the police power would be a mere pretext
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
558. E.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
559. E.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); North Dakota Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156 (1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963).
560. In 1974 the Court decided Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), was technically a regulatory case, not a zoning ques-
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process doctrine in a land use context that was grossly inconsistent with the
emerging federal constitutional doctrine of economic substantive due process.
In a modern context, outside the land use area, a decision such as Nectow
would likely be considered a dispensable relic of the activist economic substan-
tive due process era.56 1 Since the Court remained aloof from land use contro-
versies for so long, it allowed state court evolution of land use doctrine, in
reliance on Euclid-Nectow, that no longer comported with governing constitu-
tional norms in the context of other forms of governmental regulation of pri-
vate economic interests.
A consequence of the "fairly debatable" standard of Euclid, especially as in-
fluenced by later thinking on economic substantive due process, was ex-
panded use of the police power by local governments in the land use con-
text.5 6 2 This was a particularly attractive option for local government because
a valid police regulation--one that reasonably promoted a legitimate public
purpose-allowed public restriction of private land use without compensation.
As a result, the stakes for both government and private landowners were ex-
tremely high; if a regulatory measure were proper under the police power,
no compensation whatever was necessary. If government chose to use the
more complicated eminent domain power, it must compensate the property
owner for the taking according to the property's "highest and best use," a
standard that could be quite expensive for government.
5 63
The disparity in treatment of landowners under the police and eminent
domain powers would not be as significant if the Nectow style of relief under
economic substantive due process had remained as strong as a restraint on
governmental authority as earlier. But the increasingly permissive judicial atti-
tude toward public regulation 564 created a strong incentive for landowners to
characterize excessive or unreasonable governmental restrictions as "takings"
under the eminent domain power.565 The labeling of arbitrary regulatory ac-
tion. The Court has heard inverse condemnation cases for intrusion of air space. See Griggs v.
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
561. This might be done in the manner of Justice Douglas, who, in overruling an earlier deci-
sion, said, "The Liggett case, being a derelict in the stream of the law, is hereby overruled." North
Dakota Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156, 167 (1973). Cf. New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (overruling Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), which had been the
only exception made by the Warren Court in its usual deference to legislative economic regula-
tion).
562. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.2d 582, 607, 557 P.2d 473,
483, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 51 (1976).
563. See generally Berger, supra note 547; The Disparity Issue, supra note 547, at 411-12; "Fair"
Compensation, supra note 547, at 1038-45.
564. E.g. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94
Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d
7, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972).
565. E.g., Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962, (N.D. Cal. 1975),
vacated per stipulation, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.
3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1975); Fred F.
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tion as a "taking" is the second source of the blurring of the police and emi-
nent domain powers. 66
The blurring of the two concepts was made easier doctrinally by two
things. One was the concept of inverse condemnation.167 That arose when
government effectively appropriated private property for public use but
sought to avoid paying just compensation. The existence of situations where
private property was taken for a public use but where government declined to
acknowledge the need for compensation allowed for the evolution of an ini-
tially narrow doctrine of inverse condemnation that, in turn, provided a vehi-
cle for doctrinal expansion to cover situations of overregulation.
The doctrinal expansion of inverse condemnation, which led to the "prem-
ise that the police and eminent domain powers are correlatives, ' 568 was, in
turn, facilitated by what Professor Costonis has labeled Justice Holmes' "apho-
rism" '5 69 in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon: "The general rule at least is,
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent [under the police
power], if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. ' 570 The
Pennsylvania Coal analysis suggested that the police and eminent domain pow-
ers were on a continuum; if government went too far in the exercise of its
regulatory function, that would amount to a taking.
The Holmes view in Pennsylvania Coal, a regulatory case, has served as an
invitation to landowners to characterize regulatory actions as implicit exercises
of eminent domain powers. That has the simultaneous benefit, from a land-
owner's perspective, of eliminating the permissive form of due process review
and also suggesting the propriety of awarding compensation.
The Brandeis dissent in Pennsylvania Coal argued forcefully that the correl-
atives approach was mistaken. Justice Brandeis thought that substantive due
process, not eminent domain, was the proper approach. The question should
be whether the statute, which prohibited mining if that created subsidence of
homes, was rationally related to a permissible legislative goal. 71 Relying on
cases such as Mugler v. Kansas,5 72 which had upheld against a substantive due
process attack a state ban on the sale or manufacture of liquor, the dissent
concluded that a legitimate goal, reasonably pursued, was valid, even if there
were substantial economic hardships that resulted. The issue, for Justice
French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5
(1976), appeal dismissed. 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
566. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 9, at 493-509.
567. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation
Criteria, 44 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1970).
568. "Fair" Compensation, supra note 547, at 1033.
569. Id.
570. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
571. Id. at 416-22 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
572. 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
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Brandeis, was to characterize the nature of the government's action-police or
eminent domain-not to see them as loci along a single continuum of govern-
mental action.
The Holmes approach in Pennsylvania Coal could be somewhat contained
by the "public use" language of the takings clause. Even if the police and emi-
nent domain powers were correlatives, there was at least the requirement that
a taking be for a public use. A third factor in blurring the distinction between
police and eminent domain powers was the Court's decision in Berman v.
Parker. 7 3 An eminent domain case involving the validity of an urban renewal
program, Berman raised the issue whether condemnation of one private parcel
for resale to another private owner constituted a public use under the Fifth
Amendment. Justice Douglas for the Court competely obliterated any analyti-
cal role for the public use principle as a limitation on the eminent domain pow-
er. He appeared instead to treat the power of eminent domain as no different
from any other exercise of governmental power-merely one means to an end.
If the purpose were legitimate, the Court would not scrutinize the ultimate
means by which government implemented its policy.57 4 In short, government
could use the eminent domain power as it could any other power, without
further judicial scrutiny. With the public use limitation thus eviscerated, the
eminent domain power was no longer distinct analytically from other forms of
governmental authority. Both were limited only by a public purpose require-
ment, which Berman made clear would be a policy judgment for legislatures to
make unchecked by judicial review. Thus, there was little to stand in the way
of characterizing excessive governmental regulation as a taking, even if there
was no plausible governmental appropriation for public use.
The blurring of the eminent domain and police powers in state courts has
thus been spurred by the demise of economic substantive due process,
Holmes' "famous aphorism" in Pennsylvania Coal, and Douglas' fatal rendering
of the public use limitation on eminent domain in Berman. The Supreme
Court contributed by largely remaining aloof from the field. However, its re-
cent decision in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City57 5 and its
earlier decision in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead576 have provided certain in-
sights into how the Court perceives some of these issues.
Goldblatt involved an ordinance that regulated dredging and pit excavating
and had the effect of requiring the owner of an active sand and gravel mine
573. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
574. Id. at 33. Justice Douglas wrote that "[t]he definition [of the police power] is essentially
the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government . . . . This
principle admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent domain is involved . . ..
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of
eminent domain is . . . merely the means to the end." Id. at 32-33.
575. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
576. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
[Vol. 43: No. 2
Page 5: Spring 1979]
to shut down. 577 Although the Court indicated its apparent acceptance of the
correlatives model of Pennsylvania Coal-noting that "ft]here is no set formula
to determine where regulation ends and taking begins" 5 7 _-it analyzed the
validity of the ordinance under the police power.
The ordinance prevented deepening a water filled pond below twenty-five
feet;579 despite its skepticism about the marginal safety benefit from that pro-
hibition, the Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence on reason-
ableness to rebut the general presumption of validity.5 0 Since the burden of
proving unreasonableness rested on the challengers, and they had failed to
meet it, the Court upheld the regulation as a valid police measure. 581
Goldblatt is significant because it followed the police power cases such as
Mugler, from which it quoted extensively.5" 2 It applied a very restrained
standard of review, relying on the landowner's failure to carry its burden of
rebutting the presumption of validity. 5 3 Nevertheless, while "the fact that
[the regulation] deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not
render it unconstitutional,' 58 4 the Court carefully noted that "there is no evi-
dence in the present record which even remotely suggests that prohibition of
further mining will reduce the value of the lot in question. s5 8 5 From a formal-
istic point of view, that lack of evidence of diminution in value, however
strained, made it easier for the Court not to treat the matter as a taking case.
Thus, the Pennsylvania Coal continuum (or correlatives) analysis seemed to
577. Id. at 592.
578. Id. at 594. The Court also indicated that "governmental action in the form of regulation
cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation." Id.
See also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 n.25 (1978).
579. 369 U.S. at 595.
580. Id. at 595-96.
581. Id. at 596.
582. See id. at 593.
583. Id. at 596. There are elements in Goldblatt that do not seem so restrained at all. For ex-
ample, the Court suggests a balancing formula that would require that the means chosen by gov-
ernmental action be "reasonably necessary" to achieve government's important ends. Id. at
594-95, quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). Furthermore, in determining what is
reasonable, the Court suggests evaluating "the nature of the menace against which it will protect,
the availability and effectiveness of other less drastic protective steps, and the loss which [the
property owner] will suffer from the imposition of the ordinance." 369 U.S. at 595. These formu-
lations have many elements in common with strict scrutiny under substantive due process, see Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but are inconsistent with other economic substantive due process
cases. E.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). Most significantly, however,
in actually considering the facts in Goldblatt the Court declined to remand to overcome the
"dearth of relevant evidence" in the record, 369 U.S. at 595, rather choosing to rely on the inad-
equacy of the record to justify a finding that the landowner failed to overcome the presumption
of validity. In sum, despite some of the language in Goldblatt the actual form of review was ex-
tremely restrained.
584. Id. at 592.
585. Id. at 594. Apparently, the Court "assumed that the ordinance did not prevent the own-
er's reasonable use of the property since the owner made no showing of an adverse effect on the
value of the land." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
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be perpetuated, but with a subtle modification. Once categorizing the town's
ordinance as a police regulation, the Court proceeded to determine only
whether or not it was a permissible exercise of the police power. In essence,
the Goldblatt Court regarded the police-eminent domain issue as a matter of
threshold classification . 5 6 To the extent that diminution in value was relevant
(even if not conclusive), it and the parallel notion of alternative use were fac-
tors in determining whether the eminent domain or police power was in-
volved. If a police measure, the regulation still had to pass the restrained due
process reasonableness standard. If a taking, then presumably compensation
would be required.
Goldblatt involved a prohibition on what was arguably a noxious use; gov-
ernmental action could be justified on the ground that an externally harmful
effect, albeit shy of a full-scale nuisance, was being combated.5 8 7 The Penn
Central case, as Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent,58 8 could not fit easily into
the same prevention-of-harm garb. There, New York City sought to restrict
the right of the owner of Grand Central Terminal to construct a large office
building that was otherwise allowed under the governing zoning ordinance.
The rationale for the restriction was that "structures with special historic, cul-
tural, or architectural significance enhance the quality of life for all."' 589 No
claim of negative externalities from the existing structure was made in sup-
port of the landmark law; rather, the external disbenefit stemmed from the
alteration of the landmark as it currently existed. 590
As in Goldblatt, the Court sought first to classify the landmark regulation as
either an exercise of the eminent domain or police power. If an exercise of
the former, presumably it would require compensation to be held valid; if an
exercise of the latter, it would stand without compensation if reasonably re-
lated to a legitimate public purpose.
For the majority, Justice Brennan concluded that the landmark legislation
did not impair the use of the existing terminal; furthermore, it did not
"exploit[] ... for city purposes"' 91 the landowner's parcel, did not "facilitate[]
• . . any entrepreneurial operations of the city,"'5 9 nor did it "arise[] from"
any such operations. 593 In addition, Justice Brennan rejected the prevention-
of-harm/conferral-of-benefit dichotomy. Cases such as Goldblatt were "better
586. Id. at 592. For a discussion of other categorizational approaches, see Blumstein, supra
note 153, at 488 n.60.
587. See generally Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock,
237 U.S. 171 (1915).
588. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
589. Id. at 108.
590. Id. at 112.
591. Id. at 135.
592. Id.
593. Id.
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understood as resting not on any supposed 'noxious' quality of the prohibited
uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related to
the implementation of a policy-not unlike historic preservation-expected to
produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated
property.1' 5 9 4 In short, the city could reassign entitlements in land by estab-
lishing a public right in preserving its architectural heritage. Destruction or
fundamental alteration of that heritage, in traditional terms, could then be
characterized fairly as a prevention of harm. 5
95
The Court's analysis of the nature of the landmark regulation led it to the
conclusion that the regulation should be treated as a police measure.5 96 Yet,
the Court's further analysis of the regulation's validity as a police measure
suggests a somewhat more stringent standard than Goldblatt. In Penn Central
the Court found that the validity of the landmark law, as a police measure,
turned on the "severity of the impact" of the measure on the relevant par-
cel. 597 Arguably, that approach conforms to the analysis in Nectow, which, some
have argued, established a reasonable beneficial use standard to measure the
scope of permissible police power regulation.5 9 In Penn Central the Court
found that the return from the present use of the terminal, the possibility
that some project would be approved consistent with preservation of the land-
mark, and the opportunity to transfer the development rights above the ter-
minal to nearby street parcels made the impact of the landmark regulation
not unduly onerous. 599
The Court's emphasis on reasonable beneficial use 60 0 is somewhat puz-
zling, however, in light of earlier cases such as Mugler, in which the liquor
manufacturing plant was rendered substantially useless. 60 ' Under modern
economic substantive due process doctrine, all the city would have to show is
that its ordinance is reasonably related to a permissible police power goal. 611
In stating its conclusion in Penn Central, however, the Court carefully noted
the landmark not only met the rationality test but also satisfied the "reasona-
594. Id. at 134 n.30. The rejection of the harm/benefit distinction may be the most radical
component of Penn Central. If noxious uses can be abated entirely, it seems that equating preven-
tion of harm and conferral of benefit allows for dramatic expansion of government authority un-
der the police power. The Court's discussion of reasonable beneficial use may suggest, however,
that it did not intend some of the broader implications of its footnote 30. See text accompanying
notes 596-607 infra.
595. 438 U.S. at 135, 138.
596. Id..at 130-35.
597. Id. at 136.
598. See, e.g., The Disparity Issue, supra note 547, at 411 & nn.27 & 28; Berger, supra note 547,
at 817.
599. 438 U.S. at 136-37.
600. Id. at 138.
601. See also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
602. See cases cited in note 559 supra.
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ble beneficial use" standard .6 0  Although the Court's analysis in Penn Central is
considerably closer to Justice Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania Coal than was
Justice Holmes' majority opinion in that case, an adherence remains to a bal-
ancing formula to determine whether a governmental regulation has an ex-
cessive economic impact on "distinct investment-backed expectations. '"604
After Penn Central, then, it seems that the nature of the governmental ac-
tion will predominate in determining whether or not an eminent domain issue
is involved. The extent of the economic burden on the landowner will be in-
volved primarily in determining whether a rational police measure is held
valid. What Penn Central does not do, however, is explain why, in a police
power context, the extra step of showing reasonable beneficial use is neces-
sary. Unless the Court does not mean' its burial of the harm
prevention/benefit conferral distinctions,605 it is unclear why the traditional
deference of economic substantive due process analysis in other areas is inap-
plicable in a land use context.6
0 6
603. 438 U.S. at 138.
604. Id. at 124.
605. See id. at 133-34 n.30. Maintenance of the harm prevention/benefit conferral distinction,
despite the difficulties in application, provides a benchmark for differentiating among different
types of governmental interests. If government can totally abate a noxious use, irrespective of the
magnitude of private harm, does the Court mean that it can similarly act to confer a benefit? The
Court does not limit the taking concept to a transfer in "physical control," id. at 123 n.25. And it
does impose a reasonable beneficial use limitation on governmental regulatory authority. But it is
unclear how these are compatible with the broad governmental authority to restrict noxious uses
if the prevention of noxiousness is not an analytically significanct component of those decisions.
See id. at 133-34 n.30. Consequently, one of the ambiguous aspects of Penn Central is whether the
Court really intended to obliterate the distinctions, and, if so, whether the reasonable beneficial
use standard will prove to be a meaningful limitation on governmental authority. If it is a signifi-
cant limitation, the further question for resolution is why such a requirement is part of the analy-
sis and how it would be applied in a future noxiousness situation.
The analysis would be simpler, and more easily reconciled with economic substantive due pro-
cess doctrine, if the reasonable beneficial use analysis were a part of the threshold inquiry on em-
inent domain versus police power. In that context the Court could quite properly focus on the
"character of the [governmental] action and on the nature and extent of the interference with
[private] rights," id. at 130, which stem from "distinct investment-backed expectations." Id. at 124.
Moreover, obliteration of the harm prevention/benefit conferral distinction would no longer have
such substantial implications because, presumably, other forms of distinctions can be drawn to
help make the initial threshold determination of either eminent domain or police power. See, e.g.,
B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967). What is so enigmatic and troubling about Penn Central is the police power mode of analy-
sis, when combined with the imposition of the reasonable beneficial use criterion and the pur-
ported elimination of the harm prevention/benefit conferral distinction.
606. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 10, at 240-46. The Court's treat-
ment of reasonable beneficial use in Penn Central suggests that the "nature and extent of the in-
terference" with private property rights, 438 U.S. at 130, is an important part of the analysis un-
der the police power. Although ambiguous, Goldblatt had indicated that these considerations were
relevant in categorizing a governmental regulation at the threshold as either based on the emi-
nent domain or police power. The analysis in Penn Central seems to establish reasonable beneficial
use as an independent criterion that must be satisfied even under a police power analysis. That is,
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While Penn Central does not explain satisfactorily why it adds an extra sub-
stantive element to a normal substantive due process analysis, it does provide
a vehicle for approaching the compensation dilemma that has concerned Pro-
fessor Costonis.6 0 7 He has objected to the Holmes correlatives approach
largely because of the compensation implications of a finding that excessive
police regulation constitutes a taking. Once characterized as an eminent do-
main case, "just compensation" would be required, and the standard of just
compensation has been defined as "highest and best use." 60 8 The theory of
'just compensation" is that there must be full compensation to the "full and
perfect equivalent for the property taken.1
60 9
Costonis objects to use of the 'just compensation" principle in cases of
regulatory overreaching and has proposed a "middle way" 6 1°0-a less generous
standard of "fair" compensation in cases involving excessive regulation rather
than conscious attempts at use of eminent domain powers.6" He has labeled
the intermediate standard the accommodation power, applicable in "disparity
genre" circumstances,6 12 and has suggested that compensation be paid by the
it appears to be a part of a due process balancing analysis rather than part of the initial
categorization decision.
Read that way, the Penn Central decision apparently treats this species of economic due process
case differently from others because such a balancing is not normally part of the deferential
mode of analysis in the garden variety economic substantive due process context. The Court, in
those circumstances, will look only at the legitimacy, not the weight, of a governmental interest
and uphold the regulation if it is rational, despite the "severity of the impact," id. at 136, of the
regulation on an individual's economic interest.
The Court's analytical framework can be interpreted in at least two ways. One is to suggest that
the Court really does intend to put more teeth into substantive economic due process analysis
when restrictions on land use are implicated. That would be consistent with Pennsylvania Coal and
the Court's recent revival of contracts clause doctrine. See note 623 infra. It would not be consis-
tent with developments over the last forty years in economic substantive due process, however.
Another view, more cynical perhaps, is that Penn Central actually reflects an even further ero-
sion of constitutional protections for property interests than Goldblatt. See note 594 supra. This po-
sition would view the treatment of reasonable beneficial use in Penn Central skeptically. If the na-
ture and degree of private harm are no longer mainstays of the threshold categorization decision,
then it will be a lot easier to characterize a governmental action as falling under the police rather
than the eminent domain power. That done, it will be difficult to rule in favor of a landowner in
an economic substantive due process context, despite the reasonable beneficial use language of
Penn Central, because of the Court's overwhelming reluctance to reenter the arena of active eco-
nomic substantive due process review. The skeptical view, therefore, is that Penn Central with-
draws consideration of private harm at the only point at which, pragmatically, it could really mat-
ter, and places it instead within an analytical context wherein it is doomed to desuetude.
607. See articles cited in note 547 supra.
608. The Disparity Issue, supra note 547, at 411; "Fair" Compensation, supra note 547, at 1042-45.
609. 438 U.S. at 150 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)).
610. The Disparity Issue, supra note 547, at 405.
611. See "Fair" Compensation, supra note 547. Professor Costonis's theory influenced the New
York Court of Appeals when it decided the Penn Central case. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 331, 335, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1275, 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914,
918, 921 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
612. The Disparity Issue, supra note 547, at 403.
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amount which regulation diminished the value of property below its reason-
able beneficial use.
6 13
The Penn Central standard, which incorporates the reasonable beneficial
use concept, could be adopted easily to Professor Costonis' end without
necessitating development of the new "accommodation power" terminology.
Thus, if a regulation failed to meet the reasonable beneficial use criterion of
Penn Central, damages (rather than "compensation") could be awarded for the
deprivation of property without due process of law. Now that civil rights
causes of action lie against municipalities 61 4 and have been inferred as arising
directly from the Constitution itself,615 it seems appropriate to allow an ag-
grieved landowner to seek damages for harms to property beyond the valid
bounds established under Penn Central. That form of relief would avoid the
"just compensation" issue by adapting other due process damage prece-
dents616 to the land use context. It would also conform to the proposals of
Professor Ellickson, who has advocated increased use of a damages remedy
rather than injunctive relief.617 Predominant reliance on the injunction in the
land use domain Ellickson has labeled the Nectow fallacy, 61" after the decision
that introduced its use. If Nectow were based on a substantive due process
finding of arbitrariness, then arguably an injunctive remedy was appropriate.
If, as Professors Berger 619 and Costonis argue, 620 it was the initiator of the
reasonable beneficial use standard, then perhaps a damage award would have
been proper, as suggested by Ellickson. 62 1
The Penn Central case, in sum, backs away from a taking approach as per
Pennsylvania Coal. It rather appears to adopt a threshold categorization mode
of analysis to determine whether police or eminent domain power is involved.
It goes further than traditional due process cases, however, in suggesting a ju-
dicial weighing of the economic impact on the landowner of a governmental
action. That reflects an additional element of judicial scrutiny in substantive
due process land use cases and could be used to achieve the compensation
goals espoused by Professors Costonis and Ellickson. Whether the reason-
613. "Fair" Compensation, supra note 547, at 1049-52. See also Ellickson, supra note 9, at Sec-
tions IV & X, and at 496 n.359.
614. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
615. See Davis v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972).
616. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (denial of due process is actionable for nomi-
nal damages without proof of actual injury.).
617. See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 493-509.
618. Id. at 490-93.
619. Berger, supra note 547, at 817.
620. The Disparity Issue, supra note 547, at 411.
621. Ellickson, supra note 9, at 493.
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able beneficial use factor in Penn Central actually represents a "straw in the
wind" '2 2 is difficult to tell because it was announced in the context of a deci-
sion that upheld a far-reaching regulatory program. Certainly the result in
Penn Central is consistent with the overall narrowing of federal constitutional
oversight of state actions that affect private economic interests. 62 3
VI
FEDERAL STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON
GOVERNMENTAL LAND USE DECISION MAKING
While the Supreme Court has largely stayed out of local land use disputes,
except upon a showing of racial discrimination,. 24 it has not similarly stopped
development 625 of statutory doctrine under the Fair Housing Act.6 26 In ad-
dition, it has dramatically opened the possibility of judicial enforcement of
the federal antitrust laws against anticompetitive local government actions in
the land use field. 627 This Section will outline these federal statutory possibil-
ities.
622. Cf. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 125 n.* (9th ed. 1975) (noting Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), as an "important straw in the wind" to the developing field of state
sovereignty). Professor Gunther's observation was vindicated by the later decision of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), in which the Court indicated its growing sensitiv-
ity to state sovereignty considerations by overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
623. See note 583, supra. But see United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)
(invalidating a state law that altered the backing of a public obligation as violative of the contracts
clause); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (invalidating under the con-
tracts clause a state statute that substantially altered the terms of a private pension agreement).
624. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Mandelker, supra note 293.
625. It is clear that the Supreme Court has indeed arrested the development of federal consti-
tutional law in the land use field, since it has reversed numerous decisions of lower courts in the
area. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (reversing court of appeals
judgment that regulation dispersing "adult" theatres was unconstitutional); City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (reversing Ohio Supreme Court finding that zoning
change referendums violated federal constitutional due process guarantees); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (disapproving several lower court decisions that applied a disproportionate
racial impact standard for determining race discrimination); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974) (reversing court of appeals judgment invalidating zoning ordinance that restricted
occupants of dwellings to one family, defined as persons related by blood or marriage); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (reversing district court ruling that a referendum on low-rent
housing was impermissibly discriminatory).
626. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1976). See generally Zoning Development, supra note 290, at
1679-94; Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARV.
C.R.--C.L. L. REV. 128 (1976).
627. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). But see The
Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 281 n.28 (1978). See generally Note, The Antitrust
Liability of Municipalities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U. L. REV. 368 (1977); Note, Antitrust Law
and Municipal Corporations: Are Municipalities Exempt From Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker
Doctrine?, 65 GEO. L. J. 1547 (1977).
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A. The Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 provides one vehicle by which victims of ex-
clusionary suburban land use practices may get relief without meeting the
stringent standing62 and proof 62 9 requirements under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's equal protection clause. Thus, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company, 630 the Supreme Court found "a congressional intention to de-
fine standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III."631 This expansive view
of standing is in contrast to the much narrower prudential limitations on
standing in Warth. The Court has interpreted the Fair Housing Act 632 as ex-
panding plaintiffs' standing to the maximum permissible under the Consti-
tution, thereby effectively eliminating a denial of standing on prudential
grounds in a Fair Housing Act case.
Substantively, the circuit courts of appeals have given greater scope to the
prohibition on race discrimination in Title VIII than the Supreme Court has
given to the nondiscrimination mandate of the equal protection clause. Under
Washington v. Davis6 33 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,634 a plaintiff must show an intent to discriminate in an
equal protection case. On remand in the Arlington Heights litigation, the sev-
enth circuit held that a prima facie case of race discrimination could be estab-
lished under the Fair Housing Act by a "showing of discriminatory effect
without a showing of discriminatory intent. '635
Reaffirming its earlier conclusion that a refusal to rezone had a discrimi-
natory effect, the seventh circuit held that the federal statute warranted appli-
cation of an effect test because of its broad goal "to provide, within constitu-
tional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." '636 The
circuit court drew an analogy to the Supreme Court's effect-based standard in
the Title VII employment discrimination area,6 37 an approach left unaffected
by the constitutional ruling in Washington and Arlington Heights.638
Section 3604(a) states in part that "it shall be unlawful to . . . make un-
available or deny . . . a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,
628. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Section V.C.2 supra.
629. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); text accompanying notes 341-373 supra.
630. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
631. Id. at 209 (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971)).
632. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1976) [hereinafter cited in text as Title VIII[.
633. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
634. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
635. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
636. 558 F.2d at 1289 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970)).
637. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
638. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976).
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sex, or national origin. '6 39 To give effect to the "because of race" language,
the court "decline[d] to take a narrow view"'6 0 of the concept by requiring a
showing of intent to discriminate. Noting that "attempts to discern the intent
of an entity such as a municipality are at best problematic ,' 641 the court
worried that "[a] strict focus on intent permits racial discrimination to go
unpunished in the absence of evidence of overt bigotry." '42 Yet, "evidence of
intent has become harder to find" because "overtly bigoted behavior has be-
come . . . unfashionable."' 6" 3 For these reasons of policy, stemming from the
court's perception of congressional design, the seventh circuit held that the
statutory language "because of race" included "[c]onduct that has the neces-
sary and foreseeable consequence of perpetuating segregation." '6 44 That view,
which had been taken by the eighth circuit in a case prior to Washington,6 45 has
been followed by the third circuit,6 46 which was "most reluctant ' 64 7 to require
a showing of intent because it would raise a Title VIII "plaintiff's burden in
proving a prima facie . . . case to a level almost commensurate with the bur-
den of proof required to demonstrate an equal protection violation. '648
While the circuits seem to be in agreement that a prima facie Fail Hous-
ing Act case can be established by evidence of segregative effect, they are not
so uniform in their analytical approach once a prima facie case has been made
out. 649 In United States v. City of Black Jack6 50 the eighth circuit held that
"[o]nce the plaintiff has established a prima facie case by demonstrating ra-
cially discriminatory effect, the burden shifts to the governmental defendant
639. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976).
640. 558 F.2d at 1289.
641. Id. at 1290.
642. Id.
643. Id.
644. Id. at 1289. Compare Arlington Heights with Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282,
2296 (1979) (" 'Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. . . . It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of' not merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group.") Feeny, however, answered the constitutional question whether a vet-
eran's preference statute which disproportionately benefited men was an invalid gender-based
classification; Arlington Heights was based on the federal statutory issue. For a bleaker prognosis
on the distinction between statutory and constitutional issues of discrimination, see General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which applied the constitutional standard of Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), in a statutory (gender-based discrimination) context.
645. United States v. Village of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975).
646. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977). cert. denied. 435 U.S. 908
(1978).
647. 564 F.2d at 147.
648. Id. at 146-47.
649. But see Zoning Development, supra note 290, at 1691 & n.3 13. That commentator con-
cludes that the compelling interest test developed by the eighth circuit predominates, despite the
dissimilarity of the standard applied by the seventh circuit and the lack of congruence between
the formula applied by the third circuit and that of the eighth circuit.
650. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
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to demonstrate that its conduct was necessary to promote a compelling gov-
ernmental interest."6 ' The third circuit, however, has declined to accept "this
heavy burden, ' 652 suggesting that "[flor the present, Title VIII criteria must
emerge . . .on a case by case basis. '653 While refusing to impose the full
compelling interest standard, however, the third circuit did require that a de-
fendant demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for its action
and "that no alternative course of action could be adopted that would enable
that interest to be served with less discriminatory impact. '6 5 4 Thus, the third
circuit standard requires judicial examination of alternatives but not neces-
sarily of the weightiness of the community interest being served, only its legit-
imacy.65
5
The seventh circuit's position in Arlington Heights was considerably more
complex. Judge Swygert, for the majority, identified four "critical factors" in
determining when discriminatory impact, without discriminatory intent, vio-
lates section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act.65 6 Essentially, he outlined a bal-
ancing approach, indicating what factors cut which way and how they were to
be weighed in assessing evidence.
The first factor is the strength of plaintiff's showing of discriminatory ef-
fect, "both in terms of disproportionate impact and in terms of racial segrega-
tion." '5 7 If the defendant's conduct perpetuates segregation and thereby pre-
vents interracial association, it will be considered invidious under the Fair
Housing Act, independent of the extent to which it produces a disparate ef-
fect on different racial groups.65 8
The second factor is whether there is evidence of some discriminatory in-
tent, though not enough to establish a constitutional violation. Equitably, the
case for relief is stronger where there is evidence that a defendant is a pur-
poseful "wrongdoer," '65 9 but the court concluded that "this criterion is the
least important of the four factors '660 because "bigoted comments of a few cit-
izens even those with power should not invalidate action which in fact has a
651. Id. at 1185. The court imposed "the compelling governmental interest requirement of
the equal protection cases," id. at 1185 n.4, even though the case was based on a statute and not
the fourteenth amendment. In the context of a private defendant Title VIII case, the eighth cir-
cuit has seemed to waver a bit on its standard, holding that a defendant can rebut a prima facie
case by "satisfactorily explain[ing it] away." Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th
Cir. 1976).
652. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977).
653. Id. at 149.
654. Id. If a defendant does offer evidence that no alternative course of action exists, "the
burden will once again shift to the plaintiff to demonstrate that other practices are available." Id.
at 149 n.37.
655. But see Zoning Development, supra note 290, at 1691 n.313.
656. 558 F.2d at 1290.
657. Zoning Development, supra note 290, at 1688.
658. 558 F.2d at 1290.
659. Id. at 1292.
660. Id.
[Vol. 43: No. 2
Page 5: Spring 1979]
legitimate basis." '6 61 Moreover, "[i]f the effect of a zoning scheme is to perpet-
uate segregated housing, . . . the preclusion of minorities in advance should
[not] be favored over the preclusion of minorities in reaction to a plan which
would create integration." '66 2
The third factor is the interest of the defendant in taking the action that
causes the discriminatory effect. If the defendant is a private individual seek-
ing to perpetuate segregated housing or a governmental body acting outside
the scope of its authority or abusing its power, the court will be more ready to
find a violation of the Fair Housing Act than if the defendant is a govern-
mental body acting within the scope of is authority. 663
The fourth factor is the nature of the relief sought. Courts "ought to be
more reluctant to grant relief when the plaintiff seeks to compel the defend-
ant to construct integrated housing or take affirmative steps to ensure that in-
tegrated housing is built than when the plaintiff is attempting to build inte-
grated housing on his own land and merely seeks to enjoin the defendant
from interfering with that construction. ' 664
Concluding that the case was extremely close, the seventh circuit re-
manded for further consideration of effect, holding that if there is no land
other than the plaintiff's property that is suitably zoned and otherwise quali-
fied for federal support of subsidized low cost housing, the village's refusal to
rezone would constitute a violation of § 3604(a). 665 The defendant village,
however, had the burden of identifying a suitable, alternative parcel. If it
failed to satisfy that burden, then the trial court should grant relief to the
plaintiffs since that would support a finding that "the [v]illage's refusal to
rezone effectively precluded plaintiffs from constructing low-cost housing
within Arlington Heights. ' 66 6
Whatever approach ultimately prevails-the compelling interest standard
of the eighth circuit, the alternatives formula of the third circuit, or the "four
critical factors" balancing approach of the seventh circuit-it is clear that the
lower federal courts are more receptive to structural challenges to suburban
zoning practices under the Fair Housing Act than the Supreme Court has
661. Id.
662. Id. at 1292-93.
663. Id. at 1293.
664. Id.
665. Id. at 1294.
666. Id. at 1295. Ultimately, the village and the plaintiffs reached a settlement in which the
village agreed to annex a parcel of land beyond its corporate limits and to zone that land to con-
form with the plaintiffs' planned uses. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Mount Prospect, a nearby community, sought to inter-
vene to contest the settlement agreement because of "its potential effect on the citizens of Mount
Prospect." Id. at 843. Other area landowners and civic associations also sought intervention. Id. at
844. The court held that the intervenors "have a legal interest in the annexation and rezoning of
the neighboring land." Id. at 860. The), did not, however, present any zoning-related objections
sufficient to block entry of the decree, and the consent decree was entered. Id. at 869.
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been in its interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protec-
tion.68 7 The adoption of the impact test for establishing a prima facie case of
race discrimination and the relaxation of prudential standing barriers66 make
plaintiffs' prospects under the Fair Housing Act reasonably promising.
B. Antitrust Liability and the Narrowing of the State Action Exemption
By imposing various restrictive land use practices, local governments typi-
cally constrain the availability of housing in that community by slowing the
rate of increase in supply.6 6 9 Unless the consumer demand for housing in a
given suburb is completely elastic, 670 the owners of existing housing "can em-
ploy growth controls to cartelize housing supply. '671 If suburls can success-
fully restrict new housing development, the value of suburban homeowners'
property will increase since the price of used housing in that jurisdiction will
rise, and "[t]he more unique a suburb ... , the more lucrative the monopoly
possibilities for its homeowners. 6 72 Thus, Professor Ellickson concludes that
"[a]ntigrowth measures have one premier class of beneficiaries: those who
own residential structures in the municipality doing the excluding. '673 Where
suburban homeowners, acting in their self-interest, dominate the suburban
political process,6 74 government officials may well be seen as acting "as perfect
agents for a homeowner cartel. '675
667. In the area of standing, the Supreme Court has been considerably more liberal in inter-
preting Title VIII than it has been in fourteenth amendment challenges. See Gladstone v. Village
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
668. Id. See also Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
669. See generally Ellickson, supra note 9, at 392-403; Note, supra note 193.
670. Demand for housing in a suburb that has perfect substitutes is perfectly elastic-in
other words, the demand curve is horizontal. When a fungible suburb imposes develop-
ment charges or wasteful development standards on its homebuilders, those home-
builders are unable to pass on any of those costs to housing consumers. Why should a
homebuyer pay more when he can purchase an equally good house at the old price
in another essentially identical suburb? When suburbs are perfectly competitive, the
burden of municipal antigrowth programs falls entirely on the producers' surplus-
the economic rents of owners of supply factors.
Ellickson, supra note 9, at 425 (footnote omitted). See generally id. at 425-30.
671. Id. at 400. See generally id. at 430-35.
672. Id. at 400.
673. Id.
674. See id. at 404-10.
675. Id. at 410. As Professor Ellickson further notes, suburbs may take advantage of a real
possibility to enhance monopoly profits by joining similar area suburbs to impose growth restric-
tions. Id. at 434. This form of "voluntary cartel" restricts the supply of housing and raises prices.
However, these voluntary arrangements easily fall apart, since the incentive for a cheating mem-
ber to collect "the lucrative development charges made possible by the monopoly prices" is tre-
mendous. Id. at 434. Professor Ellickson suggests that:
[w]hat the conspiring suburbs need is a cartel manager able to coerce all members to
comply with stipulated output restrictions. A higher government is obviously the best
candidate to perform this function. For example, a regional body with the authority to
enforce a sewer connection moratorium can effectively police the output of new housing
within many suburbs.
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Despite the patent antitrust implications of much antigrowth activity, anti-
trust lawsuits have not been brought because of a widespread belief that "local
governments would not be vulnerable to suits based on the federal antitrust
laws." '676 The basis for that belief was the doctrine of antitrust immunity es-
tablished in Parker v. Brown 677-that the Sherman Act was meant to apply to
"individual and not state action.16 78 By its recent decision in City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co.,679 however, the Supreme Court has held that
Parker immunity for "state action" will not be extended automatically to ac-
tions of local governments. 68 ° The remainder of this Subsection will discuss
the Parker doctrine, propose an analytical framework for resolving Parker is-
sues, and consider the implications of the City of Lafayette case for prospective
challenges of local land use restrictions.
The Parker case was a challenge to the California Raisin Proration Pro-
gram, which was designed to stabilize raisin prices within California by al-
lowing state officials to appropriate a certain amount of each producer's out-
put. The Court assumed that "the California prorate program would violate
the Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely by virtue of a
contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons, individual or corpo-
rate '  and noted that price competition among producers had been effec-
fively eliminated by the program. 68 2 Nevertheless, the Court declined to find
an antitrust violation because the state program "derived its authority and its
efficacy from the legislative command of the state"6 83 and because there was
no explicit congressional statement that the Sherman Act was intended "to re-
strain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legisla-
id. Ironically, the conventional solution to exclusionary land use practices is the development of a
regional governing body with broader jurisdiction than any single local unit of government. Pro-
fessor Ellickson's analysis suggests that these regional bodies may perform quite a different func-
tion than the one planners envision. Even though their political constituencies will be rather dif-
ferent from those of the suburban units they supervise, there is a clear risk of increased
anticompetitive activity, whether developers or homeowners ultimately control the activities of the
regional agency.
676. Id. at 470 n.249.
677. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See generally I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 207-218
(1978); Donnem, Federal Antitrust Laws Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 ANTITRUST L.J.
950 (1970); Handler, Anti-trust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1374-88 (1978); Handler, The
Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. I (1976); Posner,
The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693
(1974); Slater. Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw.
U.L. REV. 71 (1974); Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Anti-trust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 328 (1975); Comment, The State Action Exemption in Antitrust: From Parker v.
Brown to Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 1977 DUKE L.J. 871.
678. 317 U.S. at 352.
679. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
680. See generally The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 627, at 277-88 (1978).
681. 317 U.S. at350.
682. Id. at 359.
683. Id. at 350.
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ture."6 4 Chief Justice Stone made the Court's rationale clear: "In a dual sys-
tem of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign,
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an
unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is
not lightly to be attributed to Congress."6 5 Thus, out of deference to our
constitutional system of federalism,"'6 in which "the states are sovereign, ' 6 7
the Court in Parker refused to infer a congressional "purpose that the anti-
trust laws be used to strike down the State's regulatory program imposed as
an act of government" absent a clear statement of congressional intent."8 8
The Court's unwillingness in Parker to read the Sherman Act's coverage
expansively has clear constitutional overtones. Over time the Court has broad-
ened the Act's scope as contemporary concepts of federal power under the
commerce clause have expanded. 6 9 The continued vitality of the Parker ex-
emption must mean that the Court's restrictive interpretation of the Sherman
Act's application to "state action" is influenced by constitutional considerations
of federalism. 690 These principles are derived from the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments to the Constitution and a full understanding of the scope of the
Parker exemption must take into account the federalism values of both the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.
The Parker doctrine is best understood as incorporating a "double exemp-
tion, ' ' 91 each stemming from a distinct constitutional source of federalism:
"one reflecting the states' eleventh amendment sovereign immunity and the
other reflecting a recognition of the states' tenth amendment reserved pow-
ers."'6 92 Much confusion has arisen in Parker cases because various coalitions of
justices have failed to communicate the dual nature of the Parker exemption,
not recognizing the different constitutional sources for the twin strands of the
Parker rule.69 3
684. Id. at 350-51.
685. Id. at 351.
686. See generally City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 418
(1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring); I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 677, at 212.
687. 317 U.S. at 351.
688. 435 U.S. at 407 n.33.
689. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 421 (1978) (Burger,
C.J., concurring); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 605 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); id. at 614 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738,
743 n.2 (1976). See generally Blumstein & Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical
Services Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in Constitutional Perspective, 1978 DUKE L. J. 389, 419-21.
690. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 677, at 212. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 421 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
691. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 394-95.
692. Id. at 394.
693. For instance, although Justices Stevens, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun and Chief
Justice Burger agreed that no exemption should be applied in Cantor, only Justices Brennan,
White and Marshall joined in all of justice Stevens' opinion. Chief Justice Burger concurred in
the judgment and in Parts I and III of the Stevens opinion, making them a majority holding of
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The division among the justices is manifest in the case of Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., n94 a challenge to Detroit Edison's light bulb exchange program.
Under the program, which was included in the tariff the utility filed with the
state regulatory commission, the company furnished its residential customers
with "free" replacement light bulbs, incorporating the cost of the bulbs in the
overall price of electricity. A druggist who sold electric light bulbs claimed
that the utility was using its monopoly power in the distribution of electricity
to restrain competition in the light bulb market.
A majority of the Court agreed that private parties could not rest their
claim of exemption solely on the ground that their activity was compelled by
the state regulatory commission. 9 5 Even on the assumption that there was a
defense based on state compulsion,6 9 6 the Court held that such a defense was
unavailable unless "the State's participation in the decision is so dominant that
it would be unfair to hold a private party responsible for his conduct imple-
menting it .... -697 The light bulb program did not qualify for exemption be-
cause the decision whether to have such a program was initiated by the utility,
not the state agency. 698 Therefore, "notwithstanding the state participation in
the decision, the private party exercised sufficient freedom of choice" to jus-
tify a conclusion that it "should be held responsible for the consequences of
[its] decision."6 99
A majority of the Court agreed on another conclusion, rejecting the utili-
ty's contention that "the federal antitrust laws should not be applied in areas
of the economy pervasively regulated by state agencies. ' 70 0 The Court found
no "logical inconsistency" 70 1 in requiring a private firm to meet regulatory cri-
teria when "exercising its natural monopoly powers" and also "to comply with
the Court. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment but used a different analytical approach.
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented.
In City of Lafayette Justices Blackmun and White joined Justices Stewart and Rehnquist in dis-
sent. In Cantor Justice White had joined all of the Stevens opinion while Justice Blackmun had
concurred in the judgment. Justice Powell joined the plurality in City of Lafayette even though he
dissented in Cantor. The Chief Justice concurred in both Cantor and City of Lafayette, but, while
portions of Cantor are legitimate Court holdings, it is doubtful that any analytical compcwent of
City of Lafayette's Parker discussion commanded the allegiance of a majority of the justices.
For an attempt at reconciling at least some of these votes, see Blumstein & Calvani, supra note
689, at 411 n.133.
694. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
695. "It is not enough that ... anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather,
anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign."
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975). See generally 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 677, at 215.
696. The Court assumed this arguendo. 428 U.S. at 592. See I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 677, at 215b; Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 406.
697. 428 U.S. at 594-95.
698. Id. at 594 & n.31.
699. Id. at 593.
700. Id. at 595.
701. Id. at 596.
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antitrust standards" when competing with unregulated business activity.7 °2 To
determine whether an antitrust exemption applies the Court suggested a two-
step test. First, is the antitrust exemption "necessary in order to make the
regulatory act work? ' 7 3 Second, does the regulation in question go beyond
the "minimum extent necessary"74 to accomplish its goal? Since the light bulb
program competed with the "essentially unregulated" market for electric light
bulbs,70 5 the Court concluded that the program was scarcely necessary to fur-
ther the state's "interest in regulating its utilities' distribution of electricity.
70
While a majority in Cantor agreed on the foregoing substantive approach
to Parker immunity,7 0 7 a four-member plurality argued that Parker did not ap-
ply at all to private defendants. 70 Justice Stevens noted that "[t]he federal
statute proscribes the conduct of persons, not programs, and the narrow
holding in Parker concerned only the legality of the conduct of state officials
charged by law with the responsibility for administering California's pro-
gram.170 9 Justice Stevens further observed that the Supreme Court "has never
sustained a claim that otherwise unlawful private conduct is exempt from the
antitrust laws because it was permitted or required by state law,"7 ' 0 and he ar-
gued that Parker applied only when state officials were sued in their official
capacities. 7 11 Since the complaint in Cantor did not challenge "the legality of
any act of the state of Michigan or any of its officials or agents," the plurality
concluded that it was "not controlled by the Parker decision. 71 12
The plurality's approach in Cantor-what might be construed as a proce-
dural approach to Parker since it focuses on the identity of the parties - 713
702. Id.
703. Id. at 597.
704. Id. (quoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 391 (1973)).
705. 428 U.S. at 595.
706. Id. at 598.
707. The Cantor majority consisted of Justices Stevens, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Chief
Justice Burger. See note 693 supra.
708. Chief Justice Burger did not join in Sections 11 and IV of the majority opinion written
by Justice Stevens. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, but he reached his conclusion by
means of a different analytical mode. See note 693 supra.
709. The opinion continues: "What sort of charge might have been made against the various
private persons who engaged in a variety of different activities implementing that program is un-
known and unknowable because no such charges were made." 428 U.S. at 601.
710. Id. at 600.
711. Id. at 591.
712. Id. at 591-92. See note 722 infra and accompanying text. Justice Stevens took a narrow
view of the term "state action." Although he acknowledged that the term "may be used broadly to
encompass individual action supported to some extent by state law or custom," id. at 590, he ar-
gued that such a broad definition was not applicable in Parker situations. Justice Stevens believed
that the references in Parker to state action were "carefully drafted" and "unequivocably differen-
tiate[d] between official action, on the one hand, and individual action (even when commanded
by the State), on the other hand." Id. at 591 n.24.
713. That is, "a plaintiff might be able to circumvent Parker simply by suing an appropriate
defendant." Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 407. This possibility was actually suggested
by the plurality in Cantor. 428 U.S. at 601. See note 709 supra.
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"would suggest that the state action exemption is available only to a state and
its officials (and perhaps certain of its subdivisions) although immunity would
not automatically be conferred on all governmental agencies or units." 71 4 Al-
though the diverseness of opinions in Cantor confuses more than it enlightens,
at least one important conclusion can be drawn: Parker issues should be ana-
lyzed differently when private parties are sued than when governmental pro-
grams or official conduct are challenged.
The best way to reconcile the differing approaches 71 5 is to recognize the
dual sources of Parker doctrine. The procedural concern of the Cantor plural-
ity can be understood as a manifestation of a sensitivity toward the proper
"relationship between the sovereign states and the antitrust laws.1 716 The
holding in Georgia v. Evans,717 that a state could maintain an action for treble
damages as a "person" under the Sherman Act, "generated the logical next
question-whether a state could in turn be sued and held liable for dam-
ages. '718 Analyzed in that manner, it is clear that Parker raised considerations
of Eleventh Amendment federalism, concerning the "susceptibility of states to
suits in federal courts; subjecting a state or its officials acting in their official
capacities-the situation in Parker v. Brown-to antitrust liability would seem
to conflict with the policy embodied in the Eleventh Amendment." 71 9
The Eleventh Amendment source for Parker suggests 20 a limitation of the
Parker exemption to actions of certain state agencies and officials, not to pri-
714. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 408.
715. The five justices who did not join the plurality all advocated a more substantive ap-
proach. The dissenters (Justices Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist) "would have exempted all state-
compelled activity, even when the impetus for governmental compulsion was essentially
self-initiated." Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 408. Chief Justice Burger, however, while
objecting to an exclusive focus on the identity of the defendant and arguing for a more substan-
tive effect for Parker, failed to indicate which activities should be protected. Id. Justice Blackmun,
on the other hand, suggested a formula to use in separating exempt and non-exempt activities.
He proposed "a rule of reason approach," id., for "state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity must
fall like any other if its potential harms outweigh its benefits." 428 U.S. at 610. Justice Blackmun
advocated balancing the "implicated federal and state interests with a view to assuring that when
these are truly in conflict, the former prevail." Id. at 611.
716. 428 U.S. at 587.
717. 316 U.S. 159 (1942). This case was decided contemporaneously with Parker.
718. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 414.
719. Id. at 414-15. Cf. I P. ARE.EDA & D. TURNER, supra note 677, at 217al ("[T]he Eleventh
Amendment . . .does raise a substantial bar to damage actions in many suits against state offi-
cials").
720. This analysis is not meant to suggest that the Parker doctrine is coextensive with the
eleventh amendment. It is clear, for example, after Edelman v. Jordan that suits for
injunctive relief are not barred by the eleventh amendment. If the Parker doctrine had
no independent force beyond the narrow limits of the eleventh amendment then the de-
cisions in Bates and Parker themselves would have been incorrect because in neither case
was the plaintiff seeking damages from the state. Therefore, while the Parker doctrine is
built in part on the same concerns of federalism that underlie the eleventh amendment,
that doctrine certainly goes further than the requirements of the Constitution.
Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 417 (footnotes omitted).
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vate parties. In light of Cantor, however, only a plurality of the Court would
accept the procedural approach as the exclusive form of state action exemp-
tion,7"' even though all Supreme Court cases in which the Parker exemption
has actually been applied have involved actions by state governmental defend-
ants.7
22
The four Cantor dissenters and Chief Justice Burger articulated a view of
the Parker exemption that closely paralleled the Tenth Amendment's concept of
reserved powers as that notion was developed in National League of Cities v.
Usery.71 3 In urging that Parker not be read narrowly, the Cantor dissenters ar-
gued that erosion of Parker would allow intrusion of federal policies on the
traditional authority of states to perform social and economic regulatory func-
tions.7 2 4 The dissenters were also apprehensive of an expansion of federal
judicial interventionism in state regulatory matters under a vaguely worded
federal statute that furnishes courts little guidance and therefore affords
them considerable discretion to make and federalize state social and economic
policy.725
Many of the concerns of the Cantor dissenters reflect those of the majority
in Usery, in which the Court held invalid federal minimum wage and maxi-
mum hour standards as they applied to state and local government employees
performing essential governmental functions. 726 While recognizing the broad
scope of federal power under the commerce clause, the Court in Usery noted
that "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government
which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an
affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the
Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner. "727
Thus, Congress cannot "impair[] the State's integrity" 728 nor "abrogate" 72 9
721. See id. at 419. Accord, I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 677, at 212b.
722. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109-10 (1978); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See also Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
723. 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976).
724. 428 U.S. at 631, 637. See generally Handler. Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrine: An Un-
precedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 1009-13; Handler. The Current At-
tack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, supra note 677, at 17-20; Verkuil, supra note 677,
at 334. See also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
725. 428 U.S. at 640. See Verkuil, supra note 677, at 332-35. But see City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 416 n.46 (1978) ("Restating a theme made and re-
jected before, . . . our Brother Stewart's dissent . .. likens judicial enforcement of the antitrust
laws to a regime of substantive due process used by federal judges to strike down state and mu-
nicipal economic regulation thought by them unfair. That analogy .. . ignores the congressional
judgment mandating broad scope in enforcement of the antitrust laws and simply reflects the dis-
sent's view that such enforcement with respect to cities is unwise."); Blumstein & Calvani, supra
note 689, at 428-31.
726. 426 U.S. at 845.
727. Id.
728. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
729. 426 U.S. at 846.
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state authority with respect to "functions essential to [a state's] separate and
independent existence. '"730
The concerns and analytical approach in Usery are closely related to the ra-
tionale of the Parker exemption.13 1 As in Usery, the scope of federal power is
broad since the federal antitrust law has been interpreted broadly under the
commerce power. 732 The antitrust exemption formulated in Parker reflects a
sensitivity on the part of the Court to extending federal antitrust coverage to
include state action. Parker thus serves to limit the breadth of application of
the Sherman Act because of the Tenth Amendment's principles of reserved
powers, which command respect for activities of state government. Conse-
quently, in interpreting the scope of the state action antitrust exemption, it is
appropriate to incorporate Usery's principles of federalism as a second strand
of the Parker analysis. Importantly, Usery, applying Tenth Amendment princi-
ples, did not distinguish between state and local governments 733 whereas tra-
ditional Eleventh Amendment immunity extends only to the state itself and to
political subdivisions that can properly be viewed as agents of the state and
therefore entitled to the state's immunity.
7 3 4
Application of Usery principles in a Parker context provides the second
facet of the dual exemption analysis. For these purposes three components
derived from Usery form the analytical framework:
first, there must be an attribute of sovereignty involved; second, the state activ-
ity must be an essential governmental function; and third, there must be an
impairment of that state function. 731
The City of Lafayette decision provided an opportunity to clarify Parker
analysis, but instead it contributed to the perpetuation of analytical disarray,
since no majority opinion was handed down.7 36 In City of Lafayette the city,
which owned and operated an electric utility, sued an investor-owned electric
service utility alleging a variety of antitrust violations. 737 The private utility
counter-claimed, charging the city with committing sundry violations of fed-
730. Id. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
731. See generally Davidson & Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional Limits on Fed-
eral Interdiction of Anticompetitive State Action, 31 VAND. L. REV. 575, 597-604 (1978).
732. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 605 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976).
733. 426 U.S. at 855-56 n.20. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 430 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
734. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). See generally L.
TRIBE, supra note 347, at §§ 3-35 to -36, 3-38.
735. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 424.
736. Justice Brennan wrote the prevailing opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Marshall, Powell and Stevens joined in Part I and Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens joined in
Parts II and III. In addition, Justice Marshall filed a concurring opinion, while the Chief Justice
wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices White and Rehnquist concurred in Justice
Stewart's dissent, and Justice Blackmun concurred in all but one portion of that dissent.
737. 435 U.S. at 391-92 & n.5.
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eral antitrust law. 3 ' The city moved to dismiss on the ground that, as a city
and political subdivision of the State of Louisiana, it was not subject to the
federal antitrust laws under Parker v. Brown.
A four-justice plurality rejected the city's argument that "all governmental
entities, whether state agencies or subdivisions of a State, are, simply by rea-
son of their status as such, exempt from the antitrust laws. '739 Writing for the
plurality, Justice Brennan noted that "[c]ities are not themselves sovereign;
they do not receive all the federal deference of the States that create
them. '74 0 Parker exemption should not automatically be extended to local gov-
ernments because of the "serious economic dislocation"7 4 ' that could come
from "anticompetitive municipal action" that placed cities' "parochial interests
above the Nation's economic goals reflected in the antitrust laws .... -742 How-
ever, while cities will not be accorded automatic Parker exemption, the "actions
of municipalities [that] reflect state policy"743 are exempt. In sum, "the Parker
doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of gov-
ernment by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service. 744
The plurality's approach in City of Lafayette largely reflects a reliance on
the "official action" reading of Parker suggested by the plurality in Cantor.
Justice Brennan noted that policies adopted by cities may reflect their own
preferences rather than those of the state.7 45 Because of the difference in re-
spect accorded states and their political subdivisions, a characteristic of Elev-
enth Amendment case law,7 46 the plurality was unwilling to find a Parker ex-
emption "in the absence of evidence that the State authorized or directed a
given municipality to act as it did. '74 7 Although a political subdivision need
not point to "a specific, detailed legislative authorization" to qualify for Parker
immunity,74s it must show "that the legislature contemplated the kind of ac-
tion complained of. '7 49 In essence, for the plurality the crucial question was
whether a municipality acted as the agent of the state, effectuating state-
initiated policies, in performing the challenged activities. 5 0 The Eleventh
738. Id. at 392 & n.6.
739. Id. at 408. A majority, which included Chief Justice Burger, agreed that, apart from the
exemption outlined in Parker, there was no blanket exemption from federal antitrust laws for cit-
ies as such. Id. at 394-408.
740. Id. at 412. Justice Brennan found support for his statement in Edelman v. Jordan. 415
U.S. 651, 677 n.12 (1974) and Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
741. 435 U.S. at 412.
742. Id. at 413.
743. Id.
744. Id.
745. Id. at 414.
746. See note 734 supra, and accompanying text.
747. 435 U.S. at 414.
748. Id. at 415.
749. Id. (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th
Cir. 1976)).
750. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 411 n.133.
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Amendment strand of analysis was apparent, and Justice Brennan in fact cited
Eleventh Amendment cases to bolster his argument.7 5 ' At the same time, he
emphatically rejected the dissent's suggestion that National League of Cities v.
Usery752 was "even tangentially implicated,"' 75 3 thereby declining to adopt a
Tenth Amendment analysis.
In his concurrence, the Chief Justice did not focus on the difference be-
tween a state and its political subdivisions for Parker analysis. Rather, he em-
phasized the nature of the "challenged activity, not ... the identity of the par-
ties to the suit. ' 75 4 For the Chief Justice, the general question of the Sherman
Act's coverage of "the monopoly powers of state and local governments 755
was "not presented by ... the facts" in City of Lafayette.756 The Parker issue
was "whether the Sherman Act reaches the proprietary enterprises of munici-
palities, ' 757 and Chief Justice Burger carefully noted that at the time Parker
was decided "the Court had already recognized, for purposes of federalism,
the difference between a state's entrepreneurial personality and a sovereign's
decision . ..to replace competition with regulation.7 15 8 Only where the state
as sovereign compelled the anticompetitive activity in question pursuant to
"an articulated policy to displace competition with regulation ' 7 9 would Park-
er's exemption apply.
Chief Justice Burger explicitly recognized that "[t]he Parker decision was
... firmly grounded on principles of federalism, 7 60 but concluded that Usery,
"which rekindled a commitment to tempering the Commerce Clause power
with the limits imposed by our structure of government, 7 6 1 was the appropri-
ate source of federalism principles to govern City of Lafayette. Relying on
standards articulated in Usery, the Chief Justice argued that only "functions
essential to [a state's] separate and independent existence '7 62 were incorpora-
751. 435 U.S. at 412 & n.42, 414 n.43. Compare id. with id. at 430 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
752. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
753. 435 U.S. at 412-13 n.42.
754. Id. at 420 (quoting Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 604 (1976)) (emphasis in
original).




759. Id. at 425 n.6. See id. at 418; Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975). Cf.
I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 677, at 214e ("[T]he meaning of state approval and the extent
of state authorization must be subject to a clear statement requirement"); The Supreme Court, 1977
Term, supra note 627, at 282 (concluding that a clear statement requirement is reasonable). See
generally Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689. at 427-28 (suggesting a "double clear statement
rule"); Posner, supra note 677, at 7 15 (advocating a clear statement rule because "[ilf the legisla-
tors have to go on record as favoring the suppression of competition, they may hesitate to do
so.").
760. 435 U.S. at 421.
761. Id. at 423.
762. Id. (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976), which in turn
quoted Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
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ted within the Parker exemption, and "the running of a business enterprise is
not an integral operation in the area of traditional government functions. '763
Thus, the allegedly anticompetitive activities of the city in the operation of its
electric power business were subject to the antitrust laws, under the Burger
rationale, if they were not in furtherance of an essential governmental func-
tion. One way of determining whether a function is "sovereign" apparently
turned on whether the activity was "compel[led]" by the state as "part of a
regulatory scheme to supersede competition. '764 Furthermore, relying on the
majority component of Cantor, Chief Justice Burger would require a showing
that the anticompetitive scheme "was essential to the State's plan ' '7 65 i.e., a de-
termination "whether the implied exemption from federal law 'was necessary
in order to make the regulatory Act work, and even then only to the mini-
mum extent necessary.' "766
The Burger concurrence focuses exclusively on Tenth Amendment princi-
ples of federalism in considering the Parker doctrine, relying on the essential
function language of Usery and eschewing consideration of the relationship
between states and their political subdivisions. Presumably, the Burger analy-
sis, which goes to the substantive scope of the Parker exemption and relies in
part on the majority component of Cantor,767 would apply even if the defend-
ant utility were run by a state agency rather than by the City of Lafayette. As
the dissent pointed out, the failure to distinguish between states and cities is
proper in a Tenth Amendment context.7 6
The disagreements that surfaced in Cantor and City of Lafayette suggest a
doctrinal accommodation that encompasses both Tenth and Eleventh Amend-
ment sources of federalism-Parker as a dual exemption. 769 This may well be
the implicit position of Justice Powell, who dissented in Cantor but who joined
the plurality in City of Lafayette.770 A footnote to the plurality's opinion is in-
structive in this regard:
Cantor's analysis is not, however, necessarily applicable here. Cantor was
concerned with whether anticompetitive activity in which purely private par-
ties engaged could, under the circumstances of that case, be insulated from
antitrust enforcement. The situation involved here, on the other hand, pres-
ents the issue of under what circumstances a State's subdivisions engaging in
anticompetitive activities should be deemed to be acting as agents of the
State.7 7
1
763. 435 U.S. at 424.
764. Id. at 425 n.6. Accord, New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 99 S. Ct. 403, 412
(1978). See Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 425 n.212.
765. 435 U.S. at 425 n.6.
766. Id. at 426 (quoting Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 597 (1976), which in turn
quoted Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
767. 428 U.S. at 592-98.
768. 435 U.S. at 430. Justice Stewart cited National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
855-56 n.20 (1976) as support for his statements.
769. See text accompanying notes 691-92, 715-17, supra.
770. See Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 411 n.133.
771. 435 U.S. at411 n.40.
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Arguably, Justice Powell views Parker as stemming from both Tenth and Elev-
enth Amendment sources:
In the context of conferring Parker immunity on private parties [Cantor], he
would apply a tenth amendment approach, limited by Goldfarb's requirement
that immunity arise only where government compels private anticompetitive
conduct. [citation omitted] In the context of determining which governmental
units receive Parker immunity, however, perhaps he sees the issue as parallel
to the eleventh amendment analysis. In that way, he is able to join the plurali-
ty's essentially eleventh amendment, sovereign immunity approach in City of
Lafayette.772
Adoption of the dual exemption approach would necessitate two inquiries
in a case like City of Lafayette, in which a governmental entity or governmental
officials were sued. First, the issue addressed by the plurality must be
considered-whether the act of the political subdivision (or state agency) "is
that of the State as sovereign.1 773 This is analogous to the type of inquiry the
Court uses to determine the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity.7 7 ' As
articulated by the City of Lafayette plurality, this facet of the analysis would de-
termine whether the "anticompetitive activity engaged in" was "an act of gov-
ernment by the State as sovereign or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service. '77 5
The second inquiry in the proposed analysis in a City of Lafayette-type of
case would focus on the more substantive concerns of Chief Justice Burger's
concurrence and the majority component of Cantor. It would examine
whether the exercise of governmental authority constituted an attribute of
sovereignty and promoted an essential governmental function. Also, there
must be a finding of an impairment of traditional governmental sovereign
functions. 77 8 Presumably, no such impairment exists unless the state can show
that no reasonable, less anticompetitive alternative exists by Which it can fur-
ther its goals. 777 Clearly, the second facet of the dual exemption analysis
tracks closely the approach of Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in City of
Lafayette778 and the majority component of Cantor.779
In cases where private parties are defendants, the Eleventh Amendment
772. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 411-12 n.133 (citation omitted).
773. 435 U.S. at 410.
774. E.g., Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Lincoln County
v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 347, at § 3-38.
775. 435 U.S. at 413. According to the plurality, a political subdivision need not point to a
"detailed legislative authorization" in order to assert a Parker defense. Id. at 415. Although the
subordinate political unit may not "as readily" establish a Parker claim as a state government itself
may, an "adequate state mandate" will be found " 'from the authority given a governmental entity
to operate in a particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained
of.' " Id. (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir.
1976)).
776. See Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 419-28.
777. Id. at 426-27.
778. See id. at 431 n.242.
779. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-98 (1976).
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component of the dual exemption would be invoked to determine whether
the state agency or political subdivision was acting pursuant to expressly artic-
ulated state policy to substitute regulation for competition. Only when that
threshold is passed is an agency or political subdivision capable of conferring
an antitrust exemption. Despite the urging of the Cantor plurality, a majority
of the justices is apparently unwilling to restrict Parker's exemption to
specified governmental defendants, however.18 0 The substantive facet of the
proposed dual exemption would also govern in such private defendant situa-
tions. The Court's inquiry would be whether private party exemption was nec-
essary to make the regulatory program work, i.e., essential to avoid an impair-
ment of a traditional sovereign function.
What City of Lafayette and the proposed dual exemption analysis of the
state action antitrust exemption will mean can only be determined as more
cases are brought. Already, some commentators have suggested that cases
involving a zoning ordinance presented opportunities "for the Court to ap-
prove an antitrust exemption,' '17 l since, under the Chief Justice's pivotal con-
currence, zoning would be "recognized as a proper local function, and land
use regulation is clearly a 'governmental' activity. ' 782 Nevertheless, the Court
has declined the invitation to review a fifth circuit decision that held that an
antitrust suit could be brought against a city and private parties.7,83
In Whitworth v. Perkins7s4 the fifth circuit concluded that "[t]he mere pres-
ence of [a] zoning ordinance does not necessarily insulate the defendants
from antitrust liability where . . . the enactment of the ordinance was itself a
part of the alleged conspiracy to restrain trade.178 1 Clearly, where the city
participates with a private party in restraining trade, Parker itself 78 6 suggests
the lack of an antitrust exemption. That point was expressly asserted by Jus-
tice Blackmun who, though he dissented in City of Lafayette, nevertheless distin-
guished the situation where a city was "acting in concert with private par-
ties. '787 In Whitworth the allegation was that the city, through its zoning
ordinance, was protecting a liquor dealer by foreclosing opportunities for
competitors to enter the community and sell liquor. There was also an implicit
regional dimension in Whitworth because the City of Impact was the only "wet"
area-a virtual oasis of over two hundred inhabitants but only thirty-one qual-
ified voters-in an otherwise "dry" county. That fact made the exclusion
more decisive from a regional perspective.
780. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 419.
781. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 627, at 281 n.28. See also id. at 285.
782. Id. at 281 n.28.
783. Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of
Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), opinion reinstated and case remanded per curiam sub nom.
Whitworth v. Perkins, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978).
784. Id.
785. 559 F.2d at 379.
786. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943).
787. 435 U.S. at 441.
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Another example of alleged anticompetitive collusion between a city and
private economic interests was Mason City Center Associates v. City of Mason
City.788 Plaintiffs sought to develop a regional shopping center on the west
side of town. Another group of developers sought to build a regional shop-
ping center in downtown but only "upon the express condition that the City
prevent any person or firm from planning or constructing a regional shop-
ping center that would compete with the Downtown Center."7 9 The plaintiffs
needed a rezoning to enable them to proceed with their planned develop-
ment, but requests for rezoning were denied by the Planning and Zoning
Commission and by the City Council. Plaintiffs alleged the rezoning denials
were carried out "pursuant to and in furtherance of" the anticompetitive
agreement. 790 The district judge, in denying a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, emphasized that it was the anticompetitive agreement that was
the subject of the antitrust claim, "not the City's decision to deny [plaintiffs']
zoning request, as such and without more.1791
The decisions in Whitworth and City of Mason City clearly read a lot like
state court decisions on public purpose. 792 There is a strong undercurrent
that suggests the cities are acting in furtherance of private rather than public
purposes. That form of analysis falls comfortably within the proposed analyt-
ical framework; decisions furthering private interests cannot be necessary for
promoting essential governmental functions in the Usery sense, and failure to
confer an antitrust exemption on private parties in such situations can hardly
impair the integrity of government in performing sovereign functions. Conse-
quently, the threshold Eleventh Amendment type issue-whether the city's ac-
tion qualifies as action of the state-is not even reached because, even assum-
ing that the city stands in the shoes of the state procedurally, its action does
not warrant Parker protection.
The difficult questions lie ahead in the exclusionary zoning and growth
management contexts. Clearly, under the proposed dual exemption analysis
there is room for a court to conclude that parochial land use restrictions are
no more than governmentally legitimized products of the homeowner cartels
Professor Ellickson decries.7 93 In such situations, a court could easily conclude
that such exclusionary purposes or effects were not "contemplated" 794 by the
state when it delegated land use control to local governments.79 5 Similarly, a
court could conclude that a parochial local decision-especially if imple-
788. 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
789. Id. at 740.
790. Id.
791. Id. at 741 n.4.
792. E.g., Price v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 422 Pa. 317, 221 A.2d 138 (1966). See 6 E.
MCQUILLIN, supra note 2, at § 24.09.
793. See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 392-402, 404-10, 425-35.
794. 435 U.S. at 415.
795. For an example see id. at 414 n.44.
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mented by a referendum-that was at odds with regional welfare was not suf-
ficiently reflective of broad state policy to qualify for Parker immunity under
City of Lafayette. The clear statement rule of City of Lafayette could easily be
held to require a more direct statement of state policy than a generalized de-
cision to delegate authority to local units of government to make land use de-
cisions.796
From the perspective of the substantive component of the proposed dual
exemption analysis, restrictive suburban land use legislation could be viewed
as either not promoting an essential governmental function or, at least, as not
a necessary part of a rational planning program. Especially where the
homeowners implement a restrictive development plan through direct democ-
racy, the element of state-imposed compulsion vanishes, suggesting that the
policy is more discretionary and less basic to government's ability to function
effectively in a federal system.
While the Court can allow for greater effect of the antitrust laws in cur-
tailing some suburban anticompetitive activity, the question of judicial role re-
mains. 797 An active court threatens a "return to the regime of substantive due
process and [a] repudiat[ion of] the values of federalism protected by Parker
.... ,,798 A restrained court allows anticompetitive abuses to benefit suburban
homeowners at the expense of others. The lack of a federal constitutional
remedy suggests a statutory alternative, especially since such decisions do not
have the permanency of constitutional adjudications. 799 At a minimum, a
community should not be permitted to justify a policy on the ground that it
promotes the local welfare at the expense of unrepresented nonresidents.8 "'
The City of Lafayette decision, when read in conjunction with Cantor, allows the
Court to go further; whether it will allow the statutory law to evolve in an an-
titrust context as it has in the fair housing area80 remains to be seen, but it is
perhaps noteworthy that the Court did not jump at the opportunity pres-
ented, in the aftermath of City of Lafayette, to limit its application.8 0 2
796. See I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 677, at 214e; The Supreme Court, 1977 Term,
supra note 627, at 282-83. This could also be a means for giving effect to the regional dictum in
Euclid in a non-constitutional setting. See text accompanying note 11, supra. See also Section V.B.,
supra.
797. See 435 U.S. at 416 n.46; id. at 434-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 428 U.S. at 629-640
(Stewart, J., dissenting). But see Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 428-31; Posner, supra note
677; Slater, supra note 677.
798. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 627, at 286.
799. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 689, at 428-31. See 435 U.S. at 416 n.46.
800. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 627, at 286. See also Ellickson, supra note 9, at
469-75; Note, supra note 400; supra note 796.
801. See Section VI.A., supra.
802. See Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom.
City of Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), opinion reinstated and case remanded per curiam
sub nom. Whitworth v. Perkins, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra
note 627. at 281 n.28.
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